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Abstract
Cloud computing offers computational resources such as processing,
networking, and storage to customers. Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS) consists of a cloud-based infrastructure to offer consumers raw
computation resources such as storage and networking. These re-
sources are billed using a pay-per-use cost model. However, IaaS is
far from being a secure cloud infrastructure as the seven main security
threats defined by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) indicate. Use
of logging systems can provide evidence to support accountability for
an IaaS cloud.
An accountability helps when mitigating known threats. However,
previous accountability with logging systems solutions are provided
without systematic approaches. These solutions are usually either for
the cloud customer side or for the cloud provider side, not for both
of them. Moreover, the solutions also lack descriptions of logging
systems in the context of a design pattern of the systems' components.
This design pattern facilitates analysis of logging systems in terms of
their quality.
Additionally, there is a number of benefits of this pattern. They could
be: to promote the reusability of design and development of logging
systems; that designers can access this pattern more easily; to assist
a designer adopts design approaches which make a logging system
reusable and not to choose approaches which do not concern reusabil-
ity concepts; and to enhance the documentation and maintenance of
existing logging systems.
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to provide support for accountability in
the cloud with systematic approaches to assist in mitigating the risks
associated with real world CSA threats, to benefit both customers and
providers. We research the extent to which such logging systems help
us to mitigate risks associated with the threats identified by the CSA.
The thesis also presents a way of identifying the reference components
of logging systems and how they may be arranged to satisfy logging
requirements. `Generic logging components' for logging systems are
proposed.
These components encompass all possible instantiations of logging so-
lutions for IaaS cloud. The generic logging components can be used to
map existing logging systems for the purposes of analysis of the sys-
tems' security. Based on the generic components, the thesis identifies
design patterns in the context of logging in IaaS cloud. We believe
that these identified patterns facilitate analysis of logging systems in
terms of their quality.
We also argue that: these identified patterns could increase reusability
of the design and development of logging systems; designers should
access these patterns more easily; the patterns could assist a designer
adopts design approaches which make a logging system reusable and
not to choose approaches which do not concern reusability concepts;
and they can enhance the documentation and maintenance of existing
logging systems.
We identify a logging solution which is based on the generic logging
components to mitigate the risks associated with CSA threat number
one. An example of the threat is malicious activities, for example
spamming, which are performed in consumers' virtual machines or
VMs. We argue that the generic logging components we suggest could
be used to perform a systematic analysis of logging systems in terms
of security before deploying them in production systems.
To assist in mitigating the risks associated with this threat to benefit
both customers and providers, we investigate how CSA threat number
one can affect the security of both consumers and providers. Then we
propose logging solutions based on the generic logging components
and the identified patterns. We systematically design and implement
a prototype system of the proposed logging solutions in an IaaS to
record history of customer's files.
This prototype system can be also modified in order to record VMs'
process behaviour log files. This system can record the log files while
having a smaller trusted computing base, compared to previous work.
Additionally, the system can be seen as possible solutions that could
tackle the difficult problem of logging file and process activities in the
IaaS. Thus, the proposed logging solutions can assist in mitigating the
risks associated with the CSA threats to benefit both consumers and
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The National Institute for Standards and Technology or NIST [4] defines cloud
computing as:
"a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with min-
imal management effort or service provider interaction".
Many people argue that the cloud is the future of computing, and has the
potential to transform the IT industry in a wide variety of application areas [5].
This thesis focuses on public cloud computing, where the cloud infrastructure is
provided for open use by the general public, and owned, managed, and operated
by business organisations which are called cloud providers [4].
Figure 1.1 illustrates a public cloud computing environment. In the figure,
there are two main sides or parties involved in the environment: the customers
and the providers. The provider owns its cloud infrastructure which includes a
virtual machine manager and cloud offering services or products such as servers
and networking.
Some of the services may require the provider to store and operate a customer's
1
Figure 1.1: A public cloud computing environment
files, for example executable programs and/or database files, in a virtual machine
or VM1. A virtual machine is managed by a virtual machine management system
which is controlled by a provider. Full details of the management system are in
Section 2.2. The cloud infrastructure is maintained by the provider's employees
such as system administrators. Customers can purchase or rent these services,
and use or interact with their services via the Internet. This thesis uses the term
'cloud' to refer to 'public cloud computing'.
The benefits that the cloud can bring to the business, education, government,
and science industries are example [6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14]. For example,
to be convenient and to minimise the budget for highly data-intensive comput-
ing (such as in the fields of physics, climate science, or astronomy), scientists
can use cloud to share their data [15]. In education, for example, the european
project Cloud Services for E-learning in Mechatronics technology or CLEM [16]
is researching how advanced mechatronics facilities (such as highly sophisticated
robotic laboratories which are not available to all colleges and schools) can be
delivered through the cloud.
The cloud can provide for the needs of the IT department with low investment
and unlimited resources [5]. In addition, it can provide the ability of easily adding
or removing resources on demand, scalability, availability and/or reliability for
1It is a software that can replicate a physical computer system which includes an operating
system or OS, a main memory, disks, networking, etc.
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the IT environment with cheap cost. These attributes make the cloud attractive
to IT departments.
IaaS cloud. Note that, the terms consumer and customer are used interchange-
ably throughout this thesis. There are many types of public cloud. We focus on
infrastructure as a service or IaaS public cloud such as Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud or Amazon EC2 [17]. IaaS consists of a cloud-based infrastructure to offer
consumers raw computation resources, such as storage and networking, with a
pay-per-use billing model. This type of cloud is used by enterprise, government,
and academia, such as in medical experimentation [18; 19; 20; 21]. Figure 1.1 can
also represent an IaaS cloud environment. From the figure, customers can rent
VMs, and then they can virtually own and control these VMs. Following this,
they may also upload and store their files in these VMs.
The problems of the cloud. Trust of consumers in a cloud/IaaS is extremely
important for its continued proliferation. Customers want to know how and where
their data and related logs are stored and who has access to them. There are
many causes of security concerns. For example, [9] argues that cloud security
concerns (e.g., virtual machine/VM-level attacks) involve computer and network
intrusions or attacks that will be made possible or at least easier by moving to
the cloud.
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has extensively published on security con-
cerns, see for instance the Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud
Computing report [22] and the Top Threats to Cloud Computing report [23]. The
latter document is used in this study, providing the basic threats for which we aim
to provide systematic support for accountability to mitigate the risks associated
with these threats.
Cloud security concerns have to be solved before effective realisation of the
benefits [24]. Thus, we use the CSA top threats report as real world concrete
cloud problems that we intend to deal with. CSA continues working to focus on
security concerns for the cloud after this report by publishing other reports such
as Top Threats to Cloud Computing Survey Results Update 2012 [25], or The
Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013 [26].
3
Accountability with logging systems as the solution to mitigate risks
associated with CSA threats. Although by itself it is not considered suffi-
cient to avoid or remove the risks associated with threats, a logging system is an
important aspect of any accountability solution in the cloud, as argued by many
researchers [5; 8; 9; 10; 27; 28; 29]
Accountability in the cloud. To mitigate the risks associated with CSA
threats, accountability is needed in the cloud. This means that the cloud be-
haviours can be inspected by any party or that the cloud is accountable, as ar-
gued by many researchers [5; 8; 10; 28]. To enable accountability in the cloud, [8]
proposes concepts called an accountable cloud, outlines the technical require-
ments for an accountability, and states that the accountable cloud needs to have
accountability. [9] gives almost the same idea as the accountable cloud.
Then [8] describes that an accountable cloud is the cloud in which (i) the
consumers can investigate whether the provider is processing their data according
to the agreement, (ii) if errors are reported, the provider can provide the evidence
to verify who is responsible for the problem, and (iii) if there is an argument, the
provider can present proof to the third party. Therefore, an accountable cloud
could be a very good concept to deal with the CSA threats in IaaS.
Logging systems in IaaS. In this thesis, a logging system in IaaS is a system
that resides in the provider's cloud infrastructure, and can collect and store log
information of the infrastructure's components. One example of these compo-
nents can be a virtual machine. Thus, a logging system is composed of logging
processes and log files. A logging process performs logging tasks, whereas log files
are used for storing contents produced by the logging processes.
Each logging process has its own task(s). For example, a main task of a
logging process called Flogger [30] is intercepting the file operations of a virtual
machine or VM for the purposes of accountability in the cloud. It manages to
store such intercepted data as log files. We argue that logging systems are a core
component for cloud monitoring/accountability, which can assist in mitigating
the risks associated with CSA threats, as also argued by [23], [27].
Moreover, cloud-related research or projects consider logging systems as one
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of the main elements in their projects. For example, [31] argues that to enable
true traceability of data in the cloud, it needs to have a logging mechanism which
tracks and records data life-cycles and movements in the cloud. [32] (Distributed
Management Task Force, Inc.) considers logging as one of the high-level require-
ments that a cloud service provider should make available as a part of their cloud
service offering.
The Technology Strategy Board trust domains project [33] is working on pro-
viding a framework for modelling and designing e-service infrastructures for the
controlled sharing of information. These infrastructures also include the cloud.
This project provides five trust building primitives for the trust domains. Two
of them are: accountability which is whether a person is accountable for actions
at an organisational or individual level; and auditing which is the requirement to
provide evidence of processing to third parties. Both primitives require logging
to collect evidence or log files.
Thus, logging systems can be key elements of accountability in the cloud. To
achieve trust and security in the cloud, accountability in the cloud requires a holis-
tic approach [29], encompassing legal mechanisms, regulatory mechanisms, and
technical mechanisms. One of the classes of technical mechanisms for account-
ability is detective controls. These controls can be used to analyse the incident
of a privacy or security risk that goes against the privacy or security policies and
procedures [27]. Transaction logs is one of the aspects of detective control [29].
Thus, the logging systems, ability to produce the transaction logs can be seen as
an important aspect to be considered to enable accountability.
Systematic support for accountability in the cloud. The meaning of sys-
tematic from a dictionary is: using a fixed and organised plan [34]; done or acting
according to a fixed plan or system [35]; and done according to a careful plan and
in a thorough way [36]. The common key word from the dictionaries is a (fixed
or careful) plan.
We argue that systematic support for accountability in IaaS includes three
aspects. The first is simultaneous consideration of both the customer side and
the provider side, which can have effects caused by CSA threats; thus, the logging
solutions should be able to deal with the threats in order to benefit both sides
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simultaneously. The second is reducing the trusted computing base or TCB size
of a logging system when building and deploying it in IaaS. TCB is a term in
computer security to refer to the set of all hardware, software, and procedural
components, which enforce the security policy [37], more details can be found in
Section 2.13. To break security, an attacker has to subvert one or more of those
components [37].
[38] argues that the TCB size of a software system (a logging system is also a
software system) can be used to evaluate the trustworthiness of that system. [39]
state that for any software system, the size of the system's TCB should be as
small as possible. Thus, the TCB size of a logging system can be used to evaluate
the trustworthiness of this system as well, more details are given in Section 2.13.
The third is that the security of the logging systems themselves needs to be
analysed before the deployment. All the systematic aspects will be summarised
in the research gaps section below (Section 1.2).
We use the word systematic to refer to the planned introducing of logging.
For example, in order to build logging systems in IaaS, the first systematic aspect
is that the security of the logging systems themselves needs to be analysed before
deploying the systems in the IaaS real world productions. The security concern
can be the integrity of the log files that is produced by these logging systems,
more details are given in Section 2.11. This is because the log files may be used
in law courts; thus, the integrity of these files needs to be ensured before using
them.
1.2 Research Gaps
This section summarises the research gaps of previous work or approaches.
• Gap 1: Lack of systematic approaches to build logging systems in
IaaS.
 Gap 1 (a): Lack of simultaneous consideration of both cus-
tomer and provider side
Research that proposes logging solutions for accountability such as
[5; 8; 9; 27] usually discusses security in the cloud from a customer
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perspectives, which involves for example integrity and safety of cus-
tomers' data. They do not explicitly discuss how the logging solutions
can assist in security concerns from a provider's perspective such as
from Figure 1.1 when criminals use a virtual machine to attack a vir-
tual machine management system.
CSA continues to provide a new survey report (CSA Top Threats
Cloud Computing Survey 2012 [25]) to investigate if the seven top
threats [23] are still relevant. In addition, the report also provides an
update on newly emerged threats. This survey report includes both
cloud consumers and providers as the respondents: 53% of the cloud
consumers; and 30% of the cloud providers. Although the report does
not discuss solutions to deal with the threats, it is a good example that
the research should consider the threats to cloud from both customer
and provider perspectives. Accordingly, research should also provide
the solutions for both sides.
Thus, it will be beneficial to discuss the effects to both sides, and to
provide solutions to mitigate the risks associated with the CSA threats
concerned to both sides.
 Gap 1 (b): Lack of concerns of reducing the trusted comput-
ing base or TCB size of a logging system
A logging system is a software system which will not be run in an
individual private organisation's perimeter, but in the provider's vir-
tualised infrastructure or the IaaS cloud. This makes evaluation of
the trustworthiness of this system more difficult than a software sys-
tem under a private organisation. The logging systems need to be
trustworthy.
Thus, the size of the TCB can be a very important aspect, in order to
propose logging systems in IaaS. For example, the proposed systems in
[38; 39; 40; 41] are concerned with reducing the TCB sizes along with
their proposed systems. Moreover, recent work that extensively relates
to a secure cloud computing environment, such as that of [42] has also
focused on reducing TCB size in their proposed architecture. Thus, we
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argue that consideration of TCB is important, when proposing logging
solutions to deal with the IaaS issues.
 Gap 1 (c): Lack of security analysis of the logging systems
themselves before the deployment of the systems in to the
IaaS real world productions
We believe it is important to perform a security analysis of the log-
ging systems themselves before the systems' deployment in to the
IaaS real world production. Present works [8; 9] give an outline of
accountability/monitoring-related solutions for the cloud. These works
involve the logging process and the log file components, which will be
deployed in the cloud provider's infrastructure. However, they do not
discuss the exact locations in the infrastructure that these components
will be deployed such as: whether these are in a virtual machine man-
agement system which is controlled by a provider or a virtual machine
which is controlled by a customer; and who will manage these compo-
nents in these particular deployment locations and why.
Thus, the deployment locations of these components directly and sig-
nificantly affect the components' security concerns, for example how
to ensure the integrity of the log file components when they are de-
ployed in a virtual machine management system which is controlled
by providers who may alter the log files to benefit themselves. This
issue is fully discussed in Chapter 3.
Other works that involve design and implementation of the logging
solutions which could be applied in the cloud include [27; 39; 43; 44].
These works focus on monitoring and logging tasks. Ideally, a logging
system can be analysed with respect to its features and achievable goals
before deployment. However, the authors do not give concerns about
the security analysis of the logging systems themselves, which include
the logging processes and the log files before deploying the systems
to the real world IaaS. Thus, it is important to perform a security
analysis of the logging systems themselves, as will be fully discussed
in sections 3.4.2.4, and 5.10.
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• Gap 2: Research that relates to logging in IaaS only focuses on
system-centric logs
To build logging systems in IaaS, it is also important to consider log file
types which can be produced by logging systems. There are two main types
of log files as discussed in [30; 45]: file-centric logs and system-centric logs.
The first traces files from the time they are created to the time they are
deleted as discussed in [27; 45]. The latter focuses on the hardware layer
log such as memory use, disk storage, temperature, voltage, etc, as argued
by [46]. This also can concern event logs, user account activity logs, pro-
cessor usage, etc, as argued by [30].
[27] argues that research focuses instead on system-centric logs (e.g., mem-
ory use or disk storage) rather than file-centric logs (tracing customers'
files in VMs from the time they are created to the time they are deleted).
For example, [46; 47] provide a good set of recommended monitoring prin-
ciples that should be performed by a provider to collect mainly system-
centric logs. However, will the provider really implement these recommen-
dations and share the monitoring reports with the customers? [48] argues
that system-centric logs are usually disclosed to consumers.
• Gap 3: Lack of analysis of what the contents of the log file should
actually be, and of how the contents can be used to deal with the
real world CSA threats to benefit both sides in detail
For example, previous logging works such as [5; 8; 9; 27] do not clearly
discuss in detail what the log files' contents should be, and how contents
can mitigate the risks associated with threats to benefit both customers and
providers. What the content should be is dependent on what the problems
(e.g., the CSA threats) are. The right log file content can solve the right
problems.
• Gap 4: Lack of descriptions of logging systems in the context of
design patterns of the systems' components
A design pattern is a documented best practice or core of a solution that has
been applied successfully in multiple environments to solve a problem that
9
recurs in a specific set of situations [49]. Based on designing object-oriented
software as design patterns, Gamma et al [50] discuss a number of benefits
of the design patterns. For example, they state that: design patterns make
it easier to reuse successful designs and architectures, expressing proven
techniques as design patterns makes them more accessible to developers
of new systems, and design patterns assist a designer gains a design right
faster.
The design patterns in logging context could bring the same benefits as
above. This could lead us to a spectrum of patterns for describing how
to construct logging systems with varying characteristics. Previous work
neglects to describe the logging component (e.g., logging processes and log
files) configurations available as patterns and focus only on the implemen-
tation and evaluation of a single logging system. As a result, proposing,
implementing, and evaluating logging patterns systematically have not yet
been described in the literature.
This thesis concerns the broader contribution expanding from the compo-
nents of logging to the subsequent patterns these components may create
(each pattern with its own advantages and disadvantages).
1.3 Aims and Objectives
To address the research gaps in Section 1.2, this thesis aims to provide support
for accountability in the cloud with systematic approaches to mitigate
risks associated with real world CSA threats, to benefit both customers
and providers. To achieve this goal, the project aims to satisfy the following
objectives.
Objective 1: Understand the real world cloud problems (the CSA threats),
and accountability with logging approaches in the IaaS
Objective 2: Design a generic framework of logging solutions to mitigate
risks associated with the CSA threats
Objective 3: Define, identify, and draw conclusions on the advantages and
disadvantages of logging system patterns, then analyse existing works in relation
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to the patterns
Objective 4: Design and implement logging systems based on the generic
framework from Objective 2 and the identified patterns from Objective 3 to miti-
gate risks associated with a specific threat (threat 1 which is abuse and nefarious
use of cloud computing, for example when cloud customers rent VMs then use
these VMs to conduct criminal activities), and to the benefit of both cloud cus-
tomers and providers
Objective 5: Evaluate the proposed generic framework from Objective 2,
and the proposed logging systems from Objective 4
We evaluate the framework by demonstrating instantiations of logging solu-
tions to deal with CSA threat 1 in Chapter 3 (the spamming case study) and in
Chapter 6 (a proposed logging system to benefit both customers and providers).
We then evaluated the performance of the proposed logging system in terms of
the accuracy of the system in Chapter 6.
1.4 Methodologies
To satisfy Objective 1 and 2:
1. We use CSA threats as concrete cloud problems, and use Xen's [51] structure
to replicate IaaS infrastructure. Then we investigate the components of IaaS
structure and of existing logging systems in IaaS from previous work.
2. We investigate the importance of security of the logging systems which we
consider as one aspect of systematic approaches in order to develop the
systems in real world IaaS.
3. We investigate the logging process and log file components of each work.
We locate these components into the replicated IaaS architecture. Then,
generic logging components are proposed.
4. In order to demonstrate how the proposed generic logging components can
facilitate analysis of logging systems in terms of security before deploying
them in production systems, we map existing logging systems and our own
logging system to the proposed generic logging components.
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To satisfy Objective 3:
1. Based on the designed generic framework from Objective 2, we investigate
all possible architectures of a logging system in an IaaS.
2. Associated with these possible architectures, we then define, identify, and
give conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of logging system
patterns. To do so, first of all, this thesis discusses a definition of a pattern
in general and in object-oriented software design and defines a pattern in
logging system design and development. It then identifies and discusses
our own three identified patterns for logging systems. After that, it gives
conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of the patterns.
3. This thesis analyses existing logging systems in relation to the identified
patterns based on the given conclusions on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the patterns above.
To satisfy Objective 4 and 5:
1. To analyse how threat 1 (criminal activities in customer VMs) affects both
sides, we investigate how customer VMs can attack other customer VMs,
and also attack the provider's virtual machine management system (called
dom0) in detail. We also carefully analyse vulnerabilities of the provider's
dom0, which may lead to compromising the dom0 itself, and subsequently,
all the customer VMs hosted by this dom0.
2. We discuss what contents of the log files can deal with the effects above. To
demonstrate logging solutions regarding the file-centric logs, and to benefit
both sides, we indicate the importance of customers' critical files in VMs.
Then, we discuss the concepts of the history of critical files, the process
behaviour log files, and the content of both types of log files. We then
discuss how these log files can assist in mitigating risks associated with
threat 1 stated above to benefit both sides.
3. This thesis then describes the proposed logging system architecture to ob-
tain these log files based on: the generic logging components, its systematic
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design and implementation, and the identified patterns. Based on the re-
lated components of logging systems from the generic logging components,
we discuss how the proposed system can obtain the log files we need, while
yielding smaller TCB compared to previous work.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
This thesis provides a number of key contributions to address the research gaps,
and to satisfy the aims and the objectives stated above:
1. An in-depth background and literature review of CSA threats and
systematic support for accountability
This contribution addresses research Gap 1. The background and litera-
ture review summarises the key concepts: IaaS, CSA threats to IaaS, ac-
countability/logging approaches to mitigate risks and the problems of the
approaches, and systematic support for accountability in the cloud.
This summary differs from previous work which focus on dealing with cloud
problems without full consideration of the main involved/systematic aspects
to provide logging systems. For example, previous work does not fully
discuss the security analysis of logging systems themselves before deploying
them into the real world IaaS productions. Without the consideration of the
systematic aspects, it is difficult to efficiently and effectively enable logging
systems.
The value of the systematic approach is to provide clear visions of logging
systems, development in the cloud, such as the security analysis of the sys-
tems. Then, the systematic approach can efficiently and effectively enable
accountability in the cloud. This is because accountability in the cloud is
the most important concept to assist in mitigating the risks associated with
CSA threats.
2. Generic logging components for IaaS cloud
This contribution addresses research Gap 1 (c). To facilitate systematic
support for accountability in the cloud, generic logging components provide
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ways to build logging systems. The value of theses components is to en-
compass all possible instantiations of logging solutions for IaaS cloud, and
to provide a clear view of all components that relate to logging systems in
IaaS. This view provides a basis for the analysis of logging systems, security
before deployment.
Thus, the generic logging components enable logging systems to be appro-
priately designed or manipulated by participating cloud parties such as a
provider, customer, or auditor. As result, this enhances systematic support
for accountability in the could.
3. Analysis of how CSA threat 1 affects both the customer and
provider side simultaneously; and the proposed logging solutions
to assist in mitigating risks associated with the threat for both
sides
This contribution addresses research Gap 1 (a). The analysis illustrates
how CSA threat 1 (mis-usage of customer VMs) can affect both sides. This
analysis differs from previous work which usually focuses on the effects of
the threats to only either the customer side or provider side, providing
solutions for either side, but not for both.
The value of the combined analysis is to provide a basis to understand what
the contents are that logging solutions need to collect to be used as evidence
to deal with threat 1 for both customers and providers.
4. The design of our proposed logging system yields a smaller trusted
computing base or TCB size compared to previous work
This contribution is that the size of the TCB for the design of our proposed
logging system is smaller than TCB sizes of the proposed logging systems
of previous works. This contribution addresses research Gap 1 (b).
All logging related components, for example an introspection tool and logger
application, deployed in building the proposed logging system are inside
dom0. Thus, the proposed system in our prototype implementation yields
a smaller TCB while obtaining the history of critical files. This is because
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the TCB of our architecture includes only a hypervisor1 and dom0, not a
customer VM. In contrast, previous work have placed some of their logging
related components in customer VMs. Other previous works that deploy the
same introspection tool as we used yield the same TCB as ours. However,
they are not designed to obtain the history of critical files.
5. Collecting file-centric logs rather than system-centric logs
This contribution is that our proposed logging solutions focus on collecting
file-centric logs rather than system-centric logs. This is because research
Gap 2 states that current logging research in the cloud focuses on system-
centric logs, while neglecting file-centric logs.
There are some logging solutions that emphasise file-centric logs with an
interception approach. However, the prototype implementation of the pro-
posed logging system can be an alternative approach to collecting file-centric
logs to enhance accountability in IaaS. This approach facilitates introspec-
tion of customer VM's memory from dom0. The introspection traverses the
kernel data structures in the memory.
The prototype implementation of the proposed logging solutions can collect
a file-centric log history of customers' critical files. The history information
is of file-centric logs rather than system-centric logs. The file-centric logs
can present the associations between a process and files in a customer's VM,
for example, a record of a process P reads file F. The proposed log files differ
from previous works which focus only on system-centric logs including the
connection topology, bus speeds, and processor loads.
6. Presentation of how the results from the proposed logging system
assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1
This contribution is that we provide many scenarios to present how the
results from the prototype implementation can be used to form log files to
assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 for the benefit of both
customers and providers. This contribution addresses research Gap 3.
1software running on a physical machine and allows the machine to run multiple OSs at the
same time [52]
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To assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 to benefit cus-
tomers, we discuss formation of a history of critical files from the results
of the prototype implementation. This includes analysing nine scenarios of
malicious incidents in a customer VM when, for example, a customer shares
her VM with other users.
To assist in mitigating risks associated with threat 1 (e.g., when criminals
use VMs to conduct spamming activities) to benefit providers, we discuss
the formation of process behaviour log files. This shows that our proposed
solutions can assist in mitigating the risks associated with real world IaaS
issues and many scenarios, and can benefit both customers and providers.
7. Three proposed design patterns in the context of logging in IaaS
cloud
This contribution addresses research Gap 4. The proposed patterns facil-
itate analysis of logging systems in terms of their quality. These patterns
could increase reusability of the design and development of logging sys-
tems. Designers should access these patterns more easily. The patterns
could assist a designer adopts design approaches which make a logging sys-
tem reusable and not to choose approaches which do not concern reusability
concepts. The patterns can also enhance the documentation and mainte-
nance of existing logging systems.
We provide a spectrum of patterns for describing how to construct log-
ging systems with varying characteristics. For developers, when building
a logging system, the knowledge of characteristics of this system could as-
sist them to get the right design of the system with minimal effort and
time commitments. We also clarify why a number of patterns and logging
system architectures based on these patterns are missing. To the best of
our knowledge, these three logging patterns are not yet described in the
literature.
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• W. Wongthai, F. L. Rocha, and A. van Moorsel. A generic logging ar-
chitecture template to mitigate the risks associated with spam activities
in infrastructure as a service cloud. In a Poster Session at The Newcastle
Connection 2012, August, Newcastle, UK. [53]
This work is mainly from Chapter 2 and 3. It is the initial work which
shows that, in an IaaS environment and based on logging components, it
is possible to obtain log files that can be used as evidence to assist in
mitigating the risks associated with spamming activities performed by a
malicious customer using his VM.
• W. Wongthai, F. Rocha, and A. van Moorsel, "A generic logging template
for infrastructure as a service cloud". In 2013 27th International Con-
ference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops,
2013. [54]
This work is mainly taken from Chapter 2 and 3. It extends the logging
components above to be a more generic version as generic logging com-
ponents. It discusses how the generic logging components facilitate the
analysis of logging system security in IaaS cloud.
• W.Wongthai, F. Rocha, and A. van Moorsel, "Logging solutions to mitigate
risks associated with threats in infrastructure as a service cloud". In tracks
of service and application in 2013 International Conference on Cloud Com-
puting and Big Data (CloudCom-Asia), Fuzhou China, December 16-19,
2013. [55]
This paper presents concepts of logging solutions (Chapter 5 and 6), such
as the history of a customer's critical files and how these can assist in




The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the
background and literature review to provide the context for this thesis. Chapter
3 presents the generic logging components for IaaS, and case studies of how these
components work. Chapter 4 then describes the related work in the form of
logging patterns. Chapter 5 presents how threat 1 harms both customers and
providers, and proposes systematic support for accountability as a solution to
mitigate risks associated with the threat. Chapter 6 is the implementation of
the proposed solutions, and the discussion of how we obtain the results, and how
the results can assist in mitigating the risks associated with CSA threats, and
additionally a comparison of our proposed system with previous work. Finally,
the conclusions and future work are presented in Chapter 7.
18
Chapter 2
Background And Literature Review
The main contribution of this chapter is to present a background and literature
review for the thesis. This chapter discusses the definitions of cloud computing
and IaaS, the problems of IaaS, the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) threats, how
the accountability and monitoring with logging systems assist in mitigating the
risks associated with CSA threats, and an overview of the concepts of systematic
provision of logging systems to support accountability in IaaS.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 provides the
definition of cloud, and discusses its types. Section 2.2 provides an understanding
of IaaS Cloud. It then describes both IaaS infrastructure and the components in
the infrastructure, which will be referred to throughout this thesis. Then section
2.3 provides brief details of all CSA top threats to cloud computing.
This thesis mainly uses threat 1 as an example of how CSA threats effects both
customers' and providers' security concerns. Thus, Section 2.4 gives more details
of threat 1. Then, Section 2.5 discusses how threat 1 can have an impact on both
customers and providers. Section 2.6 discusses accountability in the cloud to deal
with CSA threats. This includes discussion of accountability and its properties,
and of the association between the accountability and logging systems.
Section 2.7 discusses logging systems in IaaS in detail. Section 2.8 discusses
related research concerning logging systems in IaaS. These works are referred
to throughout this study. Section 2.9 discusses accountability, monitoring, and
logging in IaaS. This includes a discussion of monitoring as a solution to the CSA
threats, a logging system and its components in IaaS, and the differences between
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monitoring and logging systems.
After that, Section 2.10 discusses privacy and confidentiality concerns of cus-
tomers and providers due to the log files, and how to deal with these concerns.
Section 2.11 discusses how to systematically provide logging systems to support
accountability in IaaS. Section 2.12 clarifies the meaning of an operating system,
kernel, and file, which will be referred to throughout this thesis. Section 2.13
discusses TCB and logging systems. Finally, the chapter is briefly summarised
and concluded in Section 2.14.
2.1 Definition of cloud
This section provides the definition of cloud, and discusses its various.
Cloud or Cloud computing is computing (e.g., executable program and data)
at servers to other servers which are located elsewhere on the Internet [6]. [7]
states that the cloud is a place where when we need technology, we can simply go
to use it without any software installation, and we never pay for this technology
if we do not use it. The cloud can be considered as a huge distributed system
[5], which can provide services over the Internet. These services are applications
hosted by data centres consisting of appropriate hardware and system software
[5].
A cloud provides IT services to anyone who needs it in a pay-per-usage man-
ner, like purchasing gas or electricity. These services provide for examples: com-
puting or CPU power such as Amazon Web Services Elastic Cloud Computing
or Amazon EC2 [17]; or web application development and hosting infrastructure
such as Google AppEngine [56].
The CSA catalogues three types of cloud, in the Security Guidance Report [22]
as follows: Infrastructure as a Service or IaaS, Platform as a Service or PaaS, and
Software as a Service or SaaS. Note that this is a common subdivision. IaaS
provides computer infrastructure with raw storage and networking to customers
such as Amazon EC2 [17]. PaaS, for example Google App Engine [56], provides
solution stack and computing platforms to assist in preparation of applications
with the low cost and simplicity of purchasing and managing the fundamental
hardware and software and providing hosting capabilities [22]. This includes
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supporting all processes of development and deployment of web applications and
services fully available from the Internet. SaaS, for example Google Apps [57], is
a software delivery model where the software and its associated data are hosted
in the Internet and are accessed by users via, typically, browsers [22].
2.2 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Cloud
This section provides further understanding of IaaS Cloud. It also describes both
IaaS infrastructure and the components in the infrastructure. The infrastructure
and the components will be referred to throughout this thesis.
IaaS consists of a cloud-based infrastructure to offer consumers raw compu-
tation resources such as storage and networking. These resources are billed using
a pay-per-use cost model. IaaS provides a base on which to build PaaS or SaaS
offerings, as pointed out in [22], [58]. Thus, comprehension of mitigating the risks
associated with threats to IaaS may serve as guidelines to mitigate the risks to
PaaS and SaaS. Section 2.2.1 discusses our version of IaaS architecture which is
based on the Xen architecture. We represents IaaS architecture using Xen's base
layers because Xen has been widely adopted in cloud computing platforms as
argued by [59],[43].
2.2.1 IaaS Infrastructure
Each enterprise has its own cloud computing architecture, thus there is no stan-
dard architecture of the cloud [60]. This thesis focuses on IaaS cloud. An IaaS
architecture (Figure 2.1) in this thesis is adapted mainly from papers [22; 39;
43; 46; 58; 61; 62] that discuss this phenomenon. Our version of an IaaS archi-
tecture will be referenced throughout this thesis for simplicity in explaining and
discussing logging systems in IaaS cloud.
Figure 1.1 illustrates a public cloud computing environment in general. Al-
ternatively, Figure 2.1 mainly presents the components inside the cloud infras-
tructure (Figure 1.1) as layers. These layers facilitate the investigation, under-
standing, and description of the locations where logging processes and log file
components can be deployed in an IaaS infrastructure.
21
Our version of an IaaS architecture (Figure 2.1) is composed of a provider
and a customer side. The provider side can be an organisation that offers services
as rent-able virtual machines or VMs such as Amazon EC. A virtual machine
is a software that can replicates a physical computer system which includes an
operating system or OS, a main memory, disks, networking, etc. The customer
side can be a person or an organisation that can remotely access these VMs via
the Internet. Our version of IaaS architecture is based on the Xen architecture.
Figure 2.1: The IaaS architecture.
The main components of an IaaS architecture (Figure 2.1) are hw, hypervisor,
dom0, and a number of domUs including domU1 to domUn. This architecture is
a representation of one IaaS cloud physical machine. Real world IaaS cloud has
a number of physical machines which are connected by the provider's network
infrastructure. The components' in the architecture are described and listed
below.
• hw
We use 'hw ' as an abbreviation for hardware which works as a physical ma-
chine that hosts a hypervisor, and all guest OSs. It is managed, maintained
and owned by the provider who uses it to store and process customers' data.
• A hypervisor
It is a layer of software running directly on hw and allows the hw to run
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multiple guest OSs at the same time [52]. It is an interface for all hardware
requests from the guest OSs.
• Dom0
It is a privileged domain guest OS that is launched by the hypervisor dur-
ing system boot. Dom0 can be considered as a virtual machine management
system and owned by a provider. Each physical machine has a dom0 that
is responsible for the administration of all domUs in that particular ma-
chine. Thus, the dom0 directly accesses the hw and manages domUs. Note
that, the term dom0 is from the term 'domain-0' which is from Xen's ter-
minology
• DomU
It is an unprivileged domain guest OS that runs on top of the hypervisor,
but has no direct access to the hw. DomU is a VM which customers can rent
it from a provider. Thus, it is virtually owned by a customer, and operates
independently in the system. However, a domU can also be managed (e.g.,
launched, paused, or terminated) by a dom0. The term domU is from the
term 'unprivileged domain' in Xen's terminology.
2.3 The Seven CSA Top Threats to IaaS Cloud
Computing
This section provides brief details of all the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) top
threats to cloud computing.
One of CSA's well known reports in the cloud security area is Top Threats to
Cloud Computing, version 1.0 [23] which provides guidelines of the IaaS problems.
This thesis intends to mitigate the risks associated with these threats. CSA [63] is
a non-profit organisation with a mission to promote the use of best practice for
providing security assurance within Cloud Computing, and to provide education
on the uses of Cloud Computing to help secure all other forms of computing. CSA
is led by a broad coalition of industry practitioners, corporations, associations and
other key stakeholders.
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All the threats can damage the trust of consumers in a cloud or IaaS envi-
ronment, which is extremely important for its continued proliferation. Lack of
trust in cloud slows wider deployment of cloud services [64]. For example, [23]
argues that threat number five which is data loss or leakage and will be fully dis-
cussed below can have impact on customer morale and trust. Additionally, [65]
also states that threat number three which is malicious insiders and will be fully
discussed below also causes lack of trust of customers.
In the CSA report [23], these threats are for the security of IaaS, PaaS and
SaaS. However, the threats discussed in the lists below are from the perspective
of IaaS security.
• The first is abuse and nefarious use of cloud computing.
For example, people with bad intentions can register legitimately to rent
domUs, and later engage in malicious activities such as spamming.
• The second is insecure application programming interfaces (APIs) that are
offered by providers.
Customers have to use the APIs to interact with their rented domUs. If the
APIs are insecure by design, they can be the cause of security issues such
as confidentiality regarding customers' data in such domUs.
• The third threat is malicious insiders who usually have full privilege over
dom0 in the IaaS environment.
Thus, they may exploit customers' confidential data in domUs.
• The forth is shared technology vulnerabilities.
For example, an owner of a domU may gain unauthorised access to the data
of other domUs.
• The fifth threat is data loss or leakage.
Customers' data loss may occur due to deletion of records without a backup
of the original data in domUs.
• The sixth one is account, service and traffic hijacking.
24
Attackers re-use customers' credentials and passwords, which can be stolen
through phishing and fraud. Thus, they can spy on customers' activities in
domUs.
• The last threat is unknown risk profile.
It is a fact that a customer does not know important information (such
as who is sharing her infrastructure) that can be used to predict possible
security risks of her domU.
As a result, these threats can be the cause of a lack of trust from the cus-
tomers' points of view. Hence, we intend to study how accountability, monitoring,
and logging approaches could assist in mitigating the risks associated with these
threats as discussed in Section 2.6.
2.4 Threat 1 in detail
This thesis mainly uses threat 1 as an example of how CSA threats affect both
customers' and providers' security concerns. Thus, this section gives more details
of threat 1. Again, threat 1 is the abuse and nefarious use of cloud computing,
which can occur when people misuse domUs such as spamming activities. 84% of
respondents from two CSA survey reports of top threats to cloud computing [25;
26] are concerned that threat 1 is still relevant. There are many forms of threat
1. For example, the malware domain list website [66] provides a malware domain
list. One can type in an EC2 keyword in the search tool of this site. It can
be seen that there has recently been (2012/September/17) mis-usage of Amazon
EC2 such as hosting Fake Flash page.
[67] states that the Zeus bot is a new type of cyber crime that uses EC2
as a command and control server. He also arguers that ScanSafe [68] found 80
unique malware incidents involving EC2. [69] argues that spammers and malware
authors will continue to make a home in Amazon's EC2 service. [70] argues
that there are malicious customers in the cloud provider's infrastructure. New
forms of threat 1 have emerged, such as Pirate Bay which uses cloud severs to
store their contents [71]. Thus, this thesis aims to provide systematic support for
accountability in the cloud to mitigate the risks associated with this threat.
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2.5 The effects of Threat 1 on Cloud Customers
and Providers
This section discusses how threat 1 can have an impact on both customers and
providers.
Section 5.2 will fully discuss the importance of critical files in domUs. These
files can be any file type, such as text, executable, or database files. They are the
customers' asset and valuable for their businesses. This thesis makes the case that
threat 1 can cause the compromising of domUs and also of dom0. Consequently,
this compromising can lead to undesired access to, or loss or leakage of, customers'
critical files such as business databases. As a result, threat 1 can have an impact
on both customers' and providers' companies. This can be in the form of the
companies' brand damage, or productivity losses.
Some forms of attacks associated with threat 1 such as criminals using domUs
to attack customer domUs or provider dom0 can be critical. This is because they
can eventually cause the CSA threat 5 which is data loss or leakage. It is extremely
difficult to recover the organisation's reputation or the lost data [72]. Threat 5
has been ranked as top in order of severity by the recent CSA reports [25; 26].
The CSA state the severity of threat 5 as:
"it can have a devastating impact on a business. Beyond the damage to one's
brand and reputation, a loss could significantly impact employee, partner, and
customer morale and trust. Loss of core intellectual property could have compet-
itive and financial implications. Worse still, depending upon the data that is lost
or leaked, there might be compliance violations and legal ramifications" [23].
2.6 Accountability in the cloud to mitigate risks
associated with CSA threats
This section discusses accountability in the cloud as a method to deal with CSA
threats. This includes a discussion of accountability and its properties (Sec-
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tion 2.6.1), and of the association between accountability and logging systems
(Section 2.6.2).
2.6.1 Accountability
This subsection comprises a discussion of accountability and its properties. Log-
ging systems can provide evidence to support accountability for an IaaS cloud,
which helps us in mitigating the risks associated with the threats. Macmillan's
dictionary [73] defines accountability as "a situation in which (1) people know
(2) who is responsible for (3) something and can ask them to explain (4) its
state or quality".
Thus, this thesis views accountability in the cloud as "a situation in which (1')
an auditor knows (2') a suspicious person is responsible for (3') incidents
that were already occurred and that are causes of a CSA threat or
threats and can provides (4') evidence to explain these incidents (that have
already occurred).
An auditor (1') can be a provider, customer, or trusted third party auditor.
A suspicious person (2') can be anybody who maliciously conducts activities that
relate to a CSA threat or threats. An example of the incidents (3') can be a
suspicious person accesses customer's critical files, after he takes control of the
dom0, then over all domUs [74]. Evidence (4') refers to log files. An auditor's
explanation of incidents (that are already occurred) needs evidence which is log
files. These files can be used to explain the occurred incidents.
Accountability in the cloud properties [8] proposes four features for ac-
countable distributed systems, as listed below. The cloud can be considered as
a huge distributed system [5]. Thus, the accountable cloud should have these
features.
• The first is identities which designates each action (such as the transmission
of a message) as undeniably linked to the node that performed it.
• The second is secure record which means the system maintains a record of
past actions such that nodes cannot secretly omit, falsify, or tamper with
their entries.
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• The third is auditing which is where the record can be inspected for signs
of faults.
• The last is evidence which is when an auditor detects a fault, it can obtain
evidence of the fault that can be independently verified by a third party.
[9] also propose the same idea to mitigate the risks associated with the prob-
lems of the cloud. They suggest that cloud customers have to be able to audit
their data processing in the cloud. Thus, the customers can ensure that their
data is not abused or leaked. If the data is abused or leaked, the proof of this
fault can be obtained. Then [9] introduced a 'trusted monitor' to produce proof
of compliance for the data owners. This proof of compliance can indicate that
customers' data has not been manipulated without the access policies.
2.6.2 Accountability with logging systems
This subsection discusses the association between the accountability and logging
systems. In the cloud, works discussed above that relate to the trusted moni-
tor [9] and the accountable cloud [8] focus on dealing with the problems of the
cloud using the same solution which is accountability. One of the signification
mechanisms to enable the accountability properties above can be logging systems.
To enable the ascertainment of evidence, log files are required as records of the
past actions in the cloud servers. The following lists are examples of the benefits
of logging systems which provide log data.
• [75] also states that log data is critically significant for analysing and repli-
cating events that occur in cloud computing. The data also enables trou-
bleshooting, fault diagnosis, operation audits, performance monitoring, re-
source robustness monitoring, detection and protection against intrusions,
and a host of other usages [75].
• For accountability, trust, and security in cloud computing, preventive con-
trols or detective controls can be trust components [45]. The former is
used to mitigate the presence of an action from taking place at all. The
latter is used to identify the occurrence of a privacy or security risk that
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violates policies and procedures. Logs are one of examples of the detec-
tive controls which act as a psychological obstruction to go against policies
or procedures in the cloud [27]. The approach also serves as a record for
post-mortem investigations should any non-compliance occur [27].
Thus, Section 2.7 discusses logging systems and their related work in the cloud
in depth.
2.7 Logging systems
This section discusses logging systems in IaaS in detail.
2.7.1 Logging systems
As discussed in Section 1.1, a logging system in IaaS is a system that resides in
the provider's cloud infrastructure, and that can collect and store log information
of the infrastructure's components such as domU. A logging system is composed
of logging processes and log files.
A logging process performs logging tasks, whereas log files are used for storing
contents produced by the logging processes. Each logging process has its own
task(s). For example, one main task of a logging process called Flogger [30] is
intercepting the file operations of a virtual machine or VM for the purposes of
accountability in the cloud. It manages to store such intercepted data as log files.
The logging system's main components which include logging processes and
log files can be distributed across domUs, the dom0, and the hypervisor. For
example, the logging processes may be only: in a hypervisor as in [44]; in dom0
as in [1; 39]; in dom0 and domU as in [30; 43]; or in only domU as in [76].
Recent works [8; 9] give an outline of accountability/monitoring-related solu-
tions for the cloud. These works involve the logging processes and the log files,
which will be in the cloud machines. However, they do not discuss where exactly
they could be in the machines (which involve visualisation of infrastructure and
more than one party), and who will manage them and why.
Other works that involve design and implementation of the logging solutions
which could be applied in the cloud include [27; 39; 43; 44]. These works focus
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on monitoring and logging tasks. Ideally, a logging system can be analysed,
with respect to its features and achievable goals, before deployment. However,
these authors do not give completed concerns about the security analysis of their
logging systems themselves, which include the logging processes and the log files
before deploying the systems to the real world IaaS.
Moreover, [58] propose the security model of IaaS. The model includes the
security model side that comprises of two entities. One of these entities is the
security policy monitoring and auditing, which can track the system life cycle.
This entity should involve logging systems. However, they do not provide im-
plementation and examples of the model, and do not focus on dealing with CSA
threats.
2.8 Related work concerning logging systems in
IaaS
This section discusses related work concerning logging systems in IaaS. These
works are referred to throughout this study. We investigated previous research
that can be considered as work that could be applied in a logging approach in
IaaS.
Firstly, TrustCloud [27] is a framework proposed by HP to address the lack of
trust in the cloud. Its most important layer is the system layer. It is a foundation
to build other layers, and deploys Flogger [30] as its core. Flogger is an interceptor
that can be placed in the dom0 kernel or domU kernel to intercept the file and
network operations of that domain.
Secondly, accountable virtual machines or AVMs [44] are virtual machines
that can detect mis-behaviors of online gaming servers by using a modified hy-
pervisor or VMware to record all messages sent and received by an untrusted
server. The main process of this work is a logger that resides in the hypervisor
to record incoming and outgoing network packets of domUs.
Thirdly, PASSXen [43] is an approach to collect the system-level provenance
of domUs that run under Xen. PASSXen's interceptor in domU kernel tracks
and collects the creation, access, and destruction of processes and files for this
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domU. Fourthly, [1] proposes a network monitoring application which identifies
which process inside a Windows domU is responsible for malicious network traffic
leaving this domU.
Then, it ([39]) is a demo monitoring program in dom0 that outputs all file/directory
creation/removals happening in domU's /root directory. Then, Lares [77] can
monitor domU behaviours. It may be possible to modify this system to produce
log files. This requires insertion of hooks at runtime into a domU.
Lastly, to address the problem of cloud customers that fear loss of control
of their own data, particularly financial and health data, that are in providers'
machines, JAR logging [76] proposes log files to keep track of the actual usage
of the customers' data in the cloud. It is very useful for customers to check the
transactions of their files. This work compresses a user file (such as an image
file) along with any policies (such as access control policies and logging policies)
and the logging mechanism (includes an automated and authenticated logging
mechanism) as a Java ARchive or JAR file. Any access to the user file will
trigger the logging of an automated and authenticated logging mechanism. For
example, suppose that a cloud service provider with ID Kronos, located in the
USA, reads a customer image file at 4:52 pm on May 20, 2011. The corresponding
log record is Kronos, View, 2011-05-20 16:52:30, USA.
2.9 Accountability, Monitoring, and Logging in
IaaS
Accountability, monitoring, and logging are associated. We argues that one im-
portant mechanism for accountability is monitoring which can deploy a logging
system as its core. This section discusses accountability, monitoring, and logging
in IaaS below. This includes the discussion of monitoring as a solution to the
CSA hreats, a logging system and its components in IaaS, and the differences
between monitoring and logging systems.
• Monitoring as a Solution to the CSA Threats
In [23], CSA states that a monitoring approach is one of the remediations
in its list of solutions for each threat. It also argues that monitoring can
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mitigate the risks associated with threats 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7. In [27], HP also
summarises that some log files such as histories of file access on the provider
side can aid the providers and the consumers to mitigate CSA threats 1,
2, 3, 5 and 7. However, this thesis considers a monitoring system to be
a system that can monitor which activities take place inside dom0 and/or
domUs, and its main subsystem is a logging system.
• A logging system and its components in IaaS
The basic idea of a logging system is to use logging processes to record par-
ticular information, such as in [44] the logging processes record incoming
and outgoing network packets of domUs. Then they store such information
as log files to be used for particular purposes such as evidence for identi-
fying malicious network traffic in the domUs. This thesis does not discuss
real-time elements of monitoring such as triggers, because these elements
should be fundamental for a monitoring system, and should always be con-
sidered and implemented before deploying the system. We instead focus
on the security analysis of logging processes and log files, which are critical
components in a logging system.
• Differences between monitoring and logging systems
However, we need to differentiate works for monitoring and logging. This
is because the work for monitoring does not need to have log files, whereas
logging work have to have log files. The locations of log files is an indica-
tor of the security and reliability of a logging system. This thesis defines
monitoring works as: monitoring can monitor domU's activities, then may
analyse these activities, then may detect malicious activities, then prevent
them. Examples of monitoring works are CloudSec [78], libVMI [79], a demo
monitoring program in dom0 [39], and a network monitoring application [1].
In contrast, a logging system is a regular logging such as CCTV, without
analysing the activities while doing logging. The result of the logging system
is log files which will be used later, if malicious incidents occur.
Thus, the main difference is the monitoring systems do not produce log files,
whereas logging systems do. Thus, without consideration of logging files, it
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may be easier to develop monitoring systems compared to logging systems
that need to consider the locations of log files which will be permanently or
temporally stored in media in those locations. This is because the locations
can be one of the indicators of the security of the log files themselves.
As a result, to develop a logging system is more difficult than monitoring
system. Thus, this thesis considers only logging systems that have log files.
All monitoring systems in this thesis do not have log files. However, all
monitoring work can be modified to produce log files, but they need to
consider the locations of log files. Table 2.1 again summarises monitoring
and logging work in the cloud.
Monitoring CloudSec [78], libVMI [79], a demo monitoring program in dom0
[39], and a network monitoring application [1]
Logging PASSXen [43] (do not discuss where is the log files will be in the
IaaS architecture), HP Flogger [30] (the log files are in dom0),
AVMs [44] (the log files are in dom0)
Table 2.1: Monitoring and Logging work in the IaaS
2.10 Privacy and Confidentiality Concerns of Cus-
tomers and Providers due to the Log Files
This section discusses the privacy and confidentiality concerns of customers and
providers due to the log files, and how to deal with these concerns.
Log files discussed in this thesis can be detailed records of activities of pro-
cesses and files in a customer VM. For auditing purposes, the records can be
investigated by a third party. Thus, this information may disclose customer busi-
ness activities, or malicious activities inside a provider's cloud infrastructure.
This leads to privacy and confidentiality issues for both customers and providers.
However, [8; 27] argue that privacy issues are manageable. For example, to man-
age the privacy issues, [8] states that it is important to consider what is being
recorded, and who can access this recorded information; thus, logging system
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management should return the recorded information at different levels of detail,
depending on who needs it. To address the privacy and confidentiality issues,
this may lead to further research such as balancing the privacy and its usage such
as [80]. This is out of the scope of this thesis.
2.11 A plan for Systematic provision of logging
systems to support accountability in IaaS
This section discusses how to systematically provide logging systems to support
accountability in IaaS.
The generic framework we aim to design (stated in Objective 2 and 4, Sec-
tion 1.3) is the same as a plan to systematically build up logging systems to
support for accountability in the cloud. In an IaaS environment, this frame-
work should be used to encompass all possible instantiations of logging system,
according to the system owner's requirements.
Systematic logging system development with a plan The logging system
development also needs a plan or should be systemic. A logging system is a soft-
ware system. In IaaS, what makes it special is that it will be in the virtualisation
environment instead of in local standalone machines in private organisations.
Systematic logging system development with the concerns of security
issues of log files and logging processes As discussed in Section 2.9 we
need to consider where the log files that are produced from logging systems will
be stored in IaaS architecture. This is because the locations of the log files can
affect their security such as the integrity. The next chapters will fully discuss the
security issues of log files, as well as of logging processes.
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2.12 Overview of Operating Systems, Kernels, and
Files
This section clarifies the meaning of an operating system, kernel, and file, which
will be referred to throughout this thesis.
This overview is derived from [2]. For a computer machine, the term system
refers to an operating system or OS and all the applications running on top of
this OS. An operating system is considered as the parts of the system, which
are responsible for basic use and administration of the machine. These parts are
the kernel and device drivers, boot loader, command shell or other user interface,
and basic file and system utilities. The kernel is one of the OS's parts that is
responsible for basic use and administration of a computer machine, such as the
Linux kernel for Linux OS.
The kernel typically resides in an elevated system state compared to normal
user applications. This includes a protected memory space and full access to
the hardware. This system state and memory space is collectively referred to
as kernel-space. In opposition, user applications are executed in the user-space.
They see a subset of the machine's available resources and can perform certain
system functions, directly access hardware, access memory outside of that allotted
them by the kernel, or otherwise misbehave. When executing kernel code, the
system is in the kernel-space executing in kernel mode. When running a regular
process, the system is in the user-space executing in user mode.
A filesystem is a hierarchical storage of data adhering to a specific structure.
A filesystem contains files, directories, and associated control information. A file
is an ordered string of bytes. Each file is assigned a human-readable name for
identification by both the system and the user. Typical file operations are read,
write, create, and delete.
2.13 Trusted Computing Base or TCB
This section discusses TCB and logging systems.
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[40] points out that an OS is difficult to analyse because of its size and com-
plexity. He also argues that there is too much TCB when deploying an application
in an OS such as a domU that is running on top of a hypervisor. [81] argue that
an OS code changes rapidly over time. The changes may increase the size of the
OS and its complexity, and as a result, its TCB.
Thus, the TCB can be a very important aspect of security, in order to
propose logging systems in the cloud. For example, the proposed systems in
[38; 39; 40; 41] (that can be considered as solutions to mitigate the risks asso-
ciated with the cloud problem) are concerned with reducing the TCB size along
with their proposed systems. Recent work that extensively relates to a secure
cloud computing environment such as that of [42] also focuses on reducing the
TCB in their proposed architecture.
2.14 Conclusions
The main contribution of this chapter was to present a background and literature
review for the thesis. This chapter discussed the definitions of cloud computing
and IaaS, the problems of IaaS, the CSA threats, how the accountability and
monitoring with logging systems assists in mitigating the risks associated with
CSA threats, and an overview of the concepts of systematic provision of logging
systems to support accountability in IaaS.
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Chapter 3
Generic Logging Components for
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
Cloud
This chapter addresses Gap 1 (c) which is the lack of security analysis of the
logging systems themselves before the deployment of the systems in to the IaaS
real world productions, as discussed in Section 1.2. The previous chapter provided
the holistic representation of the environment of logging systems in the cloud.
This representation is utilised as the basis for the design of a generic framework
of logging solutions to mitigate the risks associated with CSA threats (Objective
2). We call this framework generic logging components for infrastructure
as a service or IaaS cloud.
Thus, the main contribution of this chapter is these generic logging compo-
nents. To facilitate systematic support for accountability in the cloud, these
generic logging components provide ways to build logging systems. The value of
these generic logging components is to encompass all possible instantiations of
logging solutions for IaaS cloud, and to provide a clear view of all components
that relate to logging systems in IaaS. This view provides a basis for the analysis
of logging systems' security before deployment. Thus, these generic logging com-
ponents enable logging systems to be appropriately designed or manipulated by
participating cloud parties such as a provider, customer, or auditor. As result,
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this enhances systematic support for accountability in the could.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 discusses
why we need generic logging components for accountability in IaaS. Section 3.2
discusses importance of security analysis of logging systems in IaaS. Then, Section
3.3 proposes generic logging components of IaaS cloud. This section provides the
details of the generic logging components and each component. Then the section
discusses how these components assist in analysing of the security of logging
systems. The analysis include integrity and privacy issues of a logging system.
Section 3.4 provides two case studies of how to use the generic logging com-
ponents, and discussion relates to the case studies. This section includes a case
study of mapping HP Flogger on the generic logging components for the purposes
of security analysis include integrity and privacy issues of Flogger system, a case
study of an identification of the appropriate logging system based on the generic
logging components to mitigate the risks associated with CSA threat 1, discussion
of possible solutions of the security issue of log files as F3 in the logging system in
the spam case study, and discussion of to detect other forms of attacks of threat
1 using logging solutions.
Section 3.5 provides evaluation and discussion of the generic logging com-
ponents. The section includes an evaluation of the generic logging components
against how these components satisfy their goals, and many other discussions of
the generic logging components, which affect many aspects of logging systems in
IaaS, as well as PaaS such as applying the generic logging components to mitigate
risks associated with CSA threats for PaaS, and a TCB size measurement of a
logging system in the cloud based on the generic logging components. Finally,
the chapter is briefly summarized and concluded in Section 3.6.
3.1 The need for generic logging components for
accountability in IaaS
This section discusses why we need generic logging components for the account-
ability in IaaS.
We use the term generic logging components to indicate that we consider
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the union of all possible logging architectures that could be instantiated. In
that sense, the generic logging components by themselves are not meant to be
implemented, but offer the building blocks from which one can choose to create
an actual logging solution. Moreover, with respect to faster system development,
the generic logging components are flexible and implementation independent, and
provides reuse-ability. Importantly, it can be used as a tool for security analysis
of logging systems in IaaS, as will be discussed in Section 3.2. It could be a
starting point of building accountability systems to address lack of trust in an
IaaS.
3.2 The need for security analysis of logging sys-
tems in IaaS
This section discusses importance of security analysis of logging systems in IaaS.
[82] state that an important obstacle to users in adapting into cloud computing
is security and privacy issues. They also argue that to realise the prosperity in
cloud computing literature, those issues need to be addressed beforehand. This
perspective can be applied to the logging process as well: security and privacy
issues of the logging systems have to be resolved before using them.
The security analysis of logging systems themselves is very important because
the logging processes and log files are critical components and so they need to
satisfy a set of security properties such as integrity and privacy. Hence, with-
out the security analysis of logging systems, it could be difficult to effectively
and efficiently build and deploy logging systems that can satisfy those security
properties.
An IaaS environment, which involves virtualisation and more than one party,
makes the security analysis of logging systems more complicated than one within a
private organisation. Haeberlen [8] pointed out that one of the research challenges
of the accountable cloud is that it needs to have mechanisms to allow legacy users
to access the logging machine which deploys logging processes, but not to maintain
the log files. Crosby and Wallach [83] agreed that ensuring the integrity of the
log files is a critical part of a larger system.
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This thesis considers the security analysis of logging systems as a significant
criterion to establish the goals of the generic logging components as will be dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.1. Then, this chapter focuses on where the logging processes
and log files can precisely be inside the IaaS architecture. This is because the lo-
cations of these components in the IaaS can directly and significantly affect the
security concerns of these components.
3.3 Generic logging components of IaaS cloud
This section proposes generic logging components of IaaS cloud. It provides
the details of the generic logging components in Subsection 3.3.1, the details of
each component in Subsection 3.3.2, and a discussion of how the generic logging
components assist in the analysis of security of logging systems in Subsection
3.3.3. The analysis include the analysis of integrity and of privacy issues of a
logging system. In this chapter, the terms 'generic logging components' and
'logging components' are used interchangeably.
Figure 3.1: The overall view of generic logging components: logging process or Px
(P1 to P5), and log files or Fy (F1 to F4).
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We investigate logging process and log file components of each work from
previous research concerned with logging systems from the related work section
or Section 2.8. Then we consider the possible locations of logging processes and
log file components in the IaaS architecture.
Section 2.3 provides details of the CSA threats. Section 3.2 states that the
security analysis of logging systems is critical before they are deployed into the
real world IaaS. Below are two goals of the generic logging components to deal
with the threats, regarding the security analysis of logging systems.
1. The generic logging components can be used to instantiate new logging
system architecture to mitigate the risks associated with all CSA threats in
the IaaS environment.
2. The security of the newly built logging system architecture, that is based
on the generic logging components, can be systematically analysed before
deployment.
3.3.1 Details of the generic logging components
This section discusses the details of the generic logging components.
Figure 3.1 is the generic logging components. These components are divided
into three sets of components: the IaaS set of components, the logging processes'
set of components and the log file's set of components. All white boxes in Fig-
ure 3.1 are the IaaS set of components. They are hw0, hypervisor, hwU, dom0,
domU, app0, appU, disk0, diskU, mem0, and memU. The shaded boxes in dom0,
domU, and hypervisor in Figure 3.1 are the logging processes' set of components
or Px. They are P1 to P5. The log file's set of components or Fy is composed of
F1 to F4, see the shaded boxes in hw0 in Figure 3.1.
Discussion of Locations of Logging processes/Px and log files/Fy Px
can have different functions and can be deployed in different locations in the IaaS
layers when dealing with different CSA threats. Figure 3.1 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2
show that there are five locations for Px. This can be in dom0 user level as P1,
dom0 kernel level as P2, domU user level as P3, domU kernel level as P4, or
hypervisor as P5.
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1. a dom0 user
level process
-in PASSXen[43]: Waldo (to read provenance
records from a log, store these records in a
database, index them, and access the database
for querying), or Coordinator-like (to periodically
consume temporary logs from mem0, and perform
other tasks by communicating with other dom0







-in libVMI [79]: Libraries (to be called, for ex-
ample, by app0 to read memU for introspection
purposes)
P2 a dom0 kernel
level process
-in HP Floggers System [30]: Flogger (to intercept
dom0 file and network operations, then store such
intercepted data into disk0)





1. a domU user
level process
-in a logging system of [76]: Logging mechanism









P4 a domU kernel
level process
-in HP Floggers System [30]: Flogger (to intercept
domU file and network operations, then temporar-
ily store such intercepted data into diskU in case
the data are too big to be stored in memU)
-in PASSXen [43]: Interceptor in domU (to in-
tercept domU system calls, and temporarily store
such intercepted records in a mem0)
in domU
kernel level
P5 a process inside
a hypervisor
-in AVMs system [44]: Logger (to record informa-




Table 3.1: The Logging Process set of components (the shaded boxes in dom0, domU,
and hypervisor in Figure 3.1)
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Component Description Examples and Functions Locations
in IaaS en-
vironment
F1 temporary or per-
manent log data in
diskU
-in Floggers System [30]: a
domU HP Flogger (inter-
ceptor/P4) could temporarily
store the domU intercepted
data as F1 in diskU (in case
the data are too big to be
stored in memU) for further
processing
in diskU
F2 temporary log data
in memU
-in HP Floggers System [30]:
the same as the example of
F1, but Flogger/P4 could
eventually and temporarily
store the log data as F2 in
memU for further processing
in memU
F3 temporary or per-
manent log data in
disk0
-in HP Floggers System [30]:
Flogger/P2 can permanently
store the intercepted data
(as F3 ) in disk0
-in AVMs system [44]: a Log-
ger (P5) permanently stores
the domU intercepted net-
work data (as F3 ) in disk0
in disk0
F4 temporary log data
in mem0
-in PASSXen [43]: domU
Interceptor (P4) temporarily
stores intercepted domU sys-
tem calls data (as F4 ) in
mem0
in mem0
Table 3.2: The log file set of components (the shaded boxes in hw0 in Figure 3.1)
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In the generic logging components, we place Fy only in the locations of either a
primary or main memory which includes mem0 or memU, or a secondary memory
that includes disk0 or diskU. Other locations including dom0 kernel and user level
space, domU kernel and user level space, or in a hypervisor are for locating or
running Px, appU, and app0, rather than storing Fy.
Thus, there are four locations for Fy: diskU, memU, mem0, and disk0. Fy can
be a temporary Fy which is temporarily stored in either diskU as F1, memU as
F2, disk0 as F3, and mem0 as F4 for further processing then it will be removed.
For example, in HP Floggers System [30], a Flogger intercepts domU file and
network operations, then temporarily store such intercepted data into diskU as
F1 in case the data are too big to be stored in memU; or in PASSXen [43], an
interceptor intercepts domU system calls, and temporarily stores such intercepted
records in a mem0 as F4.
Fy can also be a permanent Fy which is stored in diskU as F1 or disk0 as F3.
For example, in an AVMs system [44], a logger as P5 permanently stores the domU
intercepted network data in disk0 as F3. Locations of Px and Fy can be used as
their security indicators such as privacy of Fy, as stated in Section 2.9 and 3.2
and as will be demonstrated and discussed in the case studies in Section 3.4. We
consider mem0 and memU as components of the generic logging components
because log data will eventually and temporarily be in these memory which affects
the security analysis of such log data.
3.3.2 The details of each generic logging component
This subsection provides the details of each component in the generic logging
components. The details of all components from all sets are listed below.
1. The IaaS set of components
All components of this set are derived from the IaaS architecture (Fig-
ure 2.1). Note that a component that has its name ends with 0/zero (e.g.,
hw0) is a component that is physically owned and managed by a provider.
A component that has its name ends with U (e.g., hwU) is a component
that is virtually owned and managed by a customer. Hw0 (e.g., a PC or
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server) is the hw described in Section 2.2. It is a host machine for hyper-
visor, dom0, and all domUs. It is in the provider side infrastructure and
managed and owned by a provider through dom0. It consists of a disk0
and mem0. Disk0 is a physical disk of the hw0 such as server's disks. It is
managed by dom0 and physically in hw0. Mem0 is a main memory of the
hw0 and physically in hw0 such as a server's main memory.
Hypervisor, for example Xen, is described in Section 2.2. It concurrently
runs a dom0 and domUs, and is on top of hw0. In the generic logging
components, system memory of dom0 and domU, which are discussed below
has two parts: a user level space; and a kernel level space. The former is a
set of memory locations in the system memory, that the user process such
as appU runs, discussed below. The latter is the system memory where the
kernel that is the main part of the OS runs [84], as discussed in Section 2.12.
Dom0 is described in Section 2.2. It consists of app0 and is on top of the
hypervisor. An example of dom0 is a Fedora 16 Linux system. App0 is an
application that runs inside the dom0 user level through a provider such as
a logging-related application. DomU is described in Section 2.2. It consists
of appU and hwU, and is on top of the hypervisor. An example of domU is
a Fedora 16 Linux system.
AppU is an application that runs inside the domU user level through an
owner of this domU. An example of appU is a mail application which is a
mail command in Linux system. HwU is a virtual hardware that consists of
diskU and memU. It is owned by domU's owners, and resides virtually in
domU, but physically in hw0. DiskU is a virtual disk of domU. It is virtually
in hwU, but physically in disk0/hw0. The last component of the IaaS set of
components is memU. It is a virtual main memory of domU. It is virtually
in hwU, and physically in mem0/hw0.
2. The logging processes' set of components
The components of this set are P1 to P5 which are presented in Table 3.1 and
Figure 3.1. We place only one Px in particular locations as a representative
of multiple Px in each location. Hence, it is possible to have more than
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one Px in a particular location. For example, P2 in a dom0 kernel level
could actually compose of more than one logging processes, depending on
the design and implementation of an actual logging system that P2 belongs
to. Any Px can also collaborate with another or others to achieve logging
tasks.
Table 3.1 presents description, examples, functions, and locations in the
IaaS environment of each component in this set. Note that this section
refers to OS system calls. They are the interface to the OS kernel, and are
used to request services offered by, and implemented in the kernel [85].
Each Px (Table 3.1) that is discussed in this chapter has different proper-
ties or abilities compared to others. The properties and abilities of each
Px are discussed in Table 3.1. It is possible that each Px has the same
properties and abilities as others. This depends on the design of logging
systems. However, the discussion of Px in this chapter focuses on these P1
to P5 (Table 3.1). This is because we focus on the security analysis of log-
ging systems, which is based on the security of their critical components
(e.g., Px and log files) that can be distributed across an IaaS architecture.
Thus, instead of discussing all possible properties or abilities of each Px, we
focus on the locations across an IaaS architecture where Px can be deployed
such as in dom0 user level or in domU kernel level. The deployment location
of a Px can assist in analysing security of this Px. Section 3.3.1 provides
a full discussion of locations of P1 to P5, and Section 3.5.2.1 discusses
other possible locations of these Px apart from their locations in the generic
logging components.
3. The log file's set of components
All components of this set are presented in Table 3.2. This set is composed
of F1 to F4 which are all the shaded boxes in hw0 in Figure 3.1. The rep-
resentative approach of Px can apply to Fy as well. Thus, it is possible to
have more than one Fy in disk0. Table 3.2 presents description, examples,
functions, and, locations in the IaaS environment of each component in this
set. For these generic logging components, Fy can be stored in memory
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(mem0 or memU) and disks (disk0 or diskU). Section 3.3.1 provides a full
discussion of locations F1 to F4, and Section 3.5.2.1 discusses other possi-
ble locations of these Fy apart from their locations in the generic logging
components.
3.3.3 Discussion of how the generic logging components as-
sist in analysing the security of logging systems
This subsection discusses how the generic logging components assist in analysing
the security of logging systems. This includes analysis of integrity, and of privacy
issues of a logging system.
To facilitate discussion of analysing the security of existing and our proposed
logging systems in Sections 3.4 and Chapter 5 to 6, we discuss how the logging
components assist in analysing the security of logging systems with integrity or
privacy issues in this section (Section 3.3.3). Then, Section 3.5.2 will discuss many
other aspects of the logging components.
The logging components can assist in analysing the security of logging systems
in Iaas. Again, the logging components can be used to instantiate architecture of
a logging system by choosing appropriate Px and Fy from the logging components
to form the architecture based on the requirements of this logging system. Then,
this logging system can be built up later. It should be built after its security
analysis has been achieved, and security issues of the architecture/system have
been resolved by all parties that are involved in this logging system.
The logging components can assist in analysing the security of logging systems.
This is because locations of Px and Fy in the logging components can facilitate
the analysis of the security of any logging system in IaaS when the architecture
of this system is designed based on the logging components.
[86] argues that in the security of computing and communication systems
area, security comprises three attributes: confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity. They also give the definition of each attribute as follows. Confidentiality is the
absence of unauthorised disclosure of information. Integrity is the absence of im-
proper system alterations. Availability is the readiness for correct service. More-
over, confidentiality relates to the broader concept of data privacy which is the
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limitation of access to individuals' personal information [87].
We discuss only integrity and privacy attributes as an example of how the
logging components assist in analysing the security of a logging system designed
based on the logging components. From the logging components, there are nine
locations that can be used to deploy Px and Fy. Five locations are for deploying
Px: dom0 user level, dom0 kernel level, domU user level, domU kernel level, and
in an hypervisor. The other four locations are for deploying Fy: diskU, memU,
disk0, and mem0. These nine locations can be indicators of the integrity and
privacy concerns relates to a logging system, as discussed in Section 3.3.3.1 and
3.3.3.2 below.
The architecture of any logging system that is designed based on the logging
components can be used as a tool to analyse integrity and privacy issues which
relate to this logging system. Thus, the logging components assist in analysing
the security of logging systems in IaaS. In addition, when the architecture of any
existing logging system in IaaS can be mapped on the logging components, this
mapping architecture can be used as a tool to analyse the security of the system.
We consider the logging components as a tool to assist in analysing the security
of any logging system. This is because the logging components can be a neutral
reference model or tool for security analysis of logging systems in an IaaS. There
is no united or general tool available to analyse the security of logging systems
in an IaaS at the moment. Our logging components can be a candidate. The
analysis of security of logging systems is an important aspect to build logging
systems to support accountability in IaaS, as discussed in Section 1.1, 1.2, 2.9,
and 3.2. Without the logging components it would not be easy to systemically
build logging systems to support accountability in an IaaS.
3.3.3.1 Analysis of integrity issues of a logging system
From the logging components (Figure 3.1), when any logging system deploys Px
in domU user level as P3 or in domU kernel level as P4, this may lead to integrity
issues of this logging system. This is because a domU cannot be trusted from the
providers' perspective to install security software (e.g., logging systems) inside it,
as argued by [78]. This domU may tamper with the logging systems and alter the
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system's behaviour, whether by the domU owner or by an external attacker.
When any logging system deploys Px in the dom0 user level as P1 or in dom0
kernel level as P2, this may also lead to integrity issues of this logging system. This
is because dom0 is physically owned and controlled by a provider, as described in
Section 3.3.2. Therefore, the provider's employees may maliciously modify P1's
code to produce contents of log files which benefit themselves. These employees
are called malicious insiders which are serious issues as argued by [46; 88; 89].
3.3.3.2 Analysis of privacy issues of a logging system
When any logging system deploys Fy in disk0 as F3, this may lead to privacy
issues. This is because malicious insiders may learn about customers' personal
data, which is a privacy violation to a customer who owns this domU. Rocha and
Correia [41] demonstrate how this kind of attack can obtain confidential data
from a customer domU. [90] also agree that it is easier to steal customer's data
if the thief is an insider. Thus, it is also easier for malicious insiders to tamper
with or steal F3; this is because these files are in disk0 which is controlled by the
insiders. This issue needs to be addressed before deploying F3.
3.4 Case studies of how to use the generic logging
components
To present how the logging components work, this section provides two case
studies of how to use the logging components, and the related discussion. This
section includes: a case study of mapping HP Flogger on the logging components
for the purposes of security analysis including integrity and privacy issues of
the Flogger system in Subsection 3.4.1; a case study of an identification of the
appropriate logging system based on the logging components to mitigate the
risks associated with CSA threat 1 in Subsection 3.4.2; a discussion of possible
solutions to the security issue of log files such as F3 in the logging system in
the spam case study in Subsection 3.4.3; and a discussion of how to detect other
forms of attacks of threat 1 using logging solutions in Subsection 3.4.4.
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3.4.1 A Case Study of Mapping HP Flogger on the logging
components
This subsection provides a case study of mapping HP Flogger on the logging
components for the purposes of security analysis of the Flogger system. This
includes analysis of the system's integrity issues in Section 3.3.3.1 and privacy
issues in Section 3.3.3.2.
As stated earlier in Section 3.3.2, a logging system can have more than one
Px in a particular location, depending on its design and implementation. The
Flogger system [30] actually consists of more than one Px in its dom0 and domU
kernels. We assume this mapping is for the purposes of security analysis of the
Flogger system itself.
Figure 3.2: Mapping some HP Flogger Px and Fy on the logging components.
The Flogger system (Figure 3.2) deploys six critical components: two logging
processes components including P2 and P4, and four log file components which
are F1 to F4. P2 actually contains four components: a receiver, interceptor,
consolidator, and writer. Whereas P4 contains two components: a sender and an
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interceptor.
The main task of the receiver is taking log data from the sender. The P2's
interceptor intercepts dom0 file and network operations. The consolidator pro-
duces the final version of log data. The writer writes the final version of log data
to disk0 as F3. The final version of log data must eventually and temporarily be
in mem0 as F4. For P4 side, the sender transfers the log data from domU to the
dom0's receiver. P4's interceptor intercepts domU file and network operations. It
may temporarily store such intercepted data into diskU as F1, in case the data
are too big to be stored in memU as F2.
Analysis the security of Flogger system can be achieved using the mapping
(Figure 3.2), as discussed in the lists below.
• Analysis of integrity issues of Flogger system
After mapping the Flogger (see Figure 3.2), the Flogger system deploys P4
at the domU kernel level, this may lead to integrity issues of this logging
system. This is because this domU owner may tamper with P4, as discussed
in Section 3.3.3.1.
• Analysis of privacy issues with Flogger system
From the mapping, one can analyse the privacy of F3 because it is in disk0
which is a part of hw0/dom0 (as described in Section 3.3.2) and is physi-
cally owned by a provider. Therefore, malicious insiders may learn about,
or alter F3, which is a privacy violation to a customer, as discussed in
Section 3.3.3.2.
3.4.2 A Case Study of an Identification of the Appropriate
Logging System Based on the Logging Components
to Mitigate the Risks Associated with CSA Threat 1
This subsection is another case study to demonstrate how to use the logging
components. This case study is an identification of the appropriate logging system
based on the logging components to mitigate the risks associated with CSA threat
1. This subsection includes (for this case study): design and implementation of
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the logging system, how to run the experiment, the result, and the analysis of
security of the logging system.
In order to satisfy the goals of the logging components, this case study demon-
strates how to use the logging components to instantiate the logging system ar-
chitecture, and how to analyse the security of this new built architecture.
3.4.2.1 Design and Implementation of the Logging System
This logging system architecture is designed and based on the logging compo-
nents. Thus, we can choose some components from the logging components (Fig-
ure 3.1 and Section 3.2-3.3) to build up the logging system. At the time of the
experiment, we found libVMI [79] as the only available tool that can achieve the
goal of the case study. This is an introspection library to read memory of VMs
or domUs from dom0. We deployed libVMI as P1 in dom0 user level to read the
memU of this spamming domU.
Therefore, we reuse libVMI as P1, then we choose F3 as log files to build the
logging system architecture. As a result, Figure 3.3 shows the overview of the
Figure 3.3: The logging system architecture to mitigate the risks associated with threat
1.
newly designed logging system architecture according to this case study's goal.
It is quite clear that the new architecture is composed of only P1 or libVMI, F3
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or log files, F4 or temporary log data, and app0 or a logging application.
This case study simulates spam activities by assuming that spammers rent
a Linux VM or domU from an IaaS provider. They then use appU (the mail
command, see Figure 3.4 in the dot-line box) to send a spam email to a vic-
Figure 3.4: Spam activities performed by appU (mail command) in domU.
tim. The command (we call c1 ) used as simulation of spam activities is: mail
-s spamSubj winai.wongthai@ncl.ac.uk. The mail command in c1 has three ar-
guments. They are ag1 which is -s, ag2 which is spamSubj, and ag3 which is
winai.wongthai@ncl.ac.uk. It sends string 'spamSubj' as an e-mail subject to the
email address winai.wongthai@ncl.ac.uk. In order to capture ag2 and ag3, we
assume that the logger application knows the name of the mail command in c1.
The case study's goal is to enable a logging application to capture the
arguments of c1 including ag2 and ag3, and then writes the captured ag2 and
ag3 to a database as the log files as F3. These log files can be used by an auditor,
a trusted third party, or a provider as the evidence to afterwards identify spam
activities in this rented domU later. We assume that ag2 and ag3 are sufficient
to identify these spam activities.
3.4.2.2 Running the Experiment in this Case Study
We run the logging application inside the dom0 user level, see process-list com-
mand line in the dot-line box in Figure 3.5. It keeps checking memU until c1
is performed. When c1 is performed as shown in Figure 3.4, then the logging
application extracts the arguments of c1, which are ag2 and ag3 or the second
and third lines from the bottom in Figure 3.5. The application then writes both
extracted arguments to F3.
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Figure 3.5: The logging application in dom0 extracts arguments of c1 (ag2 and ag3 )
as evidence for identifying spam activities.
3.4.2.3 The Result of This Case Study
The results in Figure 3.4 and 3.5 shows that we can use an application such as the
logging application in dom0 to capture information in memU or in the memory
space of any process, or commands of appU such as c1 in domU.
We now have an appropriate logging system to mitigate the risks associated
with CSA threat 1. However, this system is in the IaaS which involves at least two
parties including a provider and customer. Hence, the system's security needs to
be analysed before deployment as described in Section 3.4.2.4.
3.4.2.4 Analysing the Security of our Logging System
The proposed logging system architecture in the implementation is systematically
designed based on the logging components. Therefore, it inherits the advantages
of the logging components. For example, one of the advantages is an architec-
ture that is based on the logging components can be used as a tool to analyse
the security of logging processes and log files, which are distributed across the
IaaS visualisation environment. Thus, one can analyse the security of the logging
system architecture in the implementation. We provide an approach to systemat-
ically analyse the security of logging systems before deploying them in the IaaS
real world productions.
Ideally, these analyses needs to be completed before deploying our logging
system. We can directly use the logging system architecture, Figure 3.3, as a tool
for our analyses, as discussed in the lists below.
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• Analysis of the integrity issues of the logging system
From the architecture of the logging system in Figure 3.3, our system de-
ploys P1 in the dom0 user level, this may lead to integrity issues of this
logging system. This is because malicious insiders may modify P1's code
to produce contents of log files which benefit themselves, as discussed in
Section 3.3.3.1.
• Analysis of the privacy issues with our logging system
The question is where F3 be located. From the architecture in Figure 3.3,
it will be located in disk0. Again, malicious insiders may learn about, or
alter F3, which is a privacy violation to a customer, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.3.2.
3.4.3 Possible Solutions to the Security Issue of F3
This section discusses possible solutions of the security issues of log files as F3 in
the logging system in this case study.
Our logging system in the case study will be deployed in dom0, this promotes
privacy concerns for domU as partially discussed in Section 3.4.2.4. Actually, P1
or libVMI can be placed in a VM such as a dom0 as in our case study, within a
hypervisor, or within any other part of the virtualisation architecture as argued
by [79].
Hence, the solution of the privacy issues above could be that a trusted third
party or TTP, not a dom0 or provider, should handle our logging system. As a
result, the TTP can manage and maintain the logging system (P1 or libVMI, the
logging application or app0, and F3) in a special-privileged domU which operates
this system. The security challenge of this new solution is how to maintain in-
tegrity of this TTP domU, for instance how to prevent the provider from altering
or learning about F3.
The trusted computing and its related-research could be the solution. An
example is the work of Rocha, Abreu, and Correia [52], which proposes a solution
based on the TPM and offers protection against a malicious provider who has full
privilege over a domU in an IaaS.
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3.4.4 Ways To Detect Other Forms of Attacks of Threat 1
This subsection discusses how to detect other forms of attacks of threat 1 using
logging solutions.
We use spammer concerns or spam activities as a representative of the forms
of attacks enclosed in threat 1. To mitigate the risks associated with this threat,
such as mis-use of domUs by criminals to facilitate those attacks, the idea is to
have the ability to collect domU's activities from domUs to be used as evidence
to identify the attacks. One approach to do so is to collect behaviour or activities
of a process or processes in domUs. This is because the attacks eventually use a
process or processes in the domU to conduct criminal activities. Thus, if we can
collect appropriate and sufficient behaviour or activities of suspect processes as
log files, these files could be used as evidence to assist in identifying these attacks.
Thus, it is possible to detect some other forms of attacks enclosed in threat
1, such as domUs that host downloads for illegal software. This can be achieved
by detecting the process that downloads a certain unacceptable amount of in-
coming network package. It is possible to detect the downloading process's mis-
behaviours as we do with the spam process. Although more research is needed to
deal with all possible forms of threat 1, this case study shows that it is possible
to detect process's behaviours and then record them as log files to be used as
evidence to identify malicious use of domUs.
3.5 Evaluation and Discussion of the Logging Com-
ponents
This section provides an evaluation and discussion of the logging components.
Subsection 3.5.1 provides an evaluation of the logging components against how
these components satisfy their goals. Subsection 3.5.2 gives many other discus-
sions of the logging components, which affect many aspects of logging systems in
IaaS, as well as PaaS.
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3.5.1 Evaluation of the Logging Components
The logging components' goals were already discussed in the beginning of Sec-
tion 3.3. We evaluate the logging components against these goals.
To satisfy the first goal which is that the logging components can be used
to instantiate new logging system architecture to mitigate the risks associated
with all CSA threats in IaaS environment, we demonstrate how to instantiate
a logging system to mitigate the risks associated with CSA threat 1 outlined in
Section 3.4.2. This is an example of how the logging components can be used
to instantiate logging systems that are capable of mitigating the risks associated
with all CSA threats.
To satisfy the second goal which is that the security of the newly built
logging system architecture, that is based on the logging components, can be
systematically analysed before deployment, we discussed how to analyse the se-
curity of the newly designed logging system architecture in the same case study
in Section 3.4.2.4. We then found out this logging system's privacy issues that
need to be addressed before deployment.
We also consider the logging components as `generic' because of these con-
siderations. 1) One can choose the components especially Px and Fy from the
logging components to instantiate their new logging systems' architecture. 2)
Then, the security of the new logging systems can be analysed before deployment
using the systems' architecture, from 1), as a tool.
3.5.2 Discussion of the Logging Components
Section 3.3.3 discusses how the logging components assist in analysing the security
of logging systems. In this subsection, the discussions below provide many other
analyses of the logging components, which affect many aspects of logging systems
in IaaS, as well as PaaS.
The discussions include: any other locations of logging processes or Px and log
files or Fy in the logging components; traditional log files versus Fy in the logging
components; how do the logging components also facilitate the analysis of the
security of Px; and applying the logging components to mitigate risks associated
with CSA threats for PaaS.
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The rest is discussion of: how the logging components facilitate faster logging
system development with security concerns; flexibility and re-usability of devel-
opment of Fy and Px; performance analysis of logging systems which are based
on the logging components; and a TCB size measurement of a logging system in
the cloud based on the logging components.
3.5.2.1 Any Other Locations of Logging Processes (Px) and Log Files
(Fy) in the Logging Components?
We identify and describe all possible and important locations of Px and Fy of
the logging components in the IaaS, as discussed in Section 3.3.2. However,
a basic understanding of logging systems and the logging components in the
Xen-based IaaS layers could apply to more complicated-based layers such as the
layers discussed in [22; 46; 91]. These complicated-based layers can indicate new
locations of Px and Fy apart from the locations which are presented in our logging
components.
For example, [46] states that IaaS is composed of four layers: facility, network,
hardware, and OS; thus it is possible to add Px and Fy into the network layer.
However, we focus only on construction of the logging components based on a
representation of only one machine or server, to have clear comprehension of the
logging components inside a machine before it is connected to other machines to
form the real world IaaS infrastructure. After the logging components for one
machine is clearly understood, then we can consider to add a network layer to
the logging components and may add Px or Fy into the network layer to form
more complicated logging components with a network.
The construction of IaaS layers can vary in the literature. If we map the lay-
ers in the logging components (Figure 3.1) to [46]'s IaaS layers (facility, network,
hardware, and OS), it can be seen that the 'hardware' layer in [46] is the 'hw0'
layer in our logging components. The 'OS' layer in [46] is considered as a combina-
tion of the 'hypervisor, domU, and dom0' in our logging components. Therefore,
in our logging components, there are only two layers which are the hardware and
OS, compared to the four layers in [46]. It is possible to have Px and Fy in the
facility layer. For example, if the facility is a keypad to access to a room that
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locates IaaS severs; thus it is possible to have Px and Fy in the keypad.
However, we focus on construction of the logging components based on the
hardware and OS layer of the IaaS architecture, which are based on the layers
discussed in [46]. We argue that our logging components can be expanded by
adding any extra layer on top of or below the hardware and OS layer. As a result,
one can identify locations of Px and Fy in the newly added layers such as the
network layer. This is out of the scope of this thesis.
3.5.2.2 Traditional Log Files Versus Fy in the Logging Components
The logging components show the possible logical and physical locations of Fy.
These locations can affect many security concerns of logging systems as discussed
in Section 3.3.1 and 3.4.2.4. We did not propose a new approach to enhance the
fundamental properties of log files such as non-repudiation or tamper evident.
There is research such as [83] that outlines or proposes these properties which
can be applied to implementation of Fy.
For example, to deal with the tamper evident property, Fy can be implemented
by re-using existing logging file systems such as in the research done by Crosby
and Wallach, which introduces the semantics of tamper-evident logs using a tree-
based data structure [83]. Therefore, it could be possible to efficiently re-use
existing Fy when building a new logging system, instead of building a whole new
log file system. This should make a logging system reliable, its security analysable,
and its development and deployment faster, more flexible, and rapidly adaptable
in the IaaS real world.
3.5.2.3 How do the Logging Components also facilitate Analysis of
the Security of Logging Processes (Px)
We have already discussed how the logging components facilitate the security
analysis of Fy in Section 3.4.2.4. We also argue that the security of a logging
process (such as P1 in the spamming case study in Figure 3.3) itself has to be
systematically analysed before deployment. For example from Figure 3.3, the
simple security relevant question is, how can customers ensure the integrity of P1
which is run by the provider in dom0 user level? Locating P1 in dom0 user level
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is a security risk because the providers or insiders may maliciously modify P1's
code to produce contents of log files as F3, which benefit themselves.
The possible solutions: in the case study, the problem becomes more com-
plicated because P1 deployed in dom0. This makes P1 is easier to be attacked
by malicious insiders such as administrators who usually have full privilege over
dom0 in IaaS environment. The possible solution is to have a proof to say that
the P1 code is genuine. It may again trusted computing/TPM research which
provides a function (called a remote attestation) to remotely verify the integrity
of the computer platform to prove that some software such as P1 or hardware
is genuine or correct. Work in [52] provides methods of the remote attestation
in the IaaS cloud context. Therefore, we argue that logging system architectures
that are based on the logging components can be used to highlight such security
concerns of P1. These concerns have to be addressed before deploying P1 in the
real world.
3.5.2.4 Performance Analysis of Logging Systems Which are Based
on the Logging Components
This thesis presents only examples of how to analyse the security of a new logging
architecture itself before deployment, in Section 3.4.2.4. However, in the complex
environment of IaaS, performance of the new built logging system could also be
a critical factor that needs to be thoroughly analysed before deployment. For
example, from the logging components (Figure 3.1), the performance of a logging
system that deploys P2 in dom0 kernel, and of one that deploys P4 in domU
kernel, should be different and needs to be considered before deployment.
With knowledge of the locations of Px in the newly built logging system archi-
tecture, made clear by using the logging components, the system's performance
analysis could be feasible. We believe that the logging components can be seen
as a preliminary study to really achieve a complete analysis of the newly built
logging systems, based on all possible aspects, such as security and performance.
60
3.5.2.5 Flexibility and Re-usability of Development of the Log Files
(Fy) and the Logging Processes (Px)
To cope with the continuously changing, growing, or developing behavior of
Internet-based services, [92] states that ideally effort and time commitments of
the deployment of monitoring and evaluation software for Internet applications
would be minimal. This perspective by [92] above should be applied to the devel-
opment of logging systems in the cloud as well. Ideally, effort and time dedication
of the development of logging systems should be as less as possible to cope with
the dynamic behavior of the cloud. In addition, we agree that flexibility and re-
usability of development of Fy and Px could be an important factor to minimise
effort and time dedication of logging system development. This facilitates faster
the logging system development, which will be discussed in Section 3.5.2.6.
For flexibility and re-usability, we argue that Fy can be implemented by re-
using existing log files as partly discussed in Section 3.5.2.2. Fy can also be
implemented and based on provenance concepts which become increasingly im-
portant as discussed in [28]. We have already demonstrated the re-using available
logging processes (libVMI) as P1 can assist building the logging system in the
case study, Section 3.4.2.1. This is possible because the logging components are
implementation independent.
Moreover, the logging components present the logical and physical locations
of Px and Fy in the IaaS structure. Then one can choose these components to
build up their own logging system architecture. This flexibility and re-usability
makes the development of logging systems faster, and more adjustable, as will be
fully discussed in the next section (Section 3.5.2.6). Thus, we are always ready to
deal with new emerging threats in the real world IaaS.
3.5.2.6 The Generic Logging Components Facilitate Faster Logging
System Development With Security Concerns
There is some work focusing on the implementation of Fy such as [83] as discussed
in Section 3.5.2.2. Moreover, other works also focus on implementation of Px such
as all those that are discussed in the related work section (Section 2.8). This thesis
does not focus on creating a new Px and/or Fy. We encourage the building of
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a logging system by following these two steps: 1) the design phase which can
instantiate a logging system architecture by choosing the appropriate Px and Fy
(from the logging components), which fit their needs; and 2) the implementation
phase which can re-use the existing Px and/or Fy systems (if any) that fit the
designed architecture in 1).
Thus, we argue that one can build their own logging systems based on the
logging components with the security concerns of the systems themselves and
their re-usability. However, it is also possible to create their own versions of
logging systems without re-using, but the systems can still be based on the logging
components as well. As a result, all participating parties can analyse how critical
components (Px and Fy) of a newly built system are distributed in the IaaS
visualisation environment, which affects the security of this system.
3.5.2.7 Applying the Logging Components to Mitigate the Risks As-
sociated with CSA Threats for PaaS
Although this thesis focuses on dealing with the CSA threats to IaaS, these threats
affect the security of PaaS and SaaS as well [23]. PaaS can always be built up
by adding extra layers on top of IaaS layers as discussed in the beginning of
Section 2.2. Therefore, comprehension of our proposed logging components and
of logging systems in IaaS could also assist the mitigation of the risks associated
with the CSA threats applicable to the security of PaaS.
For example, it is possible that ones can add the extra layers on top of our
proposed logging components to build up the logging components for PaaS such
as in [22] an integration and middleware layer can be added on top of IaaS to
build up PaaS. Then, they can consider the possible and appropriate locations of
Px and Fy in this new PaaS logging components. These new locations of Px and
Fy in the PaaS architecture could affect their security concerns the same as we
discussed for our logging components for IaaS in this thesis.
3.5.2.8 A TCB size measurement of a logging system in the cloud
based on the logging components
[38] argues that the TCB size of a software system (N.B. a logging system is also a
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Figure 3.6: The biggest TCB size, the dot rectangle
Figure 3.7: The smallest TCB size, the dot rectangle
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software system) can be used to evaluate the trustworthiness of that system. We
can define the size of TCB of a logging system based on the logging components
as the set of all hw, a hypervisor, dom0, and domU. TCB size of a logging system
can be compared to the TCB size of another logging system. For example, the
TCB size of a logging system, which includes all components (hw, a hypervisor,
dom0, and domU) is bigger than the TCB size of another logging system, which
includes only hw, a hypervisor, and dom0.
The biggest TCB size of a logging system is when this system deploys P3 in
domU user level (Figure 3.6). In this case, this TCB size includes hw0, hypervisor,
dom0, and domU. The size includes domU because this deploys P3. Figure 3.7
is the smallest TCB size of a logging system, when the system deploys P5 in
hypervisor. In this case this TCB size includes only hw0 and hypervisor. The
size does not include dom0 and domU because there is no any logging process
is deployed in dom0 and domU. Thus, if all logging processes are only in the
hypervisor, the TCB size includes only the hw0 and hypervisor. This TCB size
is the smallest one.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter addressed Gap 1 (c) which is the lack of security analysis of the
logging systems themselves before the deployment of the systems in to the IaaS
real world productions, as discussed in Section 1.2. The previous chapter provided
a holistic representation of the environment of logging systems in the cloud. This
representation is utilised as the basis for the design of a generic framework of
logging solutions to mitigate the risks associated with CSA threats (Objective 2).
We call this framework generic logging components for infrastructure as
a service (IaaS) cloud.
Thus, the main contribution of this chapter was these generic logging compo-
nents. To facilitate the systematic support for accountability in the cloud, these
generic logging components provide ways to build logging systems. The value
of the generic logging components is to encompass all possible instantiations of
logging solutions for the IaaS cloud, and to provide a clear view of all components
that relate to logging systems in IaaS.
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This view provides a basis for the analysis of logging systems' security before
their deployment. Thus, the generic logging components enable logging systems
to be appropriately designed or manipulated by participating cloud parties in-
cluding a provider, customer, or auditor. As as result, this enhances systematic
support for accountability in the could.
In the next chapter (Chapter 4), the generic logging components are utilised as
the basis for describing the related work in the form of patterns. These patterns
can be made up of the logging components or can be associated to the logging
component configurations. The advantages and disadvantages encountered when
using different patterns can be used to clarify the fact that a number of patterns
and logging system architectures based on these patterns are missing, for example,
our proposed logging system in the spamming case study in Section 3.4.2. The
proposed system is based on a pattern that is quit specifically more easily to be
deployed, but it is not very robust. Chapter 4 also discusses a "spectrum" of
patterns for describing how to construct logging systems of varying quality. It
also presents sophisticated examples or case studies to illustrate and evaluate the
proposed patterns.
The generic logging components are also utilised (in Chapter 5) as the basis
for an analysis of how real world threats, specifically CSA threat 1, affect both
the customer and provider simultaneously. It is also used as the basis for design
of the proposed logging solutions in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1,
in order to benefit both the customer and provider sides.
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Chapter 4
Logging System Architectures and
Patterns
This chapter mainly addresses research Gap 4, which is the lack of descriptions
of logging systems in terms of design patterns of the systems' components. Its
main contribution is three proposed design patterns in the context of logging in
IaaS cloud. The proposed patterns facilitate analysis of logging systems.
The proposed patterns can also bring a number of benefits as the same as
benefits from design patterns in object-oriented software design and development
area. Thus, the proposed patterns could increase reusability of the design and
development of logging systems. Moreover, designers should access the proposed
patterns more easily. Additionally, the proposed patterns could assist a designer
adopts design approaches which make a logging system reusable and not to choose
approaches which do not concern reusability concepts. Lastly, they proposed
patterns can also enhance the documentation and maintenance of existing logging
systems.
We provide a spectrum of patterns for describing how to construct logging
systems with varying characteristics. For developers, when building a logging
system, the knowledge of characteristics of this system could assist them to get
the right design of the system with minimal effort and time commitments. We
also clarify why a number of patterns and logging system architectures based on
these patterns are missing. To the best of our knowledge, these three logging
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patterns are not yet described in the literature.
Thus, this chapter intends to define, identify, and draw conclusions on the
advantages and disadvantages of logging system patterns. Then it analyses ex-
isting works in relation to the patterns. These patterns can be made up of the
generic logging components in Figure 3.1 or can be associated to the logging com-
ponent configurations. This chapter also discusses a "spectrum" of patterns for
describing how to construct logging systems of varying quality or characteristics.
It also presents sophisticated examples or case studies to illustrate and evaluate
the proposed patterns.
Section 4.1 investigates and introduces 93 possible architectures of a logging
system in an IaaS. These architectures are divided into three categories. It also
discusses the structure and example of architectures of each category in details.
Associated with the possible architectures, Section 4.2 identifies and gives con-
clusions on the advantages and disadvantages of logging system patterns. First of
all, the section discusses a definition of a pattern in general and in object-oriented
software design and defines a pattern in logging system design and development.
It then identifies and discusses three patterns for logging systems. After that, it
gives conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of the patterns.
Then, Section 4.3 analyses existing logging and monitoring works and our
proposed system in relation to the patterns. To do so, it discusses advantages and
disadvantages or characteristics of five existing systems, as well as our proposed
system for spam. Lastly, the chapter is briefly summarised and concluded in
Section 4.4.
4.1 All possible architectures of a logging system
This section investigates and introduces 93 possible architectures of a logging
system in an IaaS. These architectures are divided into three categories. It also
discusses the structure and example of architectures of each category in details.
All these possible architectures are formed based on the critical components
or Px and Fy in the generic logging components in Figure 3.1. These components
are in three domains: dom0, domU, and hypervisor. P1 and P2 are in dom0 user
level and kernel level respectively. P3 and P4 are in domU user level and kernel
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level, respectively. Lastly, P5 is inside a hypervisor. For Fy, it is assumed that if
a logging system architecture deploys F1 in diskU or F3 in disk0, it then needs
to eventually deploy F2 in memU or F4 in mem0 respectively. The deployment
of Fy is already discussed in Section 3.3.1.
Any concrete logging system will be based on one of the 93 possible archi-
tectures discussed in Section 4.1.1 to 4.1.3. Based on our investigation in the
literature in this thesis, a few of the possible architectures exist. However, the
non-existing ones can be interesting. For example, an architecture that deploys
all nine Px and Fy, it is the most complicated architecture that is not existing
and will be discussed in Section 4.1.3. One of the architecture's advantages is
having many abilities to facilitate logging tasks including: to record the necessary
logging data as log files across domU and dom0; and/or to assist in collaboration
of Px and Fy with other components such as database components.
Reducing TCB size of a logging system is one of the three aspects of systematic
support for accountability in IaaS, as discussed in Section 1.1, 2.13, and 3.5.2.8.
One of disadvantages of the most complicated architecture is having a big TCB
size of the system. This is because Px and Fy are deployed and distributed across
all the three domains (domU, dom0, and hypervisor).
In contrast, for the most simple architecture as will discussed in Section 4.1.1,
the architecture may not be able to record the necessary logging data across
domU and dom0 compared to the most complicated one. The system TCB size
is smaller than the TCB size of the most complicated one.
To simplify the presentation of all the possible architectures, they are divided
into three categories called: single domain, two domains, and three domains. A
single domain category means that all Px of a logging system are deployed in
either dom0, domU, or a hypervisor. A two domains category means that all
Px of a logging system are deployed in two domains among dom0, domU, or a
hypervisor. A three domains category means that Px are deployed in all three
domains, thus at least one Px of a logging system is deployed in each domain.
The 93 possible architectures compose of: 21 architectures in the single domain
category, 45 architectures in the two domains category, and 27 architectures in the
three domains category. The following subsections will clarify how each category
gets the number of architectures. Below are conditions of all categories:
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1. Each logging system architecture from these three categories has to deploy
Px based on its category's conditions which will be discussed in the following
sections. Eventually, the system has to deploy Fy by choosing one from
these three different approaches of deploying Fy: in disk0, in diskU, or in
both disk0 and diskU which we call disk0U.
2. When a system is deployed in dom0, its Px can be in: dom0 user level as
P1, dom0 kernel level as P2, or both of them
3. When a system is deployed in domU, its Px can be in: domU user level as
P3, domU kernel level as P4, or both of them.
4. When a system is deployed in a hypervisor, its Px can be in only this
hypervisor as P5.
5. The notation PaPb such as P1P2 means that when an architecture or a sys-
tem deploys both Pa and Pb. Thus, P1P2 means that when an architecture
or a system deploys both P1 and P2.
6. PbPa has the same meaning as the meaning of PaPb.
7. In forms such as Pa/Pb, Pa/disk0, PaPb/PcPd, or PaPb/Pc/Pd/diskU,
'/' is a separator notation among the elements of the forms. For example,
Pa/disk0 indicates that Pa is in a domain and disk0 is deployed by a system
that deploys Pa.
4.1.1 The single domain category
This section discusses the structure and example of architectures of this category
in details. We form an architecture of this category by firstly considering the
deployment of Px of a system in either dom0, domU, or a hypervisor, as discussed
in the conditions above. After that, to create a final architecture of this system,
the system can choose to deploy Fy in appropriate locations: diskU, disk0, or
both of them.
For considering of deployment of Px, when Px is deployed in a domain, this
creates one or more forms of deployment of Px. For example, when a system
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deploys one Px (such as Pa) in a domain, this creates one form of deployment
as: a system which deploys Pa called a Pa form. When a system deploys two
Px (such as Pa and Pb) in a domain, this creates three forms of deployment as:
a system which deploys Pa called a Pa form; a system which deploys Pb called
a Pb form; and a system which deploys both Pa and Pb (PaPb) called a PaPb
form.
After that, to create a final architecture of a system, each form above can
choose to deploy Fy in disk0, diskU, or disk0U. For example, a Pa form can deploy
disk0 to create a final architecture of a system which deploys Pa and disk0. We
represent this final architecture as 'Pa/disk0'. Thus, each form can create three
final architectures. For example, a Pa form creates three final architectures as:
Pa/diskU, Pa/disk0, and Pa/disk0U.
Figure 4.1 presents all 21 possible final architectures of the single domain
category. From the figure, each branch can be a final architecture of a logging
system, for example, see the three shaded boxes with the dotted-lines labelled
one. The lines create the branch of dom0, P1, and disk0. This branch is a
final architecture of a logging system, and this architecture is represented as
dom0/P1/disk0 or for short P1/disk0. The representation means that a logging
system that follows this architecture deploys P1 in dom0 user level, F3 in disk0,
and F4 in mem0. The architecture is presented in Figure 4.2.
Forming all the 21 final architectures or branches is discussed in the lists
below:
• 9 architectures when a system deploys Px in dom0
See the three branches originated from dom0 box in Figure 4.1, this creates
three forms as: a system which deploys P1, a system which deploys P2,
and a system which deploys P1P2. These three forms can deploy the three
deployment approaches of Fy or condition 1 discussed above. This then
creates nine architectures as: P1/disk0 (in the figure from dom0 box, see
P1 box and its first branch), P1/diskU, P1/disk0U, P2/disk0, P2/diskU,
P2/disk0U, P1P2/disk0, P1P2/ diskU, and P1P2/ disk0U
• 9 architectures when a system deploys Px in domU
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Figure 4.1: All possible architectures of a single domain category
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Figure 4.2: A logging system architecture deploying P1, F3, and F4 (dom0/P1/disk0
or for short P1/disk0)
See the three branches originated from domU box in Figure 4.1, this cre-
ates other three forms as: a system which deploys P3, a system which
deploys P4, and a system which deploys P3P4. These three forms can de-
ploy the three deployment approaches of Fy. This then creates other nine
architectures as: P3/disk0 (in the figure from domU box, see P3 box and
its first branch), P3/diskU, P3/disk0U, P4/disk0, P4/diskU, P4/disk0U,
P3P4/disk0, P3P4/diskU, and P3P4/ disk0U
• 3 architectures when a system deploys Px in a hypervisor
Lastly, see the branch originated from hypervisor box in Figure 4.1, this
creates only one form which is a system which deploys P5. The form can
deploy the three deployment approaches of Fy. Then, this creates other
three architectures as: P5/disk0, P5/diskU, and P5/disk0U.
Not all 21 architectures of the single domain category already exist. We find
three existing architectures, which are listed below. Some of the architectures are
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from the related work concerning logging systems in IaaS in Section 2.8.
1. The architecture in Figure 4.2 is the architecture of the logging system
(Figure 3.3) in the spamming case study in Section 3.4.2.1.
2. The dotted-lines labelled two in Figure 4.1 create the branch of domU, P3,
and diskU. This is the JAR logging [76] system architecture.
3. The dotted-lines labelled three in Figure 4.1 create the branch of hypervisor,
then P5, and disk0. This architecture is for AVMs [44] system and a system
in [93].
Systems of the other 18 non-existing architectures are feasible to be built.
We do not investigate if all these systems are very useful. However, these archi-
tectures can be used as tools for analysis of systems (e.g., in terms of systems'
robustness) that built based on these architectures. For example, from Figure
4.1, the following non-existing and existing architectures below can be analysed
and compared.
When following the branch dom0/P2/disk0 in Figure 4.1, this is the first
architecture or P2/disk0 non-existing architecture. When following the branch
dom0/P1/disk0, the second one is existing P1/disk0 architecture. A system built
based on the architecture of P2/disk0 should be more robust compared to the
architecture of P1/disk0. Then, for example, it will be more difficult for attackers
to compromise P2 in the kernel of the first architecture, compared to compromis-
ing P1 in the user level of the second architecture. Full analysis of systems that
built based on these non-existing architectures is out of the scope of this thesis.
4.1.2 The two domains category
This section discusses the structure and example of architectures of this category
in details. A two domains category means that all Px of a logging system are
deployed in two domains among the three domains (dom0, domU, or a hypervi-
sor). Figure 4.3 presents the 45 architectures of this category. For example, the
dotted-lines labelled one in the figure create the branch of dom0U, P2, P4, and
disk0U. This branch represents a logging system architecture as P2/P4/disk0U.
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Figure 4.3: All possible architectures of a two domains category
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This means that the architecture deploys P2 in dom0 kernel, P4 in domU kernel,
F1 in diskU, F2 in memU, F3 in disk0, and F4 in mem0. The architecture is
presented in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: A logging system architecture deploying P2, P4, and F1 to F4
A box which labelled disk0, diskU, or disk0U is the end of the representation
of a final architecture. For example, from the first stack of boxes from the right of
Figure 4.3, the top box of the stack is disk0 box which can be repetitively linked
back to P3, P1, and dom0U box. This representation is a dom0U/P1/P3/disk0
or P3/P1/disk0 architecture and applies to the discussions of the next category.
We form an architecture of this category by firstly considering the deployment
of Px of a system in the first domain then in the second domain. Finally, to create
a final architecture of this system, the system can choose to deploy Fy in disk0,
diskU, or disk0U, see condition 1. This section represents a Pa form as just Pa,
Pb form as Pb, and PaPb form as PaPb. For example, a P1 form, P2 form,
and P1P2 form are represented as P1, P2, and P1P2, respectively. Dom0U is
an abbreviation which means that Px are deployed in both dom0 and domU.
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Dom0H and domUH are also abbreviations which mean that Px are deployed in
both dom0 and hypervisor (H) and in both domU and hypervisor, respectively.
Below are discussions of forming the 45 architectures.
• 27 architectures when deploying Px in dom0 then in domU (dom0U)
There are three forms of deploying Px in dom0: P1, P2, and P1P2 see
the three branches originated from dom0U box in Figure 4.3. Then, each
form can deploy other three forms of domU: P3, P4, and P3P4 see the
three branches originated from each of boxes labelled P1, P2, or P1P2
after box dom0U in the figure. Thus, this generates nine forms of dom0U:
P1/P3, P1/P4, P1/P3P4, P2/P3, P2/P4, P2/P3P4, P1P2/P3, P1P2/P4,
and P1P2/P3P4.
Finally, these nine forms can choose to deploy Fy by the three different ap-
proaches or condition 1. When multiplying these 9 forms by the 3 different
approaches of deploying Fy, this generates the 27 final architectures. These
architectures are in Figure 4.3, from the first stack of boxes from the right
of the figure see the first 27 boxes from the top of the stack.
• 9 architectures when deploying Px in dom0 then in hypervisor (dom0H)
There are three forms of deploying Px in dom0: P1, P2, and P1P2 see the
three branches originated from dom0H box in Figure 4.3. Then, each form
can deploy a form of hypervisor as P5 see the branch originated from each
of boxes labelled P1, P2, or P1P2 after box dom0H in the figure. Thus,
this generates 3 forms of dom0H: P1/P5, P2/P5, and P1P2/P5.
These three forms can choose to deploy Fy by the three different approaches.
When multiplying these 3 forms by the 3 different approaches of deploying
Fy, this generates the 9 final architectures. They are in Figure 4.3, from the
first stack of boxes from the right of the figure see the 10th to 18th boxes
from the bottom of the stack.
• 9 architectures when deploying Px in domU then in hypervisor (domUH)
There are three forms of deploying Px in domU: P3, P4, and P3P4 see the
three branches originated from domUH box in Figure 4.3. Then, each form
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can deploy a form of hypervisor as P5 see the branch originated from each
of boxes labelled P3, P4, or P3P4 after box domUH in the figure. Thus,
this generates three forms of domUH: P3/P5, P4/P5, and P3P4/P5.
These three forms can choose to deploy Fy from the three different ap-
proaches. This also generates 9 final architectures. They are in Figure 4.3,
from the first stack of boxes from the right of the figure see the first nine
boxes from the bottom of the stack.
We find two existing architectures of this category which are listed below.
1. The architecture in Figure 4.4 is the architecture of Flogger [30] which is
the branch of P2/P4/disk0U.
2. The dotted-lines labelled two in Figure 4.3 create the branch of P1P2/P4/
disk0. This is PASSXen [43] system architecture which is Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: An architecture of PASSXen
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Systems of the other 43 non-existing architectures are feasible to be built. We
do not investigate if all these systems are very useful. However, these architectures
can be used as tools for analysis of the systems (such as in terms of robustness
of the systems) that built based on them. For example, from Figure 4.3, the two
following non-existing architectures can be analysed and compared to.
When following the branch dom0H/P2/P5/disk0 in Figure 4.3, this is the
first architecture which is P2/P5/disk0. When following the branch dom0U/P1/
P3/disk0 in the figure, the second one is P1/P3/disk0 architecture. A system
built based on the first architecture should be more robust compared to a system
built based on the second architecture. Then, for example, it will be more difficult
for attackers to compromise P2 in the kernel and P5 in hypervisor of the first
architecture, compared to compromising P1 and P3 in the user levels of the second
one. Full analysis of systems that built based on these non-existing architectures
is out of the scope of this thesis.
4.1.3 The three domains category
This section discusses the structure and example of architectures of this category
in details. A three domains category means that Px are deployed in all three
domains or that at least one Px of a logging system is deployed in each of the
three domains. Figure 4.6 presents 27 possible architectures of the catalogue.
We form an architecture of this category by firstly considering the deployment
of Px of a system in the first, second, then third domains. Finally, to create a
final architecture of this system, the system can choose to deploy Fy with the
three different approaches or condition 1. Dom0UH (the second box from the
left of Figure 4.6) is an abbreviation which means that Px are deployed in dom0,
domU, and hypervisor.
For example, the dotted-lines labelled one in the figure create the branch of
P1/P3/P5/disk0. It is a logging system architecture which deploys P1 in dom0
user level, P3 in domU user level, P5 in a hypervisor, F3 in disk0, and F4 in mem0.
The most complicated architecture can be the one when following the dotted-lines
labelled two in Figure 4.6. This is P1P2/P3P4/P5/disk0U architecture which
deploys all the nine critical logging components or the five Px and four Fy.
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Figure 4.6: All possible architectures of a three domains category
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To form all the 27 architectures, there are three forms of deploying Px in dom0:
P1, P2, and P1P2 see the three branches originated from dom0UH box in Figure
4.6. Then, each form can deploy other three forms of domU: P3, P4, and P3P4
see the three branches originated from each of boxes labelled P1, P2, or P1P2
after box dom0UH in the figure. Thus, this generates nine forms: P1/P3, P1/P4,
P1/P3P4, P2/P3, P2/P4, P2/P3P4, P1P2/P3, P1P2/P4, and P1P2/P3P4.
After that, each form can deploy a form of domH as P5 see the branch origi-
nated from each of boxes labelled P3, P4, or P3P4 after the boxed labelled P1, P2,
or P1P2 in the figure. Thus, this generates nine forms (see the nine boxes labelled
P5): P1/P3/P5, P1/P4/P5, P1/P3P4/P5, P2/P3/P5, P2/P4/P5, P2/P3P4/P5,
P1P2/P3/P5, P1P2/P4/P5, and P1P2/P3P4/P5.
Finally, these nine generated forms can choose to deploy Fy with the three dif-
ferent approaches. When multiplying these 9 forms by the 3 different approaches
of deploying of Fy, this generates the 27 final architectures. These architectures
are in Figure 4.6, see all the boxes of the first stack of boxes from the right of the
figure.
We did not find existing architectures of this category yet. Systems of these
architectures are feasible to be built. We do not investigate if all these systems
are very useful. However, as the same as the non-existing architectures of the
first two categories, the architectures in this category can be used as tools for
analysis of systems that built based on them.
4.2 Logging System Patterns in IaaS
This section defines and identifies logging system patterns. It then gives conclu-
sions on the advantages and disadvantages of the patterns. It starts by discussions
of a definition of a pattern in general and in object-oriented software design. It
then defines a pattern in logging system design and development area. The sec-
tion then identifies and discusses three patterns for logging systems. Finally, it
gives conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of the patterns.
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4.2.1 Defining Logging System Patterns
This section gives a definition of a pattern in general and in object-oriented soft-
ware design. Then, it defines a pattern in logging system design and development
in IaaS.
4.2.1.1 Definition of a pattern in general and in object-oriented soft-
ware design
In general, [49] describes a design pattern as "a documented best practice or core
of a solution that has been applied successfully in multiple environments to solve
a problem that recurs in a specific set of situations." Based on simple and ele-
gant solutions to specific problems in object-oriented software design, [50] design
patterns (also called by [94] as software design patterns) are defined as:
"descriptions of communicating objects and classes that are customized to
solve a general design problem in a particular context."
[49] states that patterns typically comprise of a name, a purpose, a description
of when and why to apply the pattern, structural diagrams, examples of use, and
a discussion of interactions with other patterns.
Gamma et al [50] discuss a number of benefits of the design patterns. They
state that: "design patterns make it easier to reuse successful designs and ar-
chitectures. Expressing proven techniques as design patterns makes them more
accessible to developers of new systems. Design patterns help you choose design
alternatives that make a system reusable and avoid alternatives that compromise
reusability. Design patterns can even improve the documentation and main-
tenance of existing systems by furnishing an explicit specification of class and
object interactions and their underlying intent. Put simply, design patterns help
a designer get a design right faster".
The design patterns in logging context could bring the same benefits as above.
These benefits could be: to promote the reusability of design and development of
logging systems; to make the logging design patterns more accessible to developers
of new logging systems; to assist a designer chooses design alternatives that make
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a logging system reusable and avoid alternatives that compromise reusability;
and to improve the documentation and maintenance of existing logging systems
by providing an explicit specification of the critical logging components (Px and
Fy) with their locations in IaaS infrastructure and the components' underlying
intent. To sum up, logging patterns could assist a designer gains a design right
faster.
Apart from the object-oriented area, design patterns are also applied in other
environments [49]. For example, with only trivial changes, a design pattern de-
scription can be adapted to refer to software design patterns in general [49]. Thus,
design patterns should be applicable in the area of the logging system design and
development in IaaS as well. We define and identify patterns for this area.
4.2.1.2 Defining a pattern in logging system design and development
For simplicity, we call a design pattern of logging system design and development
in IaaS as a 'pattern'. We will define its definition from design patterns discussed
by Gamma et al in Section 4.2.1.1. Their definition of a design pattern is:
descriptions of communicating objects and classes that are customized
to solve a general design problem in a particular context.
For further discussions and based on the generic logging components, our
general definition of a design pattern or pattern in logging system design and
development environment is:
descriptions of participating critical components (Px and Fy) and
their locations that are customized (the components can be appropriately
located in IaaS components including domU, dom0, and hypervisor) to
solve a general design problem in a particular context.
Participating critical components are Px and Fy that are used to form a log-
ging system.
From the generic logging components in Figure 3.1, the logging processes or
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P1 to P5 and log files or F1 to F4 are critical components of a logging system, as
discussed in Section 2.9 and 3.2. Our patterns can be used to describe or compare
between logging systems in IaaS in terms of their characteristics or advantages
and disadvantages. This should facilitate design and development of the systems.
Figure 3.3 is an architecture of a logging system. Based on our investigation,
this architecture is only one of all the 93 possible logging system architectures
which are discussed in Section 4.1. A software design pattern can be used as a
blueprint to create a concrete software architecture before building the software.
In the logging system context, a concrete logging system architecture can be
derived from a pattern as well. An absolute number of locations of Px and
Fy deployed in a concrete system architecture derived from any of our patterns
depends on the requirements and the context of the system. We identify patterns
in IaaS logging environment in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.2 Identifying patterns for logging system design and
development
This section identifies and discusses our three patterns for logging system design
and development in IaaS.
Heer and Agrawala [94] identify software design patterns for information visu-
alization based upon a review of existing frameworks and their own experiences
building visualization software for the domain of information visualization. This
section identifies patterns in IaaS logging environment based on the idea that we
need a logging system that is simple and cheap for design and development, can
facilitate enforcement of security policy of a logging system itself, or is capable
of capturing as much as the necessary logging data as possible.
To achieve this idea, we follow three approaches. Based on the generic logging
components of Figure 3.1, the first one is to investigate and evaluate all possible
forms of distribution of Px and Fy (to form a logging system) into a customer
side structure and a provider side structure. The next one is to investigate and
evaluate the distributions of Px and Fy in system architectures of the related work
concerning logging systems in IaaS in Section 2.8. The last one is to leverage our
experiences building the prototype of logging systems in the spamming case study
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in Section 3.4.2.
The following sections describe our three identified patterns called: simple
logging system, security facilitator logging system, and complex logging system.
In the object oriented software development area, [50] describe their well-known
design patterns using a consistent format. We follow this format to describe our
patterns. The elements of the format are: pattern name, intent, motivation, ap-
plicability, structure, participants, collaborations, consequences, implementation,
known uses, and related patterns.
The common abilities of a logging system based on any of the three patterns
are to capture and store necessary logging data. We define the meaning of this
necessary logging data as: behaviour or activities of a process or processes in
domU or as: a domU file's life cycle. An example of the data of behaviour or
activities of a process or processes is discussed in Section 3.4.2 (the spamming
case study) and Section 3.4.4. The example of data of a domU file's life cycle can
be the creation, access, and destruction of the file, as discussed in [43]; or tracing
domUs' data and files since they were created until deletion, as discussed in [27].
Chapter 5 fully discusses this data.
Note that, an absolute number of locations of Px and Fy deployed in a concrete
system architecture derived from any of our patterns depends on the requirements
and the context of the system.
4.2.2.1 Simple Logging System Pattern




Provide a simple logging system architecture for capturing the necessary
logging data then storing the captured data as log files, which can decrease
effort and time of design and development of the system.
3. Motivation
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• Problem The changing, growing, or developing behaviour of Internet-
based services are continuous as argued by Parkin and Morgan [92].
They also state that ideally effort and time commitments of the deploy-
ment of monitoring and evaluation software for Internet applications
would be minimal. Minimizing the effort and time commitments ben-
efit rapid logging system development which is an important aspect
of the development of logging systems in the cloud, as discussed in
Section 3.5.2.6
• Solution The solution is to minimize effort and time commitments
of design and development of logging systems. This can be achieved
when the system deploys Px and Fy in either only the provider side or
only the customer side.
This does not include the deployment of Px as P5 in a hypervisor.
To do so needs to modify the hypervisor. The deployment is compli-
cated. The work of [93] apply this deployment. However, the output
of their system is only small parts of the necessary logging data. The
output is not sufficient to be considered as the necessary logging data.
PASSXen [43] also do not publicly publish the code of their work,
which is necessary to apply this deployment.
Moreover, the source code of the present hypervisors including VMware
and Xen are large and complex [95]. Then, to modify a hypervisor for
deployment of Px in it is a challenge. The challenge can increase effort
and time commitments of the deployment of a logging system. The
deployment is opposite to the aim of this pattern. The aim of this
pattern is to minimize effort and time commitments of design and de-
velopment of logging systems. Therefore, the pattern does not include
the deployment of Px as P5 in a hypervisor.
• How and why the pattern works, and its example scenario
When Px and Fy of a system are in the same side, this is easier for de-
sign and development of the system compared to when the components
are distributed across both sides.
In the context of identifying spam activities in an IaaS, an example
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scenario of a customized concrete system for the context is the logging
system in Figure 3.3, discussed in Section 3.4.2. This system records
spam activities in domU, and is a simple logging system architecture
derived from this pattern. P1 is installed in dom0 user level to capture
the necessary logging data from domU. The captured data is stored as
log files F3. Px (P1) and Fy (F3) are both on the provider side. This
minimizes effort and time commitments of design and deployment of
the logging system.
4. Applicability
Use the pattern when:
• To cope with rapid growing of an IaaS, the logging system development
also need to be fast.
• Logging systems are located in an IaaS visualisation infrastructure
which involves more than one party. The infrastructure is normally
complicated. To place Px and Fy diffusely in many locations in the in-
frastructure may cause difficulties in terms of design and development
of the systems.
• One wants quick, cheap, and simple ways to design and develop logging
systems in an IaaS.
5. Participants
• Provider side deployment
 P1, P2: processes that individually or co-operationally capture the
necessary logging data and store the captured data as log files.
 F3: log files to be used to store the data captured by P1 and/or
P2.
• Customer side deployment
 P3, P4: processes that individually or co-operationally capture the
necessary logging data and store the captured data as log files.
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 F1: log files to be used to store the data captured by P3 and/or
P4.
6. Structure
The descriptions of this pattern's structure is that both Px and Fy are
deployed in either only the provider side or only the customer side. This
does not include deployment of Px in a hypervisor. Figure 4.7 presents this
Figure 4.7: A structure of the simple logging system pattern
structure.
Figure 4.7 a is an overall structure of the pattern. Figure 4.7 b is expand-
ing descriptions of dotted-line boxes in dom0 and domU. It illustrates all
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possible forms or architectures when the pattern deploying Pa and/or Pb
which creates three architectures. They are: Pa as the architecture that
deploys only Pa see the first arrow line from the top of Figure 4.7 b, Pb as
the one that deploys only Pb see the second arrow line in the figure, and
PaPb as the one that deploys both Pa and Pb see the last arrow line in the
figure. For example, when this pattern deploys P1 and/or P2, this creates
three architecture as: P1, P2, and P1P2. Figure 4.7 a and b enforce the
deployment of an architecture derived from the pattern as discussed in the
lists below.
• The provider side deployment: when a logging system architecture
deploys Px in the provider side (P1 and/or P2 in the boxes in dom0
in Figure 4.7 a), the architecture also deploys Fy in this provider side
as F3 and F4 see inside the thick-dot-line box in hw0 in Figure 4.7 a.
• The customer side deployment: when a logging system architec-
ture deploys Px in the customer side (P3 and/or P4 or the boxes in
domU), then the architecture also deploys Fy in this customer side as
F1 and F2 see inside the hwU box in Figure 4.7 a.
Based on the structure of the pattern, there are six concrete logging sys-
tem architectures based on this pattern. All of them are in the single
domain category (Figure 4.1 in Section 4.1.1). From the figure, for the
provider side deployment and when following the branches in this figure,
there are three architectures. They are the branches of: dom0/P1/disk0,
dom0/P2/disk0, and dom0/P1P2/disk0. For the customer side deployment,
there are other three architectures: domU/P3/diskU, domU/P4/diskU, and
domU/P3P4/diskU.
7. Collaborations
• Provider side deployment
 P1 can collaborate with P2 (and vice versa) to capture the nec-
essary logging data and to store the captured data as log files or
F3.
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 P1, P2, or both normally write(s) the captured data to disk0 as
F3.
• Customer side deployment
 P3 can collaborate with P4 (and vice versa) to capture the nec-
essary logging data and to store the captured data as log files or
F1.
 P3, P4, or both normally write(s) the captured data to diskU as
F1.
8. Consequences
Below are benefits and liabilities of this pattern. Basically, a logging system
architecture derived from this pattern is simple but not secure.
• The benefits:
It is simple, cheap, and fast to design and develop a logging system
in IaaS. This is because: there is no unnecessary modifications to a
hypervisor; and modifications are in only one side not both sides.
• The liabilities:
Security issues of a concrete logging system architecture derived from
this pattern come from both sides, as discussed in the lists below.
 Security issues when deploying Px in the provider side
Section 3.3.3.1 discussed that when a logging system deploys P1
in dom0, which is owned and controlled by a provider, this may
lead to integrity issues of the system. This is because malicious
insiders may modify P1's code to benefit themselves. This is a
serious concern as argued by [46; 88; 89].
 Security issues when deploying Fy in the provider side
Section 3.3.3.2 discussed that when any logging system deploys F3
in hw0, this may lead to privacy issues. This is because malicious
insiders may learn about customers' personal data from F3 or F4.
 Security issues when deploying Px in the customer side
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Section 3.3.3.1 discussed that when deploying P3 in domU, this
may lead to integrity issues because domU cannot be trusted from
the providers' perspective to have installed security software, as
argued by [78]. Attackers who compromise and take control over
domU or malicious domU owners may modify P3 in domU to alter
logging system's behaviour to benefit themselves, as will be fully
discussed in Section 5.4 and 5.5. Placing P3 in domU also allows
the owner of domU to tamper with the components, as mentioned
by [30; 39; 78; 96; 97].
 Security issues when deploying Fy in the customer side
This is the same as the drawback of P3 discussed above. This is
because domU cannot be trusted [78]. When a pattern deploys F1
and F2, attackers who compromise and take control over domU or
malicious domU owners may modify these files.
9. Implementation
Below are some helpful techniques for implementing the pattern.
• As discussed in Section 2.12 the kernel usually resides in an elevated
system state compared to normal user applications [2]. This includes
a protected memory space and full access to the hardware [2]. Thus,
a system should be more robust when deploying Px in a kernel level
compared to in user level. Then, for example, it will be more difficult
for attackers to compromise Px.
• When a concrete logging system architecture derived from this pattern
deploys Px in user level in domU or dom0, the system may be less
robust compared to when deploying Px in the kernel. For example,
binding Px with the kernel, which is in a protected memory space, is
more difficult for attackers to compromise compared to compromising
Px in user level.
• Section 3.5.2.5 already and fully discussed flexibility and re-usability
of development of Px and Fy. There are existing user level Px such
as libVMI [79] (as P1 discussed in Section 3.4.2.1) or the JAR logging
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[76] (as P3 discussed in Section 2.8), thus ones can reuse them. Fy
can be implemented by re-using existing logging file systems such as a




Below are two existing concrete architectures of this pattern, see Figure 4.1.
• The dotted-lines labelled one in Figure 4.1 create the architecture of
dom0/P1/disk0. Actual systems that apply this architecture include:
a network monitoring application in [1]; a demo monitoring program
in [39]; and the logging application (Figure 3.3) in the spamming case
study in Section 3.4.2.
• The dotted-lines labelled two in Figure 4.1 create the architecture of
domU/P3/diskU. The JAR logging [76] system applies this architec-
ture.
12. Related Patterns
A logging system that is derived from the simple logging system pattern
when this system deploys Px and Fy in the provider side can be also con-
sidered as a derivation of the security facilitator logging system pattern.
This will be fully described in the 'Related Patterns' element of the secu-
rity facilitator logging system pattern in Section 4.2.2.2.
4.2.2.2 Security Facilitator Logging System Pattern
The security of logging systems themselves is very important. To enforce the
security policy of these systems in the IaaS context is also significant. Thus, we
separate the security facilitator logging system pattern from the simple logging
system pattern. In IaaS context, a concrete logging system architecture that is
derived from this pattern can facilitate enforcement of a security policy of the
system itself in terms of integrity considerations.
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Anderson et al [98] define a security policy as "a high-level specification of
the security properties that a given system should possess". Bishop [99] argues
that all related features of confidentiality, integrity, and availability are the con-
sideration of a security policy. This section limits the discussions to the integrity
consideration of a security policy, i.e., the integrity policies. In the context of log-
ging in IaaS, the security concern is the integrity of log files (Fy) that is produced
by Px as discussed in the end of Section 2.11. Additionally, for the integrity of
Px that produces Fy, Px must not be randomly changed.
Bishop [99] argues that the difference between commercial requirements and
military requirements is that the former focuses on preserving data integrity. As
the goals of the integrity policies, he also refers to five requirements which is
defined by Lipner [100]. The first requirement is that:
users1 will not write2 their own programs3, but will use existing produc-
tion programs and databases4.
To create a requirement of the integrity policies of a logging system, the first
requirement by Lipner also can apply to this creating requirement as:
domU owners, or customers1' will not develop2' logging systems3', but
will use the logging systems developed by providers4'.
With the different contexts, the users1 is similar to the domU owners, or
customers1', write2 is similar to develop2', and so on.
DomU cannot be trusted from the providers' perspective to install security
software (e.g., logging systems) [78] as discussed in Section 3.3.3.1. Concerning
our created requirement of the integrity policies of a logging system, when one
deploys Px and Fy in domU, an owner of this domU may change these compo-
nents. If we want to facilitate enforcement of these integrity policies, we need to
obey the created requirement. This is achieved if: Px and Fy are deployed in
the provider side.
In IaaS logging context, this pattern facilitates enforcement of a security policy
of a logging system in terms of the integrity aspect discussed above. The elements
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below are the descriptions of this pattern.
1. Pattern Name
Security Facilitator Logging System
2. Intent




Deploying Px and Fy in domU allows the owner of this domU to tamper
with them, as agreed by [30; 39; 78; 96; 97]. [97] states that when a
monitored machine resides in the same machine as the detector system,
the owners of the monitoring machine can disable the detection system,
or modify the detected data.
• Solution The solution is to deploy Px and Fy only in the provider
side.
• How and why the pattern works, and its example scenario
An IaaS server has dom0 that is responsible for the administration
of domUs [41]. One dom0 in the provider side can host a number of
domU in the customer side. The number can be numerous. Ideally,
one logging system should monitor all the monitored domUs, not one
logging system for one monitored domU.
Regarding enforcement of a security policy of a logging system in terms
of the integrity aspects, deploying a logging system (Px and Fy) in the
provider side makes the enforcement easier than deploying the system
in the customer side. The first reason is that deploying a logging
system in the provider side needs only one logging system in dom0 to
monitor all domUs.
In contrast, deploying logging systems in the customer side needs a
logging system in each of all domUs. If the number of domUs is nu-
merous, it should be difficult to enforce the security policy of each of
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all the systems in all the domUs, compared to enforce the policy of
only one system in dom0.
The second reason is that, if deploying logging systems in all domUs
instead of deploying one logging system in dom0, this allows the owners
of domUs to tamper with the systems, as discussed above. This is a
challenge for the enforcement of the policy. Lastly, it should be difficult
for domU owners to tamper with (e.g., alter the code of) a logging
system in the provider side. This is because the domU owners have no
control over the components that are in the provider side. A logging
system in the provider side makes it easier for the enforcement of the
policy.
4. Applicability
Use the pattern when:
• To facilitate enforcement of a security policy of a logging system in
terms of the integrity aspects in IaaS.
• A system should be in only the provider side.
5. Participants
• P1, P2, P5: processes that individually or co-operationally capture the
necessary logging data and store the captured data as log files.
• F3: log files of the captured data by P1, P2, and/or P5.
6. Structure
The descriptions of the structure of this pattern is that 'Px and Fy need
to be deployed only in the provider side'. Figure 4.8 presents the structure
of this pattern. Figure 4.8 a is an overall structure of the pattern. When
a logging system deploys P1, P2, and/or P5 (see the dotted-line boxes in
dom0 and in hypervisor in Figure 4.8 a), this system also needs to deploy
F3 and F4 see the dotted-line box in hw0 in Figure 4.8 a. The deployment
of these Px and Fy is in the provider side.
Figure 4.8 b is expanding descriptions of the dotted-line boxes in dom0
and in hypervisor. It illustrates all possible forms or architectures when
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Figure 4.8: A structure of the security facilitator logging system pattern
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the pattern deploying P1, P2, and/or P5 which creates seven architectures.
They are: P1, P2, P5, P1P2, P1P5, P2P5, and P1P2P5, see the first to the
seventh arrow lines from the top of Figure 4.8 b. Then, each architecture
needs to deploy F3 and F4.
There are seven concrete architectures of the pattern. In the single do-
main category or Figure 4.1, for the provider side deployment and when
following the branches in this figure, there are four architectures. They
are the branches of: dom0/P1/disk0, dom0/P2/disk0, dom0/P1P2/disk0,
and hypervisor/P5/disk0. In the two domains category or Figure 4.3,
when following the branches in this figure, there are three architectures.
They are the branches of: dom0H/P1/P5/disk0, dom0H/P2/P5/disk0, and
dom0H/P1P2/P5/disk0.
7. Collaborations
• Px (P1, P2, and/or P5) can collaborate with another or other Px
(and vice versa) to capture the necessary logging data and to store the
captured data as log files or F3.
• P1, P2, and/or P5 normally write(s) the captured data to disk0 as F3.
8. Consequences
Below are benefits and liabilities of the pattern. In summary, this pattern
facilitates enforcement of a security policy of a logging system in terms of
the integrity aspects, or for short: the integrity policies of a logging system.
However, when deploying Px and Fy in provider sides, this may give them
more control over the logging systems.
• The benefits:
 It facilitates enforcement of the integrity policies of a logging sys-
tem.
 This pattern could benefit rapid logging system development which
is an important aspect for the development of logging systems in
the cloud, as discussed in Section 3.5.2.6. This is because there
will be modifications on only provider components (e.g., dom0
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and/or hypervisor) but domUs in the customer side, which can be
a numerous number of them.
 The next advantage is small performance impact on domUs. This
is because there are no modifications to domUs in the customer
side.
 When a logging system is in the provider side, it should be difficult
for malicious domU's owners from the customer side to tamper
with (e.g., alter the code of) Px and/or Fy in the system.
 This thesis focuses on the systematic aspects for accountability
in the cloud as discussed in Section 1.1. One of the aspects is to
concern reducing a TCB size of a logging system. The TCB is
discussed in Section 1.1, 1.2, 2.13, and 3.5.2.8. A logging system
derived from this pattern yields the smallest TCB size compared to
the TCB sizes yielded from the other patterns. Section 3.5.2.8 has
discussed the smallest TCB size of a logging system (Figure 3.7).
 A logging system derived from this pattern can simplify the man-
agement of the system. This is because the management will be
achieved in only the provider side, not in both the provider side
and the customer side.
 As discussed in Section 3.3.3.1 that domU in the customer side can
not be trusted to deploy security software inside it. This pattern
has no deployment of Px and Fy in customer sides. Thus, there
are no security issues generated from the customer side.
• The liabilities:
 More control over logging systems by a provider
When deploying Px and Fy in the provider side, this may give it
more control over a logging system. This leads to security issues
discussed below.
 Security issues when deploying Px and Fy in the provider side
Section 3.3.3.1 discussed that when a logging system deploys P1
in the provider side or in dom0, this may lead to integrity issues
of the system. This is because malicious insiders may modify P1's
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code to benefit themselves. This is a serious concern as argued
by [46; 88; 89].
Section 3.3.3.2 discussed that when any logging system deploys F3
in hw0, this may lead to privacy issues. This is because malicious
insiders may learn about customers' personal data from F3 or F4.
9. Implementation
Below are some helpful techniques for implementing the pattern.
• When a concrete logging system architecture that is derived from this
pattern deploys Px in only a hypervisor, the system architecture yields
the smallest TCB size (Figure 3.7).
• As discussed in Section 2.2.1 that a hypervisor is run directly on hard-
ware of a computer machine. It allows the machine to run multiple
guest OSs (dom0 and a number of domUs) at the same time [52]. Thus,
regardless of the hardware, a hypervisor is in a lower layer compared
to dom0.
A system should be more robust when deploying Px in a hypervisor
level compared to when this Px is in a dom0 user or kernel level. This
is because a dom0 user or kernel level is in a higher layer compared
to a hypervisor. Thus, binding Px with a hypervisor is more difficult
for attackers to compromise the Px in a hypervisor level compared to
compromising the Px in a dom0 user or kernel level.
However, to place Px in a hypervisor is a challenge. One of the rea-
sons can be that the source code of the present hypervisors including
VMware and Xen are large and complex [95].
• Section 3.5.2.5 discussed re-usability of Px and Fy. There are existing
Px that can work in the provider side such as libVMI [79] (as P1,
discussed in Section 3.4.2.1), thus a logging system that is derived from
this pattern can reuse this existing Px. The system can implement
Fy by re-using existing logging file systems such as a tree-based data





Below are two existing concrete architectures derived from this pattern, see
Figure 4.1.
• The dotted-lines labelled one in Figure 4.1 create the architecture of
dom0/P1/disk0. Actual systems that use this architecture include:
a network monitoring application in [1], a demo monitoring program
in [39], and the logging application (Figure 3.3) in the spamming case
study in Section 3.4.2.
• The dotted-lines labelled three in Figure 4.1 create the architecture of
hypervisor/P5/disk0. This architecture is for AVMs [44] system and
a system in [93].
12. Related Patterns
A logging system that is derived from this pattern when the system deploys
Px and Fy in the provider side without deploying P5 is also considered
as a derivation of the simple logging system pattern. In this case, this
system inherits main benefits from both patterns. They are to facilitate
enforcement of a security policy of the system itself and to enable simple
and cheap design and development of the system.
4.2.2.3 Complex Logging System Pattern
The pattern is capable of capturing log files across the customer side (domUs)
and the provider side (a hypervisor and dom0). Examples of the log files are
discussed by Ko et al [30]. They explain that when one domU (that is hosted
by dom0) sends a file to another domU, the loggers need to record this sending
event as a log file of the first domU (called a log fileA). At the same time and
to correspond to log fileA, the corresponding dom0 log file (called log fileB) is
also generated in this dom0. Log files across the customer side (domUs) and the
provider side (dom0) can be used to provide full transparency of all operations





Provide abilities to capture the necessary logging data across the customer
side and the provider side.
3. Motivation
• Problem
For loggers1 to perform effective monitoring of data in the cloud, Ko
et al [30] introduce five necessary requirements. One of them is 'tran-
scend virtual machine (VM) and physical machine (PM)2'. To do so,
their loggers must be in kernel space, and must be able to transcend
both domU and dom0 spaces. This provides full transparency of all
operations in the cloud [30]. To satisfy this requirement, their loggers
need to have abilities to capture the necessary logging data across the
customer side (domUs) and the provider side (dom0s).
• Solution
To provide such abilities to capture the necessary logging data across
domUs and dom0s, Ko et al [30] deploy their Px and Fy in both the
customer side and provider side. We believe that deploying Px and
Fy in both sides can provide such abilities to logging systems as done
by [30]. This provision is significant for logging and accountability
approaches in a complicated IaaS environment which involves virtuali-
sation infrastructure and more than one party. Note that, this chapter
does not investigate capturing the necessary logging data as log files
across both sides by deploying Px and Fy only in either sides.
• How and why the pattern works, and its example scenario
To provide full transparency of all operations in the complicated IaaS
environment and to benefits the accountability, logging systems should
1They are Px in our generic logging components (Figure 3.1)
2A PM is dom0 in our IaaS architecture in Figure 2.1 and 3.1
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be able to record as much necessary logging data as possible. The sys-
tems have to be equipped with sophisticated abilities such as to cap-
ture the necessary logging data across domUs and dom0s as discussed
above. Deploying Px and Fy across both customer and provider sides
means that Px and Fy can be distributed to all critical inner layers
of the IaaS infrastructure such as in dom0 user level or domU ker-
nel. This should enable Px and Fy to cooperate in capturing of the
necessary logging data as much as possible.
4. Applicability
Use the pattern when:
• To provide a logging system in IaaS infrastructure with concerning
to cover abilities to capture the necessary logging data across both a
customer and provider side.
• Px and Fy of a system should be in both a customer and provider side.
5. Participants
• Provider side participants
 P1, P2, P5: processes that individually or co-operationally capture
the necessary logging data and store the captured data as log files.
 F3: log files of the captured data by P1, P2, and/or P5.
• Customer side participants
 P3, P4: processes that individually or co-operationally capture the
necessary logging data and store the captured data as log files.
 F1: log files of the captured data by P3 and/or P4.
6. Structure
The descriptions of this pattern's structure is that a concrete logging system
architecture derived from this pattern has to deploy Px and Fy in both
customer and provider sides. The descriptions can be interpreted as: this
system architecture needs to deploys at least one Px in the provider side
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and at least another Px in the customer side. It then has to deploy F1 in
the customer side and F3 in the provider side.
Figure 4.9 presents the structure of this pattern. A concrete logging system
Figure 4.9: A structure of the complex logging system pattern
architecture that derived from this pattern has to follow the structure in
this figure. From the figure, the system architecture needs to deploy at least
one Px in the provider side or choose one of the seven forms pointed by the
arrow lines in Figure 4.9 a. Then, it needs to deploy at least one Px in the
customer side or choose one of the three forms pointed by the arrow lines
in Figure 4.9 b. Finally, the architecture has to deploy Fy in both sides see
Figure 4.9 c which is deployment of F1 and F2 in the customer side (hwU)
and F3 and F4 in the provider side (hw0).
There are 21 concrete logging system architectures based on this pattern.
First 12 architectures are from the two domains category or Figure 4.3.
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From the figure, all the concrete architectures can be created by follow-
ing any branch of dom0U or domUH then ending with disk0U. For ex-
ample, the dotted-lines labelled one in the figure create the branch or of
dom0U/P2/P4/disk0U concrete architecture.
Other 9 architectures are from the three domains category or Figure 4.6.
From the figure, all the concrete architectures can be created by following
any branch of dom0UH/P1, of dom0UH/P2, or of dom0UH/P1P2 then
ending with disk0U. For example, the dotted-lines labelled one in the figure
create the branch of dom0UH/P1/P3/P5/disk0U concrete architecture.
7. Collaborations
• The collaborations within provider side participants
 Px (P1, P2, P5) can collaborate with another or other Px (and
vice versa) to capture the necessary logging data and to store the
captured data as log files or F3.
 P1, P2, and/or P5 normally write(s) the captured data to disk0
as F3.
• The collaborations within customer side participants
 P3 can collaborate with P4 (and vice versa) to capture the nec-
essary logging data and to store the captured data as log files or
F1.
 P3, P4, or both normally write(s) the captured data to diskU as
F1.
• Provider side participants in collaboration with customer side partici-
pants
 The participants of each side can collaborate with the participants
of another side (and vice versa) for capturing and storing the nec-
essary logging data.
8. Consequences
Below are benefits and liabilities of the pattern.
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• The benefits:
 It provides abilities to capture the necessary logging data across
the customer side and provider side.
 It is not only either the customer side or provider side to com-
pletely control over logging systems. When deploying Px and Fy
in both sides, this may give both sides to share the control over
the logging systems.
• The liabilities:
 It may be difficult to enforce a security policy of a logging system.
This is because Px and Fy are distributed across both sides.
 It may not be cheap and fast to design and develop logging systems
derived from this pattern. This is because both Px and Fy are
distributed into both sides.
 A system derived from this pattern yields the biggest TCB size
compared to the TCB sizes yielded from the other patterns. For
this pattern, this is because a system's TCB size needs to include
domU from the customer side. Section 3.5.2.8 has discussed the
biggest TCB size of a logging system see Figure 3.6.
 Security issues of a logging system can be generated from both
sides at the same time. This should be difficult to mitigate these
issues compared to the issues generated from only either side.
∗ Security issues when deploying Px in the provider side
Section 3.3.3.1 discussed that when a logging system deploys
Px such as P1 in dom0 at the provider side, this may lead
to integrity issues of the system. This is because malicious
insiders may modify Px's code to benefit themselves. This is
a serious concern as argued by [46; 88; 89].
∗ Security issues when deploying Fy in the provider side
Section 3.3.3.2 discussed that when any logging system deploys
F3 in hw0, this may lead to privacy issues. This is because
malicious insiders may learn about customers' personal data
from F3 or F4.
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∗ Security issues when deploying Px in the customer side
This is because, for example, Section 3.3.3.1 discussed that
when deploying Px such as P3 in domU, this may lead to
integrity issues because domU cannot be trusted from the
providers' perspective to have installed security software, as
argued by [78].
∗ Security issues when deploying Fy in the customer side
This is the same as the drawback of Px in the customer side
discussed above. This is because domU cannot be trusted [78].
When a pattern deploys F1 and F2, attackers who compromise
and take control over domU or malicious domU owners may
modify these files.
9. Implementation
Below are some helpful techniques for implementing the pattern.
(a) The smallest TCB size of a concreted system derived from this pattern
is when the system does not deploy P3 in domU.
(b) The robustness of a system can be improved when there is no Px
deployed in the user levels of domU and dom0.
(c) Ones can reuse existing Px such as libVMI [79] (as provider side Px) or
the JAR logging [76] (as customer side Px). Fy can be implemented by
re-using existing logging file systems such as a tree-based data struc-




We found only one existing concrete architecture of this pattern, see Fig-
ure 4.3. From the figure, the dotted-lines labelled one create the branch





4.2.3 Conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of
the patterns
This section gives conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of the pat-
terns.
Although the advantages and disadvantages were discussed in the 'conse-
quences' element of each pattern, this section draws conclusions on the advantages
and disadvantages again based on typical good programming guidelines or good
security guidelines for design a robust monitoring architecture discussed by Payne
et al [39].
Payne et al [39] design a robust monitoring architecture based on six high-level
requirements. They identify these requirements and argue that the requirements
can be considered as typical good programming guidelines or good security guide-
lines. They also state that some of their identified requirements could be recog-
nized as specially designed versions of classic security design principles proposed
by Saltzer and Schroeder [101].
Although their requirements are for designing a monitoring architecture, we
believe they apply to logging architectures as well. This is because the monitoring
and the logging system architectures in an IaaS are the same except the former
architectures do not need to have log files while the latter architectures do, as
discussed in Section 2.9. However, only four of their requirements can apply
to our logging context. When applying these four requirements to our logging
approaches, we paraphrase some of their technical terms in our context. Our four
paraphrased requirements are: no unnecessary modifications to a hypervisor, no
modifications to domUs, small performance impact on domUs, and the rule that
domU can not tamper with (e.g., alter the code of) Px and/or Fy in a logging
system.
This section uses these four paraphrased requirements as the advantages and
disadvantages of a logging system derived from a particular pattern. When the
system satisfies our requirements, then these requirements can be seen as the
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system's advantages. Otherwise, they can be considered as the system's disad-
vantages. We also add three requirements from the main benefits of the simple
logging system, security facilitator logging system, and complex logging system
pattern. They are a simple logging system, to facilitate enforcement of a security
policy of a logging system, and abilities to capture the necessary logging data
across the customer side and the provider side. These additional requirements
also are significant for comprehending the benefits and liabilities of applying the
patterns and for assessing them.
We omit two of the six high-level requirements discussed by Payne et al [39].
The first one is rapid development of new logging systems. To satisfy this require-
ment, a new system should provide APIs that makes the developers' tasks easier.
However, in our context, we investigate only how to build logging systems, not
yet the system's APIs which could be achieved in the future. The second omitted
requirement is abilities to record any data on domUs. This data includes memory
and disk I/O, network traffic, CPU context, and static disk contents. However,
we discuss to record only behaviour or activities of a process or processes in domU
or a domU file's life cycle.
Table 4.1 presents the advantages and disadvantages of the three patterns. In
the table, '/' means that a system derived from a particular pattern can satisfy a
requirement, and 'X' is the opposite. '/X' means that the system can achieve a
requirement only if it also satisfies a condition or conditions in the parenthesis or
'()'. Note that, all three patterns have the same common aim which is capturing
the necessary logging data. Section 4.2.2 defined this data as: behaviour or
activities of a process or processes in domU or as: a domU file's life cycle. Thus,
this section gives the conclusions based on only the seven advantages or the
requirements in the table.
From the table, the second and the third column are for the simple logging
system pattern. The forth and the fifth column are for the security facilitator
logging system and the complex logging system pattern respectively. A logging
system architecture derived from the simple pattern which deploys Px and Fy
only in the customer side (column 2 in the table) can satisfy only requirement 1
and 5 which are: no unnecessary modifications to a hypervisor, and the system

























1) no unnecessary modifica-
tions to a hypervisor













2) no modifications to domUs X / / X
3) small performance impact
on domUs
X / / X
4) the rule that domU can not
tamper with (e.g., alter the
code of) Px and/or Fy in a log-
ging system.
X / / X






6) facilitate enforcement of a
security policy of a logging sys-
tem
X / / X
7) abilities to capture the nec-
essary logging data across the
customer side and the provider
side
X X X /
Table 4.1: The advantages and disadvantages of the three patterns
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Whereas, an architecture derived from the simple pattern which deploys Px
and Fy only in the provider side (column 3 in the table) cannot satisfy only
requirement 7 which is: abilities to capture the necessary logging data across the
customer side and the provider side. See column 3 at the row of requirement 6,
interestingly, this architecture is also considered as a derivation of the security
facilitator logging system pattern. In this case, the architecture is simple and
cheap for design and development (the main benefit of the simple logging system
pattern), and also can facilitate enforcement of a security policy of the system
itself (the main benefit of the security facilitator logging system). The 'Related
Patterns' element of the simple and security facilitator logging system pattern in
Section 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.2.2 discussed this case.
In the forth column, the architecture derived from the security facilitator
logging system pattern cannot satisfy only requirement 7. However, the architec-
ture can satisfy requirement 1 and 5 only when it does not deploy P5. In the last
column, the architecture derived from the complex logging system pattern can
satisfy only requirements 1 and 7, and it can satisfy requirement 1 only when it
does not deploy P5.
4.3 Analysis of existing logging and monitoring
works and our proposed system in relation to
the patterns
This section analyses existing logging and monitoring works and our proposed
system in relation to the patterns. To do so, it discusses advantages and disad-
vantages or characteristics of three existing logging systems, our proposed system,
and two existing monitoring systems. We use the conclusions of the three pat-
terns in Table 4.1 as tools to analyse all the existing work architectures in relation
to the patterns.
The goal of this section is to leverage our patterns in order to give examples
for analysing the characteristics of logging systems which are derived from such
patterns. The discussions in this section could be sophisticated examples or case
studies to illustrate and evaluate the patterns.
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Section 2.8, 2.9, and 3.3.2 already gave the details of the existing logging
systems in the related work. Each related work may be modified to be able
to achieve the necessary logging data. This section focuses on analysing these
existing logging systems in relation to the patterns rather than to explain the
details of all the components of the system.
This section draws conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages encoun-
tered when using existing logging systems that are derived from different patterns.
The result is a spectrum of patterns for describing how to construct logging sys-
tems of varying characteristics. The characteristics of a logging system are based
on the combination of advantages and disadvantages of its pattern. To introduce
examples of the spectrum, in the following sections, we discuss advantages and
disadvantages of three existing logging systems, our proposed system, and two
existing monitoring systems.
We could not absolutely conclude that, in terms of the characteristics of log-
ging systems that are derived from our patterns, which architecture or pattern is
better than which one, or which architecture or pattern is the best one. However,
there is a variety of architectures and patterns that can be chosen by the partic-
ipated parties to suit their needs in building logging systems in an IaaS cloud.
Based on the current deployment of Px and Fy of some existing system architec-
tures from the previous work such as PASSXen [43] in Figure 4.5 or Lares [77]
in Figure 4.10 (assuming Lares deploys F3 for this discussion), they cannot be
considered as architectures derived from our patterns. However, they may be
modified to do so. This is out of the scope of this thesis.
The following subsections below analyse all the existing work architectures
in relation to the three patterns. Regarding the current deployment of Px and
Fy of the existing work architectures, each of the architectures is considered as
a derivation of one of the three patterns. We use the conclusions of the three
patterns in Table 4.1 as tools to analyse all the existing work architectures in
relation to the patterns. The analysis reveals advantages and disadvantages or
characteristics of all the architectures.
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Figure 4.10: An architecture of Lares
4.3.1 Analysis of existing logging works
Section 2.8 investigated previous research that can be considered as work that
could be applied in a logging approach in IaaS. This subsection analyses the
architectures of logging systems in the previous research in relation to the three
patterns. Based on the current Px and Fy deployment of the architectures, each
of them is considered as a derivation of one of the three patterns. This subsections
uses the conclusions of the three patterns in Table 4.1 as tools to analyse all the
architectures in relation to the patterns, below.
• The JAR logging [76]
In this work, log files have to be strongly tied to a user's data file or cor-
responding user's JAR file [76]. Thus, to apply this work in an IaaS envi-
ronment, a user's data file (which also includes log files) is stored in diskU.
When this data file is activated, its logging mechanism as P3 is also ac-
tivated. Then, this mechanism performs logging tasks in domU user level,
and the log files that are produced by this mechanism are stored in diskU
as F1.
The system architecture of this work (Figure 4.11) deploys three critical
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Figure 4.11: The system architecture of Jar logging: a derivation of the simple logging
system pattern when the architecture deploying Px and Fy in the customer side.
logging components: one logging processes component which is P3, and
two log file components including F1 and F2. This system architecture can
be considered as a derivation of the simple logging system pattern with the
architecture deploying Px and Fy in the customer side.
From the conclusions of the simple logging system pattern when Px and Fy
deployed in the customer side in the Table 4.1, this architecture is quick,
cheap, and simple ways to design and develop logging systems in an IaaS.
Moreover, it has no modifications to a hypervisor.
• AVMs [44]
The architecture of this work can be modified to record the necessary log
data. The main process of this work is a logger as P5 that resides in a
hypervisor to record incoming and outgoing network packets of domUs.
The logger then permanently stores the domU intercepted network data as
F3 in disk0. The architecture of AVMs is Figure 4.12. This system deploys
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Figure 4.12: The system architecture of AVMs: a derivation of the security facilitator
logging system pattern
three critical components: one logging processes component which is P5;
and two log file components include F3 and F4.
From the conclusions of the security facilitator logging system pattern in
Table 4.1, AVMs have no abilities to capture the necessary logging data
across the customer side and the provider side. This architecture is not
simple because the needs to modify a hypervisor.
• Flogger [30]
Section 3.4.1 discussed the main components of Flogger in details. A pattern
of this system is Figure 4.4. Flogger deploys six critical logging components:
two logging processes components which are P2 and P4; and four log file
components including F1 to F4. The system is a derivation of the complex
logging system pattern.
From the conclusions of the complex pattern in Table 4.1, Flogger has no
unnecessary modifications to a hypervisor. It has abilities to capture the
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necessary logging data across the customer side and a provider side.
4.3.2 Analysis of our proposed system
The architecture in Figure 4.2 is for our proposed logging system in the spamming
case study in Section 3.4.2. This section discusses characteristics or advantages
and disadvantages of this architecture. From the figure, this architecture deploys
three critical components: one logging processes component which is P1; and two
log file components include F1 and F2. The architecture is a derivation of the
simple logging system pattern when the system deploys Px and Fy in the provider
side, without deploying P5.
This makes the architecture is also considered as a derivation of the security
facilitator logging system pattern. From the conclusions in Table 4.1, this archi-
tecture is simple and cheap ways for design and development the system, and it
also facilitates enforcement of a security policy of the system itself.
4.3.3 Analysis of existing monitoring works
We investigated previous research of monitoring in the cloud which can be con-
sidered as work that could be applied in a logging approach in IaaS. As discussed
in Section 2.9, monitoring work does not deploy log files or Fy. For demonstra-
tion of analysing these work, we assume that they deploy F3. These works below
could be modified to perform logging tasks. They all deploy libVMI, as previously
known as XenAccess [39].
• A network monitoring application in [1]
This application is comprised of many modules (including XenAccess) as P1
only in dom0 user level. The details of the modules can be found in [1]. A
pattern of this application is Figure 4.13.
• A demo monitoring program in [39]
The program needs XenAccess as P1 in only dom0 user level. The details
can be found in [39]. Thus, a pattern of this program deploys only P1,
114
Figure 4.13: A pattern of a network monitoring application in [1]
and it is the same as the pattern of a network monitoring application in [1]
above which is Figure 4.13.
Architectures of both works are the same as our proposed architecture above.
Their characteristics can be considered as the same as ours.
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4.4 Conclusions
This chapter mainly addresses research Gap 4, which is the lack of descriptions
of logging systems in terms of design patterns of the systems' components. Its
main contribution is three proposed design patterns in the context of logging in
IaaS cloud.
The proposed patterns can bring a number of benefits as the same as ben-
efits from design patterns in object-oriented software design and development
area. Thus, the proposed patterns could increase reusability of the design and
development of logging systems. Moreover, designers should access the proposed
patterns more easily. Additionally, the proposed patterns could assist a designer
adopts design approaches which make a logging system reusable and not to choose
approaches which do not concern reusability concepts. Lastly, they proposed pat-
terns can also enhance the documentation and maintenance of existing logging
systems.
We provide a spectrum of patterns for describing how to construct logging
systems with varying characteristics. For developers, when building a logging
system, the knowledge of characteristics of this system could assist them to get
the right design of the system with minimal effort and time commitments. To
the best of our knowledge, these three logging patterns are not yet described in
the literature.
This chapter describes the related work in the form of patterns. These pat-
terns can be made up of the generic logging components in Figure 3.1 or can
be associated to the logging component configurations. Then, the chapter draws
conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages when using different patterns.
This chapter can be used to clarify the fact that a number of patterns and log-
ging system architectures based on these patterns are missing, for example, our
proposed logging system in the spamming case study in Section 3.4.2.
This system is based on a pattern that is quit specifically more easily to be
deployed, but it is not very robust. In addition to the spectrum of patterns, we
also present sophisticated examples or case studies to illustrate and evaluate the
proposed patterns.
In the next chapter, the generic logging components from Chapter 3 are
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utilised as the basis for an analysis of how real world threats, specifically CSA
threat 1, affect both the customer and provider simultaneously. These compo-
nents are also used as the basis for design of the proposed logging solutions in
mitigating the risks associated with threat 1, in order to benefit both the customer
and provider sides.
The architecture of our proposed logging system in the spamming case study
in Section 3.4.2 is also used in Chapter 6 as the basis for design of the proposed
logging solutions in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1, in order to
benefit both the customer and provider sides. This is because the architecture
is simple and cheap ways for the design and development (the main benefit of
the simple logging system pattern in Figure 4.7 Section 4.2.2.1) as discussed in
Section 4.2.3. The architecture also facilitates enforcement of a security policy
of the system itself, which is the main benefit of the security facilitator logging




In this chapter, the generic logging components from Chapter 3 are utilised as the
basis for an analysis of how real world threats, specifically CSA threat 1, affect
both the customer and provider simultaneously. These components are also used
as the basis for design of the proposed logging solutions in mitigating the risks
associated with threat 1, in order to benefit both the customer and provider sides.
This chapter mainly addresses research Gap 2 which is the issue that research
relating to logging in IaaS only focuses on system-centric logs. It also addresses
research Gap 1 (a) which is the apparent lack of simultaneous consideration of
both the customer and provider sides.
This chapter provides two main contributions. The first contribution is the
proposed solution to collect file-centric logs rather than system-centric logs. This
contribution addresses research Gap 2. There are some logging solutions that
emphasise file-centric logs with an interception approach. However, the prototype
implementation of the proposed logging system (in the next chapter) can be an
alternative approach to collecting file-centric logs to enhance accountability in
IaaS. This approach advocates the introspection of customer VM's memory from
dom0. The introspection traverses the kernel data structures in the memory.
The prototype implementation of the proposed logging solutions (in the next
chapter) can collect the file-centric log history of customers' critical files. The
history information is classified as file-centric logs rather than system-centric
logs. The file-centric logs can present associations between processes and files
in a customer VM, for example, a record of a process P which reads file F. The
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proposed log files differ from previous work which focus only on system-centric
logs such as the connection topology, bus speeds, and processor loads.
The next contribution is the analysis of how CSA threat 1 affects both cus-
tomers and providers simultaneously, and the proposed logging solutions that
assist in mitigating the risks associated with the threat for both customers and
providers. This contribution addresses research Gap 1 (a). The analysis illus-
trates how CSA threat 1 such as mis-usage of customer VMs can affect both
sides.
This analysis differs from previous work which usually concerns the effects
of the threats to only either the customer side or the provider side, providing
solutions for either side, but not for both. The value of the combined analysis
is to provide a basis to understand what the contents are that logging solutions
need to collect to be used as evidence to deal with threat 1 for both customers
and providers.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 explains
the users environment inside a domU and types of domUs. Section 5.2 defines
customers' critical files, explains the files' location in the generic logging compo-
nents, and gives examples of the files. Then, Section 5.3 discusses how to measure
the costs of threat 1 which affects both customers and providers, based on the
costs of cybercrime.
Section 5.4 provides an in-depth discussion of the effects on customers due to
threat 1. The discussion includes: customer's critical files at risk due to threat
1; domU attacks domU; and effects on customers including direct losses and
indirect losses when customers' critical files are attacked. Section 5.5 provides an
in-depth discussion of the effects on providers due to threat 1. The discussion
includes three main aspects. First is that hypervisor or dom0 vulnerabilities may
be channels for domUs to attack the provider's cloud infrastructure. Second is
that because of these vulnerabilities, it is possible that domU may attack dom0
and uses this dom0 to attack other domUs. Third is a discussion of direct losses
and indirect losses when providers are attacked by domUs.
After that, Section 5.6 provides: a definition for the history of a critical file,
and examples of the history information, and a discussion of how the history
of critical files can be useful for both customers and providers. Following this,
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there is discussion of: a process behaviour log and the log's examples; and how
the process behaviour logs can be useful to deal with spam activities in domUs.
After that, it discusses how the process behaviour logs can be useful to enhance
the flexibility of auditing in the cloud using logging systems, and how both the
history of critical files and process behaviour logs can provide indirect benefits
for providers.
Section 5.7 discusses an approach (called the domU memory introspec-
tion approach, for short: memory introspection) to obtain the history of critical
files. This section describes the memory introspection approaches to obtain his-
tory of critical files, and discusses how the memory introspection can obtain the
history of critical files. It then, from Linux kernel's data structures, explains how
to obtain the full path name of a critical file, the operation's name of an operation
that is performed on a critical file, and the last accessed and modified times of a
critical file. After that, it describes how to obtain creation and deletion records
of a critical file. Lastly, it discusses how to obtain process behaviour logs through
the introspection approach.
Section 5.8 discusses another approach to obtain the history of critical files,
which is the domU system calls interception approach, for short: intercep-
tion. Section 5.9 discusses some aspects of both the introspection and interception
approaches. This includes: security aspects of introspection and interception,
which need to be analysed; helper components in introspection and interception
approaches; the combination of introspection and interception; ideal logging so-
lution regarding the smallest TCB to produce the history of a critical file; and
failure of the implementation for the ideal solution.
Section 5.10 discusses a security analysis of the system architecture of the
introspection approach which is used as the architecture of the proposed log-
ging system in the next chapter. Finally, the chapter is briefly summarised and
concluded in Section 5.11.
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5.1 Users Environment Inside A DomU And Its
Types
This section explains the users environment inside a domU and the different types
of domUs. This section also provides the context of the activities of users inside
domUs. These activities can be malicious as caused by threat 1. A domU that
is referred to in this section is a Linux-based OS. This OS is the domU in the
generic logging components of IaaS cloud in Figure 3.1 Section 3.3.
5.1.1 Root And Standard Users In A DomU
This subsection defines users and user accounts in Linux domUs. In Linux sys-
tems, a user can be either people or accounts, which exist for specific applications
to use [102]. Each user is identified by a unique integer or user id, and a separate
database outside the kernel assigns a text name or user name to each user id [103].
Each user has an account which combines all the files, resources, and information
belonging to this user [103]. For discussion in this thesis, we define a user as a
person who can use a domU. We define a user account as composed of two pieces
of information: i) a user name and ii) a user password. For example, Alice's user
account which belongs to Alice may compose of a user name as 'alice' and a user
or Alice's password as 'aliceLoginPass'.
A Linux system has two types of users, a root or administrator user and a
standard user. A Linux root user has the same privilege as a Microsoft Windows
administrator [104] which has complete control over the system. Thus, the root is
a privileged user who can access all parts of the system, or execute administrative
tasks [105]. More importantly, they have full access to all files in the system. A
root user is created during the system installation phase when an installer needs
to specify a root password. We use 'Alice' as an example name of a person, and
'alice' as an example user name of Alice in a Linux system for this thesis. This
condition applies for every person name and every user name.
For a Linux-based OS such as Fedora [106], a standard user is a user who
carries out ordinary tasks not administrative tasks, and can only access her own
files not other users' files in the same system [105]. The first standard user is
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created during the first boot after the system installation. For example, the
installer above needs to create her own user name such as 'alice' with the password
(that is different from the root password) for alice user during the first boot.
Therefore, Alice is a root and also the first standard user known as 'alice'. Alice
could add new standard users to this system.
5.1.2 Types Of DomUs In this thesis
This subsection defines types of domUs based on how these domUs are used.
The different types will be used in discussions throughout this thesis. Linux is
a multi-user system [105] where more than one users share the system. In this
study, a domU is a Fedora system. Although linux is a multi-user system, a domU
can be configured as a single user or as a multiple users system. For EC2 [17],
an 'EC2 instance' which is a running virtual CPU [107] is actually a domU. An
EC2 instance can be shared with more than one user [18; 108]. Thus, due to the
sharing of instances by more than one user, this creates a multi-user environment
in domU. An EC2 instance can be a Linux-based OS such as a Fedora OS [106] or
a Red Hat Enterprise Linux or RHEL OS [109]. We call an EC2 that is a RHEL
OS an EC2 RHEL. A domU in this chapter is a replication of an EC2 RHEL. We
classify the types of domUs as follows.
• A domU with a single user: This is when Alice rents a domU, she
will then get two user accounts at the same time. The accounts are a root
user account and a standard user account, as discussed in Section 5.1.1.
Therefore, she is the only user in this system with two accounts. Each
account is composed of a user name and password.
• A domU with multiple users: This section discusses two types of mul-
tiple users domU.
 Multiple users per domU with one root: This paragraph de-
scribes multiple users per domU with one root use, when Alice is the
root. This description will be referred to again when we discuss how
our proposed logging solution is useful for this multi-user environment
in domU, in Section 6.2. This is when more than one user shares a
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domU which can be configured, as described in [110]. Note that all Al-
ice's files that we are considering are in diskU such as in '/home/alice/'
directory, which is a virtual disk of Alice's domU. It is virtually in hwU,
but physically in disk0/hw0, as discussed in Section 3.3.2.
For example, this can be done after Alice rents a domU with a single
user. Thus, she will have both the root account and 'alice' account.
Later, she adds Bob as 'bob' account to her domU as a standard user.
Thus, this domU can be used by multiple users such as Bob and Alice,
and there are three user accounts in Alice's domU. The first one is a
root user account. Alice knows this root user account's password. The
second account is that of alice user. This account is the first standard
user of this domU and is owned by Alice. This account's password can
be different from the root user account's password. Thus, Alice owns
two accounts which are the root account and the alice account. Then,
she knows two passwords which are the root user account's password
and the alice user account's password. The third account is bob user
which is a standard user. This account is created by Alice for Bob to
log in to and share Alice's domU.
A standard user can only access his or her files in specific locations
which are managed and provided by the system. Each standard user
cannot access other standard users' files. For example, a directory
for alice user to store her files can be '/home/alice'. Bob cannot ac-
cess the '/home/alice/' directory, but a root user could. As discussed
in Section 5.1.1 a root user can access all parts or files of the sys-
tem [105]. Thus, the root user in Alice's domU can access any file in
'/home/alice/'. The root user can also execute any executable files
such as programs or applications in this directory, but bob user is
unable to.
 Multiple users per domU with more than one root: For exam-
ple, after Alice rents a domU she is the root user and administrator.
Then she adds a new root user as 'rootusr' using approaches described
in [108]. Therefore, rootusr has the same privilege as root which has
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full access to all files in this domU. Both Alice and the new rootusr
can log in to this domU with their own individual and separated root
passwords.
This environment can be set up by separating key-pairs [111] for sep-
arate root users as described in [108]. Apart from the domU usage
scenarios described above, there could be more usage scenarios. For
example, each root can add their own new standard or root users to
their domU. However, this study is limited to only the scenario de-
scribed above.
5.2 Customers' Critical Files in DomUs
This section defines customers' critical files, explains the files' location in the
generic logging components, and give examples of the files.
This thesis defines critical files as files in diskUs that are owned by
customers or domU's owners. They are the customers' asset and valu-
able for their businesses. Thus, the customers do not want anyone to access
these files apart from themselves and their authenticated users, and do not want
loss or leakage of the files. For instance, [76] states that cloud customers fear loss
of control of their financial and health data, which are usually processed remotely
in unknown cloud provider's machines. A critical file can be any file such as a
text, executable, or database file.
Figure 5.1 shows the location of a critical file (called f) in the diskU within the
generic logging components. Critical files can be created inside domUs, or may
be uploaded via the Internet by customers from their local machines to diskUs in
the cloud. However, whether customers' files will be considered as critical or not
is depended on consideration of the customers.
For EC2, customers upload their files to the domU to run their systems. In [18],
in order to more quickly find new drugs to heal new diseases, a computer intensive
scientific experiment can be conducted in EC2 domUs. After these EC2 domUs
are launched, all essential software, the input files, and executable C program files
are transferred to the diskUs [18]. Thus, all these files in the diskUs are critical
from the point of view of the owner of these domUs.
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Figure 5.1: From the generic logging components, showing the location of a critical
file f in diskU
5.3 Measuring the costs of Threat 1
This section discusses how to measure the costs of threat 1 which affects both
the customer and the provider, based on the costs of cybercrime.
Threat 1 as cybercrime. Again, threat 1 is the abuse and nefarious use of
cloud computing. This could be when criminals rent, own, and then use domUs
to conduct their activities [23]. We discuss the effects on both the customer and
provider due to threat 1 by focusing on when attackers use domUs to conduct
their criminal activities which can be considered as cybercrime.
European Commission [112] argues that cybercrime is understood as "crim-
inal acts committed using electronic communications networks and information
systems or against such networks and systems". They state that, in practice, the
term cybercrime is applied to three categories of criminal activities. One of the
categories, which relates to threat 1 is "crimes unique to electronic networks, i.e.
attacks against information systems, denial of service, and hacking". We consider
criminal activities conducted by attackers using domUs as 'cybercrime' which can
have an effect on both providers and customers. The effect can be measured by
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direct losses and indirect losses of both the customer and provider side.
Direct losses and indirect losses because of threat 1. [113] defines di-
rect losses and indirect losses as follows. Direct loss is the monetary equivalent
of losses, damage, or other suffering felt by the victim as a consequence of a
cybercrime. An indirect loss is the monetary equivalent of the losses and oppor-
tunity costs imposed on society by the fact that a certain cybercrime is carried
out, no matter whether successful or not, and independent of a specific instance
of that cybercrime. Indirect costs cannot generally be attributed to individual
victims. [114] also states that the indirect costs associated with cybercrime can
include such factors as reputational damage to organisations, loss of confidence in
cyber transactions by individuals and businesses, reduced public sector revenues,
and the expansion of the underground economy.
[113] also states that although the direct costs of cybercrime for the typical
citizen are in the tens of pence or cents, the indirect costs are much higher.
For example, the botnet1 behind a third of the spam sent in 2010 earned its
owners around US$2.7m, while worldwide expenditures on spam prevention was
probably more than a billion dollars. In our context, threat 1 can be considered as
cybercrime such as when attackers use domUs to conduct their criminal activities,
and the thereat also affect customers or providers in terms of direct costs and
indirect costs.
5.4 Effects on the Customer due to Threat 1
This section provides an in-depth discussion of effects on customers due to threat
1. The discussion includes: customer's critical files at risk due to threat 1, domU
attacks upon domU, and effects on customers regarding direct losses and indirect
losses when customers' critical files are attacked. The purpose of this section is
to indicate how serious threat 1 can be for customers.
The CSA report [23] provides examples of this threat such as when criminals
use domUs as a base for criminal activities. These activities could be when they
1The term botnets is used to define networks of infected end-hosts, called bots, that are
under the control of a human operator commonly known as a botmaster [115].
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use domUs to attack other domUs and dom0. In IaaS, when a customer rents a
domU, he or she may maliciously use this domU (we call this domU a malicious
domU) to attack another customer's domU (we call this domU a victim domU).
5.4.1 Customer's critical files at risk due to threat 1
This subsection discusses customer's critical files which are at risk due to threat
1. As discussed in Section 5.2, customers' critical files are the customers' asset
and valuable for their businesses, and they do not want anyone to access these
files apart from themselves and their authenticated users, and do not want loss
or leakage of the files. Examples of the customer critical files can be financial,
health, or database data files. Form of attacks designated as threat 1, that we are
considering is those where criminals are using domUs to attack customer domUs.
Thus, the most serious situation for a customer can be when a criminal is able
to use domUs to attack such as damage, read, modify, or delete critical files in
customers' domUs. This attack is vital, as also agreed by [8; 30; 43; 76]. There
are no obvious publications in the literature of how a criminal can use domUs to
attack critical files in other domUs. However, the next subsection (Section 5.4.2)
discusses how it is possible that criminals can use domUs to attack other domUs
and can obtain victim's domU data such as a private key for decryption1 from
the victim's binary data in shared memory such as CPU cache.
5.4.2 DomU attacks upon domU
This subsection discuses the issues of the cloud sharing infrastructure. The issues
enable criminals to use malicious domUs to attack victim domUs. Then, the
criminals can obtain the victim domUs' private data.
1Encryption and decryption mechanisms are used to transmit messages privately and se-
cretly over networks [116]. Encryption changes the original message or plaintext into ciphertext.
Decryption changes the ciphertext back to plaintext. A private key is used in the decryption
process.
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5.4.2.1 Sharing cloud infrastructure
This is able to happen because, in IaaS infrastructure, a malicious domU and
a victim domU share the same machine and the same hypervisor, as argued
by [78]. [78] also states that the main source of security threats in the IaaS
platform is domUs because a provider hosts domUs without being aware of the
domUs' contents, and without control over them; thus this makes it easy to take
over the domUs, then a compromised domU can attack the other domUs.
When a malicious domU and a victim domU reside in the same machine and
share a hypervisor, this is called cloud co-residency [117]. DomU attacks upon
domU, which is a form of attack within threat 1, can have a serious effect on
cloud customers, as discussed below. This is because through these attacks, an
attacker, particularly a victim's business competitor, may be able to read private
data or compromise the victim domU, as argued by [117].
5.4.2.2 Attacks due to sharing cloud infrastructure
[9] argues that when customers move their computing systems to the cloud, secu-
rity concerns such as VM-level attacks involving computer and network intrusions
or attacks will be made possible or at least easier. Cloud providers deploy hyper-
visor or VM technology to build up their multi-tenant cloud architectures, which
causes potential vulnerabilities and then can cause a threat called 'VM-level at-
tacks' [9].
An example of VM-level attacks is cross-VM side-channel attacks. Side-
channel attacks are attacks against cryptographic implementations and the tar-
gets of these attacks can be primitives, protocols, modules, devices, and sys-
tems [118]. [119] demonstrates how cross-VM side-channel attacks can extract
private keys. Precisely, this paper assumes that (i) when a malicious domU and a
victim domU reside in the same machine and are deployed by the same hypervisor
(Xen), and (ii) when the victim domU is decrypting an Elgamal ciphertext1 using
a libgcrypt cryptographic library [120]; then the malicious domU can extract an
ElGamal decryption key which is a private key in a shared processor or CPU




Loss of a private key can cause many issues in security. For example, [41]
agrees that this key can be used by a web server application to establish secure
channels with its clients; if an attacker has the private key of this application,
they can impersonate the server before its clients. Thus, if a malicious domU
attacks a victim domU and gets the private key of the victim domU's business
web server using cross-VM side-channel attacks, this can have a serious effect for
the customer who owns the victim domU.
Moreover, [121] also demonstrates that when a malicious domU resides in
the same server as a victim domU, it is possible that the malicious domU can
monitor how access to resources varies for the victim domU then potentially
gather conscious data about the victim. The CSA argues that domUs can host
malicious software which has proven especially effective in compromising critical
private resources in cloud environments [122]. Although they did not mention
to whom the critical private resource is belonging to, it may have belonged to
customers.
5.4.3 Effects: Direct losses and indirect losses when cus-
tomer's critical files are attacked
This subsection discusses the direct losses and indirect losses when customers'
critical files are attacked. As stated in Section 5.3, direct loss is the monetary
equivalent of losses, damage, or other suffering felt by the victim as a consequence
of a cybercrime. Concerning the effects on a customer due to threat 1, this cy-
bercrime can occur when attackers use appUs to damage such as alter costumer's
critical files. This can be a vital incident. This incident causes both direct costs
and indirect costs for cloud customers. With regards to the direct costs, attack-
ers may ask the victims for money to get the files back. However, the indirect
costs for the victim's business are much higher, the same as other cybercrimes
that are discussed in Section 5.3. For example, customers may suffer from rep-
utational damage to organisations, loss of confidence in cyber transactions by
individuals and businesses, reduced public sector revenues, and the expansion of
the underground economy.
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5.5 Effects on the Provider due to Threat 1
This section provides an in-depth discussion of the effects on providers due to
threat 1. The discussion includes three main aspects. First is that hypervisor or
dom0 vulnerabilities may be channels for domUs to attack the provider's cloud
infrastructure. Second is that because of these vulnerabilities, it is possible that
domUs can attack a dom0 and use this dom0 to attack other domUs. Third is
a discussion of direct losses and indirect losses when providers are attacked by
domUs.
5.5.1 Hypervisor or dom0 vulnerabilities
This subsection discusses hypervisor or dom0 vulnerabilities. Incidents caused by
these vulnerabilities may be channels for domUs to attack the provider's cloud
infrastructure.
[123] states that a guest VM such as a domU can infiltrate and hack its host
system. [124] argues that Xen as a hypervisor is still vulnerable. In a shared in-
frastructure environment, a dom0 and a number of domUs reside in the same
machine; thus it is difficult to clarify the borders between the dom0 and do-
mUs [125]. Thus, this environment can be vulnerable.
Again, it can be crucial when the dom0 is compromised because then all
domUs could be at risk [58]. [126] states that domUs can attack the dom0 that
hosts them. [125] agrees that this is because of a difficulty in clarifying the borders
between a dom0 and domUs in the same physical machine with virtualisation
infrastructure. Thus, these unclear borders can be one of the attack channels.
Another channel can be vulnerabilities in the dom0. The vulnerabilities, such as
holes in the management consoles of dom0, can allow attackers to gain the root
privileged in this dom0, as argued by [59].
After a dom0 is compromised, it can be used by attackers to monitor do-
mUs, eavesdrop on communications between domU and dom0, take control of
all domUs, and inject malware into domU images [127]. The main purpose of
malware is to damage computers such as alter or delete files, and install other
malware [128].
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5.5.2 DomU attacks upon dom0 and use of this dom0 to
attack other domUs
This subsection discusses in detail, because of the hypervisor or dom0 vulnerabil-
ities discussed in Section 5.5.1 above, how domUs can attack dom0 and use this
dom0 to attack other domUs.
Virtualisation vulnerabilities in Windows 2008 as a hypervisor allow the domU
running under the hypervisor to crash the Windows 2008 host as dom0 [126].
Thus, a domU can control a dom0 and exploit the other domUs hosted on the
same physical machine [129]. After the dom0 is compromised, attackers can get
control of the entire domUs [74]. Thus, they may obtain root accounts of these
domUs, log into them, and use appUs to access the domUs' critical files, see
Figure 5.1, and discussion in Section 5.2 above. If these files are the customers'
business databases, this can be a very serious incident.
Moreover, [59] argue that this is because the dom0 can transparently read and
write the memory content of the domU using the management interface; thus, if
a dom0 is compromised by attackers, they may use the management interface to
steal the valuable information from any domU. It is also argued by [46] that a
dom0 can access all data in diskUs. This can be a serious security concern from
the point of view of the customers.
It is critical when a dom0 is compromised. For example, [41] demonstrates
how to use dom0 to obtain confidential data from a domU. The dom0 may control
domUs and access critical files in domUs. They may inject malware into these
domUs' images (as discussed in Section 5.5.1) to track these domUs' activities.
After malware compromises a computer, it can steal data at the OS or file system
level [130]. Thus, it may access, lose, or leak (threat 5) critical files, which is a
serious incident.
There are no explicit experiments in public literature of domUs compromising
dom0s. However, the discussion above can support that this incident may be
possible.
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5.5.3 Direct losses and indirect losses when providers are
attacked by domUs
Subsection 5.5.2 already discussed in detail, because of the hypervisor or dom0
vulnerabilities discussed in Section 5.5.1, how domUs can attack a dom0 and use
this dom0 to attack other domUs. This subsection discusses the direct losses and
indirect losses, which result when providers are attacked by domUs. Although
it seems that the incidents caused by threat 1 discussed above can affect only
customer security concerns, this threat can also affect providers.
Direct losses. This thesis argues that threat 1 can also cause the compromising
of the dom0. As discussed in Section 5.3, direct loss is the monetary equivalent
of losses, damage, or other suffering felt by the victim as a consequence of a
cybercrime. Thus, when the dom0 is compromised, the provider's direct loss
can be the monetary equivalent of losses, damage, or other suffering felt by the
provider as a consequence of the compromising of dom0. For example, the damage
could be of the provider's cloud infrastructure which is attacked by the attackers.
Indirect losses. The compromising can allow attackers to control dom0, and
use it to compromise all domUs. Then, attackers (especially the competitors of
the victim domUs) may access, lose, or leak customers' critical files, which is
threat 5.
If the customers find out this fact, it can impact on the providers in terms
of indirect losses which is losing their business reputations, the same as the im-
pact on the customers, and as discussed in Section 5.3. The provider companies'
reputations can be important for customers when deciding to buy cloud prod-
ucts [33; 131]. Thus, if the customers know that a lot of criminals are or have
been inside the provider's cloud infrastructure (threat 1), they may not want to
buy the product from this provider.
A high number of malicious domUs in a providers' cloud infrastructure can
affect the providers' business reputation. Apart from criminals using domUs to
attack domUs and the dom0, as discussed above, there are some other forms
of attacks designated by threat 1. The examples of these forms can be domUs
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that host spamming activities, or downloads for illegal software [23]. If there
are a lot of criminals inside a provider's infrastructure, this can impact on the
provider's reputation, because this can be an indicator of vulnerabilities in the
infrastructure. Thus, this thesis argues that the forms of attacks within threat
1 can affect providers' businesses. Thus, this thesis discusses how to identify
spamming activities in a domU as an example of how our proposed solutions
can mitigate the risks associated with threat 1 to the benefit of the provider
(Section 5.6.4 and 6.3.2).
5.6 History of Critical Files and Process logs
This section provides a definition of the history of a critical file and examples of
the history information in Subsection 5.6.1, and a discussion of how the history
of critical files can be useful for both customers and providers in Subsection 5.6.2.
Then, it discusses a process behaviour log and the log's examples in Subsection
5.6.3, and how the process behaviour logs can be useful to deal with spam activ-
ities in domUs in Subsection 5.6.4.
After that, it discusses how the process behaviour logs can be useful to enhance
the flexibility of auditing in the cloud using logging systems in Subsection 5.6.5,
and how both the history of critical files and process behaviour logs can provide
indirect benefits for providers in Subsection 5.6.6.
5.6.1 History of Critical Files to Mitigate the Risks Asso-
ciated with Threat 1 for Both Sides
This subsection defines the history of a critical file, and provides examples of the
history information.
As discussed in the compromising of both domUs or the dom0 in Section 2.5,
and Section 5.2 to Section 5.5, either domUs or the dom0 compromising may have
the result of undesired access to, or loss or leakage of, customers' critical files.
Thus, we propose to maintain a history of each of these critical files. This thesis
applies work by PASSXen [43] and HP TrustCloud [27] to form the definition of
the history of a critical file. PASSXen is a system that can collect the informa-
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tion on the creation, access, and destruction of a file in the domU. TrustCloud
is a framework to deal with the lack of trust in the cloud. It has file-centric
information in domUs. This information is obtained by tracing domUs' data and
files since they were created until deletion. Typical file operations are read, write,
create, and delete [2].
The history of a critical file is the information about the file since
it was created, until permanently deleted. Precisely, it contains records of
three periods of a critical file's life time:
• created or when the critical file is created,
• accessed or when the critical file is read or writte, and
• destroyed or when the critical file is deleted.
For the contents of the history of any critical file, the main attributes of each
record of the contents are as follows:
1. a record number,
2. a process id of the process that is conducting an operation such as read or
write on the critical file,
3. a process name of the process that is conducting an operation on the critical
file,
4. the id of the owner of this process,
5. a timestamp of the operation, and
6. the operation name including create, read, write, delete.
Table 5.1 is an example of the history of a critical file in a domU. The at-
tributes in the table are listed below:
1. rec_no (row 1, column 1) is a record number,
2. p_id (row 1 column 2) is a process id of the process that is conducting an
operation on the critical file,
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rec_no p_id p_nm p_ownId time operation
1 4001 appU1 1001 t1 create
2 4002 appU2 1001 t2 write
3 4003 appU3 1001 t3 read
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
N-1 4999 appU2 1001 tN-1 write
N 5000 appU3 1001 tN delete
Table 5.1: The content of the history of a critical file in a domU, N is a number of
records
3. p_nm (row 1, column 3) is a process name of the process that is conducting
an operation on the critical file,
4. p_ownId (row 1, column 4) is the id of the user that runs this process,
5. time (row 1 column 5) is a timestamp of the operation, and
6. operation (row 1, final column) is the operation name.
The detail of records in the table are listed below.
1. rec_no 1 or the first record is the evidence that a critical file is created in
diskU. For instance, the content in the first record, row 2, or rec_no 1 is
the evidence or log that a critical file is created by a user where his or her
id is 1001 in rec_no 1 column 4.
2. rec_no 2 to rec_no N-1 or the records between the first and the last record
is evidence of when the critical file is accessed such as read or write. For
example, rec_no 2 is evidence or log content of when appU2 (rec_no 2,
column 3) writes (indicated by rec_no 2, the last column) to this critical
file.
3. rec_no N or the last record is the evidence of when this critical file is
permanently deleted from diskU. For example, the last record or rec_no N
is the evidence when this critical file is permanently deleted from diskU by
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a process with its name 'appU3' in rec_no N, column 3. AppU3 is executed
by a user with the id 1001 in rec_no N, column 4.
rec_no p_id p_nm p_ownId
1 4624 read 1002
2 4800 read 1003
Table 5.2: The content of the history of critical file f or s.txt, when the appU or process
called 'read' is reading the file.
An example of the content of the history of critical file s.txt. If a
critical file f in Figure 5.1 is s.txt, the content of history of s.txt as a log file can
be for instance seen in Table 5.2. To simplify further discussion, for this table,
we assume that appU or process called 'read' is reading s.txt. Thus, we know an
operation name which is 'read', and we know the critical file name which is s.txt.
In the table, a timestamp of the operation or column 5 in Table 5.1 is omitted
and will be discussed in Section 5.7.5. The operation name or the last column in
Table 5.1 is also omitted. This is because we already know the operation name.
Table 5.2 presents only two records of the history of a critical file s.txt. The
details of both records are listed below. We omit the file creation and deletion
record. It is assumed that 1002 is Alice's id and 1003 is Bob's id.
1. For rec_no 1 in this table, p_id as 4624 and p_nm as read is the id and
name of the process that reads this file respectively, and p_ownId as 1002
or Alice's id is the id of the user who runs this process.
2. For rec_no 2 in this table, 4800 and 'read' is the id and name of the process
that reads s.txt respectively, and 1003 as Bob's id is the id of the user who
runs this process.
Main discussions about how to obtain all this information from Table 5.2 are
in Section 5.7 and Section 6.1. The contents of the table can be more complex
to provide more precise evidence, which will be discussed in Section 6.2 and 6.3.
It is possible that some incidents happening in domUs can have negative effects
on customers or providers. For example, the negative effects on customers can be
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when s.txt is belonging to Alice, from rec_no 2 in Table 5.2, why and how can Bob
access Alice's critical file. The history of critical files or rec_no 2 in Table 5.2 can
be used as evidence to assist in clarification of what happened with Alice's domU.
This kind of evidence such as Table 5.2 can be a clue to discover what is going on
inside domUs that contain critical files. Section 5.6.2.1, 5.6.2.2, 5.6.3, 6.2, and 6.3
discuss how to discover the causes of the incidents. Consequently, the evidence
should assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 such as criminal
domUs. As a result, this should assist in mitigating the causes of negative impacts
on both customer and provider companies such as brand damage, as discussed
in Section 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5.
5.6.2 The history of critical files, work for both sides
This subsection discusses in detail how the history of critical files can be useful
for both customers and providers.
[43], [30], and [76] argue that a file-centric log is important when dealing with
the cloud problems. The history of critical files (Section 5.6.1) is also a file-
centric log. To discuss how the history of critical files works, we assume that an
attacker can log into a domU and conduct criminal activities in this domU. For
example, the attacker may use appUs in this victim domU to access the domU's
critical files (as will be discussed in Section 5.6.2.1) or to send spam emails as
will be discussed in Section 5.6.2.2. In this situation, the history of critical files
(Section 5.6.1) which is produced by logging systems can assist in auditing or
clarifying the one who is responsible for this situation.
5.6.2.1 The history of critical files to mitigate the risks associated
with threat for the benefit of the customers
This section discusses how the history of critical files can assist in mitigating the
risks associated with threats, to benefit the customers.
It would be useful if we had a history of each of the domU's critical files to
assist in indicating, for example, who has access to these files, and which appU
have accessed them. The history information can enhance accountability in the
cloud and customers' confidence. For example for threat 1, when Alice's domU is
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compromised by attackers, they may control appU to access her critical file f or
s.txt, as shown in Figure 5.1 and discussed in Section 5.4. The history of f can be
used to clarify this undesired malicious incident by the attackers. For example,
the history can be information about which appU accessed f, when, and whom
this appU belonged to.
The history of critical files could assist in analysing attacker behaviours inside
domUs. To analyse attacker behaviours, Alice can check rec_no 2 column 4 in
Table 5.2, and may discover that someone else such as Bob accessed her critical
file s.txt. The content of the table can be more complex to provide more precise
evidence, which will be discussed in Section 6.2.
5.6.2.2 How the history of critical files helps providers to deal with
dom0 compromising
This section discusses how the history of critical files helps providers to deal with
dom0 compromising.
In Table 5.2, when one discovers that Bob has accessed Alice's critical file
s.txt, this can be a trigger for the providers to be aware that their dom0 may be
compromised. To identify Bob accurately, they can conduct further investigation,
for example, by pinpointing Bob's Id (p_ownId, column 4), the appU name
(p_nm, column 1) he used to access s.txt, or the s.txt file name. Then, they can
gather more necessary evidence. For example, this can be achieved by recording
Bob's appU behaviours as done in the case study in Section 3.4.2, or monitoring
this appU or domU for malicious network traffic as done in [1]. Thus, the history
of critical files can be of benefit to the provider.
5.6.3 Process Behaviour Logs
This subsection discuses a process in domU, defines a process behaviour log, and
provides examples of a process behaviour log.
5.6.3.1 Processes in DomUs
A process is a program in execution [132], or the operating system's abstraction
for a running program [133]. An appU can, for example, be a C programming
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code, and is stored in the domU/diskU. After a user compiles this code, she can
obtain the appU application/program. Then, in Linux system, she can run this
application by the command './appU'. The CPU executes the instructions in the
program, this is when the appU application become a process called 'appU'. This
thesis uses Linux processes as an example of processes in a domU. Actually, in the
generic logging components (Figure 3.1), an appU is composed of one or more
processes or commands. An appU life cycle is when the appU is executed and
becomes a process, until the process is terminated. For each individual appU life
cycle, the process has a unique id.
5.6.3.2 A processes behaviour log definition
Log files or a provenance collection in PASSXen [43] system include the creation,
access, and destruction of the processes of domUs. A process behaviour log
is a record of the process since it was created until it is destroyed.
Precisely, it contains records of three periods of a process life time: the creation,
access, and destruction of processes in the domUs.
Details of the periods are discussed in the lists below.
1. For a period of process creation, a user level process can be created by
executing an executable program or application [134]. We define a period
of process created as when an appU is executed. This causes a live process
named 'appU' which exists in memU.
2. A period of process access is when a process has access to a file. This period
focuses on the file operation (read or write) that a process carries out on
this file.
3. To define a period of process destruction, [134] states that a user process
destruction can be driven by a normal process termination event. We define
a period of process destruction as when an appU is normally terminated
when all its instructions are executed. This causes a live process name
'appU' to disappear from the memU.
Customers do not want unauthorized users to access their critical files such as
financial and health files or business database files, as discussed in Section 5.2. Thus,
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in each record of the process behaviour log, we focus on what file operation (read
and write) a process carries out on a file.
Then, for the contents of the process behaviour log, the main attributes of
each record are as listed below:
1. a record number,
2. a process id of the process that is conducting an operation (read operation
or write operation) on a file,
3. a process name of the process that is conducting the operation on a file,
4. the id of the owner of this process,
5. a timestamp of the operation,
6. a file name of the file that this process is conducting the operation on, and
7. the operation name including read or write.
rec_no p_id p_nm p_ownId time a_file operation
on a file
1 4001 appU 1001 t1 - -
2 4001 appU 1001 t2 a.txt write
3 4001 appU 1001 t3 b.txt read
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
N-1 4001 appU 1001 tN-1 c.txt write
N 4001 appU 1001 tN - -
Table 5.3: The content of process behaviour logs of a process (for an appU life cycle),
N is a number of records
Table 5.3 is an example of the process behaviour logs of an appU process, or
appU life cycle. In the table, the attributes of each record are listed below.
1. rec_no (row 1, column 1) is a record number,
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2. p_id (row 1, column 2) is a process name of the process that is conducting
an operation on the file,
3. p_nm (row 1, column 3) is a process name of the process that is conducting
an operation on the critical file,
4. p_ownId (row 1, column 4) is the id of the owner of this process,
5. time is a timestamp of the operation (row 1, column 5),
6. a_file is the file name of a file that this process is conducting an operation
on (row 1, column 6), and
7. operation is the operation name (row 1, final column).
The details of each record are listed below.
1. rec_no 1, the content in the first record is the evidence that a process is
created. For example, the content in the first record is the evidence or log
that a process (with its id as 4001 or rec_no 1, column 2 and its name as
appU or rec_no 1, column 3) is created by a user whose id is 1001 as in
rec_no 1, column 4.
2. rec_no 2 to rec_no N-1, the records between the first and the last record
is evidence of when a process has conducted an operation such as read or
write on a file. For example, rec_no 2 is the log content when this process
writes (rec_no 2, column 7) to a file (named a.txt as in rec_no 2, column
6).
3. rec_no N, the last record is the evidence of when this process is destructed.
For example, the last record is the evidence of when this process or appU
is permanently destructed from domU by a user id 1001 as in rec_no N,
column 4.
5.6.3.3 An example of process behaviour logs
Table 5.4 is an example of a cat process behaviour log file. The command cat
addr.txt is when a cat command in Linux accesses the text file called addr.txt. Cat
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p_nm p_id a_file p_ownId
cat 4000 addr.txt 1002
Table 5.4: A process behaviour log file to show the malicious cat command reading
addr.txt
stands for concatenate. The content of the log of the cat command can be listed
as below:
1. the name of the process (p_nm, cat),
2. the id of the process (p_id, 4000),
3. the name of the file accessed by the cat process, (a_file, addr.txt), and
4. the id of the owner of this process (p_ownId, 1002).
This log can be different, depending on who (a provider, customer, or auditor)
wants it and what it is for. The table shows only the content for the purpose of
identifying a spam domU in Section 5.6.4.
5.6.4 Process behaviour logs for spam activities
To benefit the providers, this subsection discusses how the process behaviour logs
can be useful to deal with spam activities in domUs. To explain how process
behaviour logs can assist in mitigating the risks associated with spam activities,
an example of three systematic steps to identify a spam domU is presented below.
1. A provider needs to pinpoint a suspicious domU, and a suspicious command
or process inside this domU.
2. The provider uses the suspicious domU id or name and the suspicious pro-
cess name as a trigger for a logging system to capture the suspicious process
activities in the process behaviour log for appropriate period of times.
3. The provider or an auditor can audit the log to analyse and identify this
suspicious spam domU.
We discuss each step in detail in the lists below.
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• For the first step, to pinpoint a suspicious domU and process this for spam-
ming, we assume that a provider has already pinpointed a domU and pro-
cess/command (e.g., a mail command in Linux system) that is suspected of
sending spam emails.
• For the second step, the provider can capture activities of this suspicious
mail command as a log file (called Log 1) to be used in the analysis and
identification of this spam domU. The details of this step are discussed
below.
 To capture the mail command behaviour/activities.
The case study in Section 3.4.2 already demonstrated how to capture
a mail command behaviour, as a simulation of spam activities. In the
case study, to send a spam email to a victim, the mail command in the
simulation is in the form ofmail -s spamSubj winai.wongthai@ncl.ac.uk.
This command sends the string 'spamSubj' as an e-mail subject to the
email address 'winai.wongthai@ncl.ac.uk'. A logger in this case study
can capture both the e-mail subject or the string 'spamSubj' and the
email address or the string 'winai.wongthai@ncl.ac.uk', and is able to
record the captured information as a log file.
 To capture another command that works with the mail com-
mand.
We can take one step further from the case study in Section 3.4.2.
One of the forms of this mail command to send emails to more than
one email address at once is mail -s spamSubj addr1 add2 ... addrN.
When addr1 to addrN is stored in a file (e.g., addr.txt), the form of
this command can be mail -s spamSubj $(cat addr.txt). The cat com-
mand will access addr.txt, then display all the addresses to the mail
command. The mail command then sends a spam email to all the
addresses. In this case, this form of mail command (mail -s spam-
Subj $(cat addr.txt)) has three arguments. The first argument is '-s',
the second is 'spamSubj', and the last is '$(cat addr.txt)'.
The second argument or 'spamSubj' and the third argument or '$(cat
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addr.txt)' of the mail command can be evidence to assist in analysing
and identifying this mail command as spam activity, and to further
identify the domU that uses this command. As we can see, the third
argument of the mail command is '$(cat addr.txt)'. The provider can
record the cat process behaviour as process behaviour logs (called Log
2 or Table 5.4). The logger in the case study can also capture and
record the second argument as 'spamSubj' and the third argument as
'$(cat addr.txt)' of the mail command discussed above.
• For the third step, the provider or an auditor can audit the log to analyse
and identify this suspicious spam domU. For the command mail -s spam-
Subj $(cat addr.txt), this mail command sends emails to all victim email ad-
dresses in a text file addr.txt. Thus, this mail command involves addr.txt in
Table 5.4, column 3. Hence, this file could be very important evidence
to identify these spam activities. Section 6.3.2 discusses an example of the
complete process behaviour log file to show the malicious mail and cat com-
mand involved in spam activities.
Regarding addr.txt, when the providers have already pinpointed the mail
command that sends emails, as demonstrated in Section 3.4.2, they can
then combine the capture of the mail command's malicious behaviours
(Log1/in Section 3.4.2) with the cat command behaviour log file (Log2/in
Table 5.4, this command reading addr.txt) as evidence to assist in identi-
fying this spam domU. Note that, for this discussion, we assume that the
second argument as 'spamSubj' and the third argument as '$(cat addr.txt)'
of the mail command above is sufficient to identify these spam activities.
Thus, process behaviour logs, for example cat's behaviour log or Table 5.4,
can be useful to assist when analysing and identifying spam domUs in the
providers' IaaS cloud. We do not discuss identifying an absolute spam
domU. This involves more research on the identification of spam application
behaviour.
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5.6.5 How Process behaviour logs benefit customers
To benefit the customers, this subsection discusses how the process behaviour
logs can be useful to enhance the flexibility of auditing in the cloud using logging
systems.
rec_no p_nm a_file p_ownId
1 gedit a.txt 1002
2 gedit *s.txt 1002
Table 5.5: A list of all files accessed by gedit appU
To enhance the flexibility of auditing in the cloud using logging systems, for
example, Alice may want to know whether a particular appU (such as one that
has an ability to view text files e.g., gedit in Linux) has accessed her critical files
or not. Thus, process behaviour logs of a particular process could be useful for
Alice. For example, the process behaviour logs of gedit could be as in Table 5.5.
The table shows a list of all files that were accessed by gedit. Alice could therefore
check whether this process reads her critical file or s.txt or not. In the table, she
can see that gedit reads s.txt, see in rec_no 2, column 3 in Table 5.5. She may
then further investigate this incident. Thus, this type of log file can be useful to
enable the flexibility of auditing.
5.6.6 Both history of critical files and process behaviour
logs with indirect benefits to providers
This subsection discusses how both the history of critical files and process be-
haviour logs can present indirect benefits for providers. [8] argues that account-
ability proactively detects and diagnoses problems, and providers can more easily
handle customer complaints. Thus, when both the history of critical files and
process behaviour logs are reliable and trusted by an auditor, as will be fully
discussed in the beginning of Section 6.3, providers can clarify the false claims
generated by customers. This benefits the providers as discussed in Section 5.5,
in that customers will buy the cloud based on providers' reputations [131]. They
will not buy IaaS products if they know that many criminals reside inside the
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provider cloud infrastructure. The criminals are in the cloud infrastructure can
be one of the forms of attacks enclosed in threat 1.
5.7 Available Approaches to Obtain the History
of a critical File
There are two approaches to obtain the history of critical files. The first is domU
memory introspection approach, for short-memory introspection which will
be discussed in this section. The second one is domU system calls intercep-
tion approach, for short-interception which will be discussed in Section 5.8. We
will describe both of these based on the generic logging components.
As discussed in Section 5.6 the history of a critical file is the records of three
periods of a critical file's life time: the time at which the file is created, accessed,
and destroyed, as presented in Table 5.1. This section contains subsections to
discuss the memory introspection. Subsection 5.7.1 describes the memory in-
trospection approaches to obtain the history of critical files. Subsection 5.7.2
discusses how the memory introspection can obtain the history of critical files.
Then, from Linux kernel's data structures,
Subsection 5.7.3, Subsection 5.7.4, and Subsection 5.7.5 respectively explain
how to obtain the full path name of a critical file, the operation's name of an
operation that is performed on a critical file, and the last accessed and modified
times of a critical file. After that, Subsection 5.7.6 describes how to obtain the
creation and deletion records of a critical file. Finally, Subsection 5.7.7 discusses
how to obtain process behaviour logs through the introspection approach. This
includes the method to obtain process behaviour logs when a process carries out
an operation on a file, and how to obtain the process creation and destruction
record.
5.7.1 Memory Introspection approaches
This subsection describes memory introspection approaches to obtain the history
of critical files.
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This subsection only discusses the method to obtain a periods accessed infor-
mation by memory introspection approach. This is because the periods accessed
represents the majority of the contents for the history of a critical file, compared
to the periods created (rec_no 1 in Table 5.1) and destroyed (rec_no N in Ta-
ble 5.1), which should be separate records of each history of each critical file. Sec-
tion 5.7.6 later discusses how to obtain the periods created and destroyed. The
terms memory introspection and introspection are used interchangeably.
Memory introspection is the process of accessing the memory state in the main
memory (Random Access Memory or RAM) of a target virtual machine such as
a domU from another such as a dom0 [39]. It is one of the virtual machine
monitoring approaches. The memory introspection has many applications in
security and systems management.
Figure 5.2: Memory Introspection
To obtain the history of critical file, Figure 5.2 illustrates memory introspec-
tion in an IaaS environment. From the figure, we can see that when appU (called
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read) reads s.txt or the dot-arrow line in the figure, this appU will own some mem-
ory space in memU, see read_mem or the ellipse in memU in Figure 5.2. This
memory space includes information of all files opened by this read appU. We can
record this information as history of critical files for example by using app0 and
P1 (Figure 5.2). This will be discussed later in the following subsections.
The memory space holds all the information we need to record. This infor-
mation is rec_no 2 to N-1 in Table 5.1 and all records in Table 5.2. However, we
only discuss to obtain the history information as shown in rec_no 1 of Table 5.2
as an example how. This information is listed below:
1. a file name of a file s.txt or the string "s.txt",
2. a process Id as 4624 of appU that accesses this file,
3. a process name as read of appU that accesses this file, and
4. an owner Id of the read process as 1002 which is Alice's user Id in this
domU.
5.7.2 How the memory introspection can obtain the history
of critical files
This subsection discusses how the memory introspection can obtain the history
of critical files. This includes: the introspection system architecture, how the
logger captures information of the history of a critical file, and Linux kernel data
structures for virtual memory organisation of an appU that hold the information
of the history of critical files.
This thesis does not propose a new memory introspection tool or approach,
as we reuse existing tools. Section 5.6.1 discusses the contents of the history of a
critical file s.txt, in Table 5.2.
For rec_no 1 in this table:
1. p_id as 4624 is the id and name of the process that reads this file,
2. p_nm as read is the name of the process that reads this file, and
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3. p_ownId as 1002 (Alice's Id) is the id of the user who runs this process.
Section 5.7.2.1 will fully discuss the technical detail of a memory introspec-
tion approach which can obtain the information in Table 5.2, by using memory
introspection tools and the comprehension of the knowledge of Linux kernel data
structures for virtual memory [135].
5.7.2.1 Introspection system architecture
Figure 5.3: The system architecture of the introspection approach
Figure 5.3 illustrates the system architecture of an introspection system. The
architecture is based on the generic logging components see Figure 3.1. The main
components of the architecture are:
1. app0 or logger in the white box in dom0 user level, Figure 5.3,
2. P1 or libVMI [79] in the shaded box in dom0 user level, Figure 5.3, and
3. F3 as a log file in disk0, Figure 5.3.
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LibVMI is a memory introspection tool to read memory from VMs or do-
mUs. Figure 5.3 illustrates the introspection with the approach used in lib-
VMI [79] to obtain runtime access to the memU of a domU. The introspection
externally performs, typically from within a dom0. We discuss how to use mem-
ory introspection tool such as libVMI to obtain information of the history of
critical file s.txt.
We can deploy libVMI in the dom0 user level to read the memory space,
see read_mem or the ellipse in memU in Figure 5.3. This memory space holds all
information (as discussed above) that we need to record, which is a file name of
s.txt and rec_no 1 of Table 5.2. Three steps to obtain the contents of the history
of critical file s.txt using introspection are listed below. The steps are the circles
with numbers in Figure 5.3.
1. The logger in dom0 user level, which is an app0 calls libVMI or P1 to access
memU to get the information in read_mem such as a file name of s.txt, as
discussed above.
2. LibVMI accesses memU to obtain the information in read_mem and returns
the obtained information to the logger.
3. The logger manages the obtained information then writes the information
which is rec_no 1 of Table 5.2 into F3.
Conditions of this system architecture of the introspection approach or Fig-
ure 5.3 are listed below.
• How does the logger know whether a file in a domU is critical or not.
In this prototype architecture, this thesis does not discuss how to manage
the logger application. Thus, we assume that the logger already knows a
file name of the critical file.
• Why are the logging processes placed in dom0, not domU.
LibVMI is designed to be inside a dom0. Thus, the logger is also in dom0,
to call libVMI. Placing libVMI and the logger in dom0 is better than plac-
ing them in domU. Placing both of them in domU allows the owner of the
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domU to tamper with them, as agreed by [30; 39; 78; 96; 97]. [97] state
that when a monitored machine resides in the same machine as the de-
tecting or monitoring system, the owners of the monitoring machine can
disable the detection system, or modify the detected data, according to
their needs. Moreover, [39] agree that to obey typical good programming
guidelines, or good security guidelines for designing monitoring architec-
ture, a monitored machine should not tamper with (e.g., alter the code of)
the monitors. Thus, we have all logging processes in dom0, not domU.
5.7.2.2 How the logger captures information of the history of a critical
file
Figure 5.4: A task_struct structure of the read process, adapted from [2]
Figure 5.5: task_struct structure list, adapted from[3]
This section discusses the technical details of how the logger (the white box
inside dom0 user level in Figure 5.3) in the introspection system architecture
works with Linux kernel data structures for virtual memory organisation to cap-
ture the contents of the history of critical file s.txt. Linux kernel data structures
are built-in data structures for use in Linux kernel code; and virtual memory
allows a process to allocate and manage main memory as if it is only one process
in the memory of the system [2].
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5.7.2.3 Linux kernel data structures for virtual memory organisation
of an appU
This section explains how Linux manages virtual memory for its processes, as
numbered below.
1. Linux kernel data structures.
The Linux system provide kernel data structures for virtual memory organ-
isation. Each process has its own data structure in the memory. This data
structure is task_struct as shown in Figure 5.4. All task_struct structures
are linked as circular linked lists as shown in Figure 5.5. In the figure,
process 3 represents the read appU.
Each task_struct contains numerous variables to keep track of a process
in the memory when it is executed by the CPU [2; 132; 136]. Examples
of the variables are: pid or process id; and comm or process name. They
hold information which is used to keep track of a process in the memory
when it is executed by the CPU. We can use an introspection approach to
extract information from all variables in a task_struct structure as shown
in Figure 5.4. In the figure, an asterisk (*) in front of a variable indicates
that this variable is a pointer. These variables are:
• pid or the process Id of a process such as 4624,
• comm or a process name or executable name such as 'read',
• files or a pointer to files_struct structure that holds all files that are
opened by this process, and
• loginuid or an account, that includes a user id and that a user uses to
gain access to the system [136] such as 1002.
These variables are based on a 64-bit Linux kernel version 3.8.5 for Fedora
18. The source code repositories of this kernel version can be found at [137].
2. A Linux kernel data structure for virtual memory organisation of
the read appU/process.
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Figure 5.6: Linux kernel data structures for virtual memory organisation of appU
process (called read) that reads s.txt.
Figure 5.6 is a Linux kernel data structure for virtual memory organisation
of an appU (called read). We assume that this memory organisation is for
when a process or appU called 'read' is reading a file called 's.txt'. Thus,
this memory organisation exists in the main memory of a Linux system
when only the system is running this process and the process is reading the
file.
As discussed in Section 5.7.2.1, this memory organisation is a memory space,
see read_mem or the ellipse in memU in Figure 5.3. This memory space is
owned by read appU when this appU becomes a live process in memU and
when it reads s.txt.
Figure 5.6 does not include all the information of the kernel data structures.
However, the figure assists in the understanding of our discussion. The
logger code traverses all those structures until it gets the history of a critical
file information such as the name of s.txt. In Figure 5.6, each box is a whole
data structure or data type such as task_struct.
The name above each box is the name of a data structure such as task_struct.
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The name inside a box or data structure is a member or variable (e.g.,
files in task_struct) of that structure. An asterisk (*) in front of a vari-
able indicates that this variable is a pointer. Each arrow line corresponds
to memory address pointers for example the arrow line from variable files
in task_struct. Each pair of arrow-dot lines from a variable to another
box (e.g., the pair of arrow-dot lines from f_path to path) indicates that
the box is a data structure of this variable.
The Linux kernel manages the task data structure or task_struct for a
process. A task_struct structure is responsible for storing all essential in-
formation to run a process including process id and pointers to all files
that are opened by a process. For example, 'files' is one of the members
of a task_struct, see Figure 5.6 in the task_struct box. It is a pointer
to a files_struct data structure which maintains all current files that this
process is currently using.
One of the current files is s.txt which the logger needs to capture the file's
details such as the file name. When assuming that appU is reading s.txt,
the logger can traverse the virtual memory space of read appU in Figure 5.6
by following Step 1 to 8 to obtain the contents of the history of critical file
s.txt, as discussed below. Each step is a circle with a number in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6 shows Linux kernel data structures for virtual memory organi-
sation of appU process (called read) that is reading s.txt. The lists below
present explanations of the data structures involved for the reading event.
• task_struct : Figure 5.6 shows that an appU process represented by
the task_struct structure (the first box from the left in the figure) has
the 'files' filed which is a pointer to the files_struct data structure
which is the second box from the left in the figure.
• files_struct : in the figure, a files_struct structure contains an fdt
pointer, see inside the files_struct structure box in the figure. This
structure holds information about all of the files that this process is
currently using.
• fdt: an fdt stands for 'f ile descriptor table'. When a process opens a
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file, the opened file is represented by a 'file descriptor' which contains
the details of this open file [138]. Thus, a file descriptor table or fdt
stores all file descriptor of all files. An fdt points to the first open file of
a process. This first open file is fd[0] which is a member in the fdtable
data structure, see inside the third box from the left in the figure.
• fdtable: each running process has a file descriptor table which is rep-
resented by a fdtable structure. This structure contains pointers to
all open files and is stored by the kernel [139]. The fdt pointer (see
inside the files_struct structure box) points to the first open file or
fd[0] inside fdtable structure. This structure contains pointers for up
to 256 file data structures. These pointers are fd[0]-fd[255].
• fd[i]: fd stands for file descriptor. Each fd[i] points to each open file
that is opened by the read process. Each open file is structured as
a file structure, see the forth box from the left in Figure 5.6.
• file: a file data structure is a representation of each open file [135].
This structure contains a variable called f_path.
• f_path: f_path contains a path file of an open file. A data structure
of f_path is path, see the third box from the right in Figure 5.6.
• path: a path data structure contains a dentry pointer. This pointer
leads us to dentry structure which contains a variable called d_name.
Dentry structure is the second box from the right in Figure 5.6.
• dentry : a dentry stands for a 'directory entry' which is each compo-
nent of a path [2]. For example, when a path is '/home/alice/s.txt',
this path is composed of four dentry structures including: the root
directory '/', two directories including home and alice, and the file
s.txt. Each dentry structure contains a variable called d_name which
is a qstr structure or the last box from the left in Figure 5.6.
• qstr : a qstr structure has a pointer variable called name. This variable
points to a file name of an open file. In this case when a process reads
s.txt, it points to a string "s.txt".
3. The logger obtaining the contents of history critical file s.txt.
155
Figure 5.2 shows a read appU reading s.txt, the dot-arrow line and Fig-
ure 5.3 shows us the logger (the white box in dom0 user level) needs to
obtain history information of the critical file s.txt. Again, the history in-
formation are the lists below:
• rec_no 1 in Table 5.2;
 process id or p_id of a process (called read) that is reading s.txt,
 process name p_nm of a process (called read) that is reading s.txt,
 an id of a user who runs the read process, and
• a file name of s.txt.
The logger can traverse the virtual memory space of read appU in Figure 5.6
by following Step 1 to 8 listed below to obtain the contents of the history
of critical file s.txt. Step 1 is to obtain the process id and name, and the
id of the user who runs read process. Step 2 to Step 8 is to obtain the file
name of s.txt.
• Step 1: This step captures the process id and name of the read pro-
cess that is reading s.txt, and the id of the user who runs the read
process, see Figure 5.6. In this step, the logger needs to access the
list (Figure 5.5) of task_struct structures to capture a read process's
task_struct, see the third element from the left in the list in Figure 5.5.
Then, the logger can capture details of the read process including: the
process id and name of the read process, and the id of a user who runs
the read process, see Figure 5.6.
• Step 2: In Figure 5.6, a files pointer is the third element from the
top of the first box from the left. This pointer is in read appU pro-
cess's task_struct. It points to files_struct structure which is the
second box from the left in Figure 5.6. This structure contains an fdt
pointer.
• Step 3: The fdt pointer is the element of files_struct. It points to the
first open file or fd[0] inside the fdtable structure which is the third
box from the left in Figure 5.6. Fdtable structure contains pointers
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fd[0]-fd[255]. Each fd[i] points to each open file that is opened by the
read process.
• Step 4: It is assumed that the read appU is reading s.txt. Thus, s.txt
is structured as a file data structure. This file is pointed to by a fd[3]
pointer.
• Step 5: In Step 4, File data structure of s.txt is pointed by fd[3]. Then,
in Step 5, the f_path variable (inside file structure) is a path structure
which is the third box from the right of Figure 5.6. This structure
contains a dentry pointer.
• Step 6: A dentry pointer is the element in the third box from the right
of Figure 5.6. It points to the dentry structure which is the second box
from the right of Figure 5.6. This structure contains a variable called
d_name.
• Step 7: D_name is the element in the second box from the right of
Figure 5.6. This element is a qstr structure which is the last box from
the left in Figure 5.6. This structure has a pointer variable called name
that points to a file name of s.txt or a string "s.txt".
• Step 8: The logger can obtain the string file name of s.txt.
Memory introspection, along with Linux kernel data structures for virtual mem-
ory organisation of a process, enables logging systems to record the appU opera-
tions (e.g., read or write) on a file which is in diskU. This recorded information
should be useful for building the logs or history of each file. As a result these logs
can be used as evidence to indicate who is responsible for any malicious activity
in domU. This can assist in mitigating the risks associated with the seven CSA
threats.
5.7.3 Getting the full path name of the critical File
This subsection explains how to obtain a full path name of the critical file.
In the system architecture of the introspection approach or Figure 5.3, s.txt
which is in diskU in the figure can actually be in a directory. When we assume
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that the file is in a directory '/home/alice', thus the full path name of this file is
'/home/alice/s.txt'. This section discusses how to obtain the full path name.
Figure 5.7: How to obtain the full path file name of s.txt
In Section 5.7.2.3, after the logger gets the file name of s.txt (Step 2 to 8,
in Figure 5.6), Figure 5.7 shows how the logger get the full path name of s.txt.
It is assumed that the logger was already able to get the file name 's.txt' by
follwing Step 1 to 4 in Figure 5.7 or Step 2 to 8 in Figure 5.6. To be simplified for
explanation, we will follow Figure 5.7 for this. In the figure, the full path name
can be obtained after Step 4.
• In Step 5, the logger can follow a d_parent pointer which is the element
in the third box from the left in Figure 5.7. This pointer then recursively
points to dentry structures, see Step 8 and 11. These dentry structures are
the second, third, and forth dentry boxes from the right in Figure 5.7. They
hold a parent directory name of s.txt, which is '/home/alice/'. This can be
obtained by following Step 6 to 13.
• Then, in Steps 6 to 7, the logger can obtain the 'alice' directory name.
• In Steps 8 to 10, the logger can continue to follow the d_parent pointer,
in Step 8. In Step 9 and 10, then the logger can get the parent directory
name of the alice directory which is 'home'.
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• Finally, in Steps 11 to 13, the logger will reach and get the root directory
or '/', and achieves the full path of s.txt or '/home/alice/s.txt', considering
all 13 steps).
5.7.4 Getting the Operations of a Critical File
This subsection explains how to get the operation's name of an operation that
is performed on a critical file from Linux kernel's data structures. An operation
name is already discussed in Subsection 5.6.1, and shown in row 1, the last column
of Table 5.1.
Figure 5.8: How to Obtain File Operations
File_operations is a data structure that has pointers to functions such as
read() or write() [135; 140]. Each field of the structure corresponds to the address
of the functions. A process can call these functions when it is performed on
an open file [2]. A pointer member of the file structure called f_op points at
file_operations [135].
Figure 5.8 shows that how a logger can ascertain the functions that a process
invokes on an open file, outlined in the lists below.
• The routines of Step 1 to 4 in the figure is the same as those in Figure 5.6.
• In Step 5, the logger can locate the f_op pointer or the element in the forth
box from the left of Figure 5.8. The logger then follows this pointer to
the file_operations structure or the last box from the left of Figure 5.8.
• Finally, the logger can get a function (e.g., read or write) in Step 6.
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5.7.5 Getting the last accessed and modified times of a file
This subsection explains how to get the last accessed and modified times of a
critical file from Linux kernel's data structures.
Unix or Linux systems separate the concept of a file from any correlated
information about this file [2]. For example, the correlated information about
a file are access permissions, size, and owner. This information is stored in a
separate data structure (called an inode) from the file. Thus, an inode is a data
structure that keeps track of all the information about a file [141]. Last accessed
time of a file or i_atime and last modified time of a file or i_mtime are attributes
in an inode. A pointer member of file structure called f_inode points to an inode
[135].
In [142], i_atime gets updated when one opens a file but also when a file is
used for other operations like grep, sort, cat, head, tail, and so on. On the other
hand, i_mtime gets updated when one modifies a file. Whenever she updates the
content of a file or saves a file the i_mtime gets updated. Thus, for the content
of the history of a critical file in a domU in Table 5.1, when a process reads a file
(see the last column of rec_no 3), i_atime is t3 (see column 5 of rec_no 3), and
is a timestamp of this event. When a process writes to a file (the last column
of rec_no 2), i_mtime is t2 (in column 5 of rec_no 2), and is a timestamp of
this event. Both i_atime and i_mtime are critical attributes for the history of a
critical file. This section discusses how to obtain both of them.
Figure 5.9: How to obtain information from inode
Figure 5.9 shows how to get i_atime and i_mtime, discussed in the lists below.
• The routines of Step 1 to 4 in the figure is the same as those in Figure 5.6.
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• In Step 5, the logger follows a pointer f_inode to get the inode structure.
• In Step 6, the logger can obtain i_atime and i_mtime, which are members
of the inode structure.
5.7.6 How to obtain the creation and deletion records of a
critical file
This subsection explains how to obtain creation and deletion record of a critical
file.
There are two types of critical files that a customer owns in his diskU:
1. uploaded critical files or files that a customer transfers from his local ma-
chine to his domU/diskU
2. newly created critical files or files that he newly creates in his domU/diskU,
for instance by using appU.
Section 5.7.2.1 discusses the introspection system architecture, see Figure 5.3.
This architecture comes with a condition. It is when the logger (a white box in
dom0 user level in the figure) needs to capture history information of a critical
file, the logger already knows the critical file's name such as "s.txt". The name
will be in the memory space (read_mem in Figure 5.3) when any process accesses
this file. This name will also be used as a trigger by the logger to capture which
process is accessing this file, as discussed in Section 5.7.2.1.
Discussion of the creation and destruction record of both uploaded critical
files and newly created critical files is presented in the lists below.
1. A creation record of a critical file.
• To obtain a creation record of an uploaded critical file:
Considering the first record of a critical file in our example of the
history of a critical file in a domU, see Table 5.1. The content in the
first record is the evidence of when a critical file was first created in
diskU.
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From the condition, a logger knows the name of a critical file. This
name will be used as a trigger when the logger captures the history of a
critical file. When a critical file is an uploaded file from local machines
to a domU/diskU, the creation time (as t1 in rec_no 1 column 5 of
Table 5.1) of this file can be either an i_atime or i_mtime.
Firstly, it is an i_atime (as discussed in Section 5.7.5), when a process
reads this file for the first time in domU. Secondly, it is an i_mtime
when a process writes this file. Thus, for rec_no 1 of Table 5.1, this is
a record to indicate the creation of a file, and all the necessary informa-
tion (including t1) of this record can be obtained by the logger. This
is because we can consider the first record of an uploaded file as when
the first time this file is accessed after the file is uploaded into domU.
However, the operation name of the operation on this file (the last
column of rec_no 1 in Table 5.1) can be either read or write, instead
of create. When the operation name is read, t1 (column 5 of rec_no
1 in Table 5.1) is i_atime. When the operation name is write, ti 1
is i_mtime. This is because, as discussed in Section 5.7.5, when a
process reads a file then i_atime is a timestamp of this event, and
when a process writes to a file then i_mtime is the timestamp of this
event.
• To obtain a creation record of a newly created critical file:
Following the same condition of our logging, which is the logger knows
the file name, thus a customer has to create a new critical file in domU
and allows the logger to know the file name of this new file. Therefore,
the creation record of this new file is when the first time this file
is accessed after it was created by this customer. Then the logger
can capture the history information as discussed above. The creation
record of a newly created critical file can be considered the same as
the uploaded file in all aspects. Thus, the logger can then capture the
history information for this file the same as discussed above.
2. Destruction record of a critical file. This discussion can be applied
to both uploaded critical files and newly created files. For the destruction
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record (rec_no N, in Table 5.1), we assume that a critical file will be deleted
by an application or appU. For example, to delete a file name 's.txt' in
the Linux system, the command to delete this file is 'rm s.txt'. For this
command ('rm s.txt' ), s.txt is a parameter or argument of the rm command.
The rm command is used for removing files or directories [143].
Thus, the logger needs to use a name 'rm' as a trigger to capture a parameter
s.txt after the rm command. This capture can be achieved the same as for
a mail command argument, as discussed in Section 3.4.2. To obtain the
destruction record (rec_no N, in Table 5.1), the logger should capture the
process id or p_id, process name or p_nm of rm command, the id of a
user who runs this rm command or p_ownerId, and the time when this
command is captured, see tN in column 5 in the table.
The operation name (the last column in the table) is fixed as 'delete' because
we know that the rm command is for used deletion. It should be possible to
capture file deletion that are performed by other commands or applications
that have the ability to delete a file the same as the method for rm command.
5.7.7 To obtain the process behaviours logs through the
introspection approach
This subsection discusses how to obtain process behaviours logs through the in-
trospection approach. This includes obtainment of process behaviour logs when
a process carries out an operation on a file, and the method to obtain process
creation and destruction records.
To obtain process behaviour log when a process carries out an oper-
ation on a file. Table 5.3 shows the contents of process behaviour logs of a
process or appU. Each record from the records rec_no 2 to rec_no N-1 is evi-
dence of when a process has executed an operation on a file. When comparing
the content of the history of a critical file in a domU (Table 5.1) with the content
of process behaviour logs of a process or appU (Table 5.3), it can be seen that
almost all the contents of both tables are the same.
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The history of a critical file is file oriented, focusing on which process accesses
this particular file such as s.txt, thus the file name is fixed, see Table 5.1 which
does not show the file name because the file name is fixed as 's.txt' for example.
The process log is process oriented, focusing on what this particular process is
doing for example which file it has access to, rec_no 2 to rec_no N-1 in Table 5.3.
Thus the process name is fixed as appU, see Table 5.3 column 3.
In Section 5.7.1, to obtain the history of a critical file, the logger (in the
introspection approach or Figure 5.3) pinpoints a particular critical file name
such as s.txt, thus the file name of the critical file is a main trigger for the logger
to capture the history information. Similarly, this logger can be modified to
pinpoint a process name to obtain process logs. The process name will be a main
trigger for the logger to capture the process log information. Thus, the method
to obtain process logs is as the same as the method to obtain history of critical
files but different triggers.
To obtain process creation and destruction records. In Table 5.3, the
content in the first record or rec_no 1 is the evidence or log that a process (with
its id as 4001 or rec_no 1 column 2, and its name as appU or rec_no 1 column
3) is created by a user whose id is 1001 which is rec_no 1 column 4. The last
record or rec_no N is the evidence of when this process or appU was terminated
by a user id 1001 which is rec_no N column 4.
Section 5.6.3 defines the process of creation as when an appU is executed,
which causes a live process name 'appU' to exist in memU. The section also
defines the process of destruction as when an appU is terminated, normally when
all of its instructions have been executed. This causes a live process name 'appU'
to disappear from memU.
Section 5.7.2.3 discusses Linux kernel data structures for virtual memory or-
ganisation of processes and a list of processes, see Figure 5.5. The logger (a white
box in dom0 user level in Figure 5.3) can be modified to capture both process
creation and destruction records.
From Table 5.3, we assume that a logger is capturing the process creation
or rec_no 1 and process destruction or rec_no N. To capture the creation of a
process, the logger needs to access the list of all processes, see Figure 5.5. It
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then keeps checking the list until a target process such as read appears in the
list. When read appU appears in the list, the logger can capture the detail of this
process. The detail includes the process id and name of the read process, the id
of a user who runs the read process, and the time (as t1, in rec_no 1 column 5
in Table 5.3) that the logger first found this process in the list. Thus, we assume
that t1 is the creation time of this process.
For the destruction period, all information of this record is as same as rec_no
1 in Table 5.3 except the time tN which is rec_no N column 5 in Table 5.3. The
time tN can be obtained by the logger checking the list until the same process
name as the one in rec_no 1 (in this case the name is 'read') disappears from the
list. Thus, we assume that tN is the destruction time of this process.
5.8 Interception
Another approach to obtain the history of critical files is domU system calls
interception approach, for short-interception. This section mainly discusses
how this approach can be used to obtain the history information.
Figure 5.10: Interception logging solutions
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As discussed in Section 2.12, only the kernel can access hardware such as disks,
thus a process has to use system calls when it wants to access the hardware [144].
The system calls provide the interface between the user and kernel spaces [2]. For
example, if a process wants to read the contents in a file, called s.txt, it has to
issue at least three system calls which are to open the file, to read the file, and to
close the file [144]. For example, from Figure 5.10, the dot-arrow-line represents
an example of when appU reads s.txt
Considering the capture of history information of a critical file in domU, the
interception approach is to intercept the file operations then to record the inter-
cepted information as log files. From Figure 5.10, when appU reads s.txt (the
dot-line represents an example), this appU needs to issue a 'read' system call via
domU kernel. Thus, the main method to intercept domU's file activities (e.g.,
when appU is reading s.txt) is placing interceptors in the domU kernel level as
P4 in Figure 5.10. These interceptors can intercept system calls that are invoked
by appU.
[43] argues that some system calls are execve, fork, exit, read, readv, write,
writev, mmap, open, pipe, and the kernel operation drop_inode, and these system
calls are sufficient to capture the rich ancestry of relationships between Linux files,
pipes, and processes, for instance the relationship information when a process
reads a file. [30] also argues that placing interceptors in the domU kernel level
can intercept information of relationship between a process and file, for example,
where a process executes actions (include create, read, write, and delete) on a
file.
Thus, domU system calls interception is an approach that requires the logger
(called interceptor) to intercept domU system calls to tracks the creation, access,
and destruction of processes, files, pipes, and sockets [43]. Thus, this approach
can collect information of a process that opens a file or history of a critical file. In
this thesis, the terms domU system calls interception and interception are used
interchangeably.
How interceptors can obtain process behaviour logs. To obtain the his-
tory of a critical file, the interceptors such as P4 in Figure 5.10 can pinpoints a
particular critical file name such as s.txt, thus the file name of the critical file is
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a main trigger for the logger to capture the history information. Similarly, these
interceptors can pinpoint a process name to obtain process behaviour logs. Thus,
the process name will be a main trigger for the interceptors to capture the process
log information.
5.9 Discussion of introspection and interception
approaches
This section discusses some aspects of both the introspection (Section 5.7.1) and
interception (Section 5.8) approaches. The lists below are the discussions includ-
ing: security aspects of introspection and interception which need to be analysed,
helper components in introspection and interception approaches, the combination
of introspection and interception, ideal logging solutions regarding the smallest
TCB to produce the history of a critical file, and the failure of implementation
for the ideal solution.
• Security Analysis.
Security aspects of the introspection architecture (which deploys P1 in dom0
user level, Figure 5.3) and the interception architecture (which deploys P4 in
domU kernel, Figure 5.10) can be analysed. Both architectures should have
different security aspects. As a result, they may need different solutions
to deal with their individual security issues. For example, the integrity of
P1 and P4 above should be different. This is because they are deployed in
different locations in the IaaS architecture.
For example, locating P1 in a dom0 user level is a security risk because
the providers or insiders may maliciously modify P1's code to produce con-
tents of log files or F3, which benefit themselves, and the complete security
analysis is in Section 5.10. P4 has different security concerns compared to
P1 above. When P4 is in the domU user level, it could be at risk as well.
This is because the owner of a domU can tamper with P4's code, as argued
by [30; 39; 78; 96; 97].
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These comparisons are very critical and need to be considered before deploy-
ment of introspection and interception in the production system. However,
this is out of the scope of this research.
• Helper components.
Figure 5.11: Helper components (app0 and P2)
Helper components can be app0 and P2 or the shaded boxes in Figure 5.11.
Both introspection and interception may need these components to achieve
the logging tasks of main components such as P1 (introspection) and P4
(interception). For example, app0 are deployed in [30; 39; 43; 44], and P2
are also deployed in works [30; 43; 44].
Helper components can perform a variety of logging-related tasks. App0 is
in the dom0 user level, and could cooperate with dom0 user level logging
processes such as P1 in Figure 5.11 to achieve logging tasks. For example
in [39] which uses introspection, app0 is used for calling P1 (in case P1 is a
library of tools such as libVMI) in order to access memU.
P2 is in the dom0 kernel level, and can cooperate with other logging pro-
cesses such as P4 in Figure 5.11, which is in the domU kernel. For example,
168
PASSXen [43] which is an interception has an analyser or P2 as a helper
component in dom0 kernel level to communicate with P4 to process log
records. However, helper components can be in the domU kernel level as
well, such as in HP Flogger [30]. These helper components need to be con-
sidered because they may affect the security analysis and performance of
logging systems.
• The combination of introspection and interception.
If the combination of introspection and interception is needed to mitigate
the risks associated with the CSA threats, the performance and security of
this new approach may be more complicated. For example, the combination
will cause more distributions of Px to many places in the IaaS architecture,
which will affect the security and performance logging systems. However,
it is possible to combine both approaches to mitigate the risks associated
with CSA threats, regarding security and performance of logging systems
which are deployed in the IaaS.
• Smallest trusted computing base or TCB.
Introspection and interception approaches involve TCB concerns. [38] ar-
gues that the TCB size of a software system (a logging system is also a
software system) can be used to evaluate the trustworthiness of that sys-
tem. [39] state that for any software system, the size of the system's TCB
should be as small as possible. Section 3.5.2.8 has already discussed the
smallest TCB size of a logging system.
Deploying all logging related components in a hypervisor. For
interception, the smallest TCB can be achieved when moving all logging
processes or components into the hypervisor. To compare the TCB of in-
trospection with interception, the interception (P4 in domU kernel level in
Figure 5.10) will have less TCB than the introspection (P1 in dom0 user
level in Figure 5.3) when all the interceptors and related logging processes
(P4) are moved and implemented in a hypervisor. Thus, it should be an
ideal consideration that we can deploy logging processes as P5 in the hy-
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pervisor as shown in Figure 3.7. P5 should collect a history of the critical
file in domU.
• The failure of implementation to place all logging processes as P5
in Xen with the interception approach
We decided to implement the ideal solution to achieve the smallest TCB
with the interception approach, see Figure 3.7. We need to place all logging
processes into Xen. We followed the work of [93] to implement this ap-
proach. Basically, they modified traps.c file (located in /xen/arch/x86/) in
Xen. They demonstrate how to obtain: system call number such as 78; sys-
tem call name such as gettimeofday; and domU id such as 8. However, they
do not discuss how to capture a critical file name that is associated with a
process which is accessing the file. We investigate some system calls that
relate to a file, such as sys_read, sys_write, sys_open, and sys_close [145].
However, we managed to get only domU id, and some system call ids which
did not relate to a file.
This approach needs to place all logging processes as P5 in Xen with in-
terception, and we realise that this approach is complicated. PASSXen [43]
also do not publicly publish the code of their work, which is necessary to
deploy this approach. With time limitations, we started to investigate the
introspection approach. The next chapter will demonstrate how to attain
the history of critical files using the introspection approach (Figure 5.3).
Although, the introspection approach does not yield the smallest TCB size,
we succeeded in implementing the proposed logging system based on this
approach. The proposed system yields less TCB compared to some previous
work, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
5.10 The Security Analysis of the Proposed Log-
ging System
This section discusses the security analysis of the system architecture of the in-
trospection approach (Figure 5.3). This architecture is used as the architecture
170
of the proposed logging system in the next chapter.
The proposed logging system's architecture in the implementation is system-
atically designed based on the generic logging components. Therefore, it inherits
the advantages of the generic logging components. For example, one of the ad-
vantages is an architecture based on the generic logging components can be used
as a tool to analyse the security of logging processes and log files, which are dis-
tributed across the IaaS visualisation environment. Thus, one can analyse the
security of the logging system architecture in the implementation.
This thesis did not aim to provide secure logging systems yet in this stage.
This means that the proposed system (Figure 5.3 as will be discussed in Sec-
tion 6.1) can be tampered with, as discussed in Section 3.4.2.4. The system
architectures of the logging system discussed in Section 3.4.2.4 and one in Fig-
ure 5.3 are the same. We provide an approach to systematically analyse the
security of logging systems before deploying them in the IaaS real world produc-
tions. Section 3.4.2.4 has already discussed how to analyse the security of our
logging system in the spamming case study.
DomUs cannot tamper with the components of the proposed logging
system. Our implementation deploys the logger and libVMI in dom0, and the log
files or F3 in hw0. The advantage of doing this is that domUs cannot tamper with
these components. In contrast, when deploying the components inside domU,
this allow the owner of this domU to tamper with these components, as argued
by [30; 39; 96]. However, deploying the logging processes in dom0 also should
consider the other security aspects as discussed below. The solutions for these
security issues are out of the scope of this thesis.
Firstly, the security analysis of the log files: we use the logging system
architecture (Figure 5.3) as a tool for this analysis. For example, the relevant
security question is how to ensure the integrity of the log files that are stored
in disk0 which is fully owned and controlled by a provider. The provider may
maliciously learn about, or alter the log files. Secondly, the security analysis
of logging processes: the next relevant security question is how can an auditor
ensure the integrity of the logger or libVMI, which is run by the provider in dom0.
Locating these components in this location can be a security risk. This is because
the provider may maliciously modify the logger's code to produce contents of log
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files, which benefit himself. We discuss the questions above as an example of the
analysis of the proposed logging system.
5.11 Conclusions
This chapter addressed research Gap 1 (lack of systematic approaches to build
logging systems in IaaS), in particular, research Gap 1 (a) which is the lack
of simultaneous consideration of both customers and providers. Importantly, it
addressed research Gap 2 which is that research relating to logging in IaaS only
focuses on system-centric logs.
This chapter provided two main contributions. The first contribution is the
proposed solution to collect file-centric logs rather than system-centric logs. This
contribution addresses research Gap 2. There are some logging solutions that
emphasise file-centric logs with an interception approach. However, the prototype
implementation of the proposed logging system (in the next chapter) can be an
alternative approach to collecting file-centric logs to enhance accountability in
IaaS. This approach advocates the introspection of customer VM's memory from
dom0. The introspection traverses the kernel data structures in the memory.
The next contribution is the analysis of how CSA threat 1 affects both cus-
tomers and providers simultaneously, and the proposed logging solutions that
assist in mitigating the risks associated with the threat for both customers and
providers. This contribution addresses research Gap 1 (a). The analysis illus-
trates how CSA threat 1 such as mis-usage of customer VMs can affect both
sides.
The next chapter is prototype implementation of the proposed logging solu-
tions that can collect the file-centric log history of customers' critical files. An
architecture of the prototype is simple and cheap ways for the design and de-
velopment (the main benefit of the simple system pattern in Figure 4.7 Section
4.2.2.1) as discussed in Section 4.2.3 from Chapter 4. The architecture also facili-
tates enforcement of a security policy of a system itself, which is the main benefit




This chapter is prototype implementation of the proposed logging solutions that
can collect the file-centric log history of customers' critical files which are dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. An architecture of the prototype is simple and
cheap ways for the design and development (the main benefit of the simple system
pattern in Figure 4.7 Section 4.2.2.1) as discussed in Section 4.2.3 from Chapter
4. The architecture also facilitates enforcement of a security policy of a system
itself, which is the main benefit of the security facilitator logging pattern (Figure
4.8 Section 4.2.2.2 from Chapter 4).
This chapter addresses three research gaps. The first one or research Gap
1 (b) is the lack of concern for reducing the trusted computing base or TCB
size of a logging system. The second one or research Gap 2 is an issue that
research relating to logging in IaaS only focuses on system-centric logs which
is the hardware layer log, such as memory use, disk storage, temperature, and
voltage. The third research gap or research Gap 3 is a lack of analysis of what
the contents of the log file should actually be, and of how the contents can be
used to deal with the real world CSA threats to benefit both sides in detail.
The chapter has three main contributions. Firstly, the design of our proposed
logging system yields TCB size compared to previous work. This contribution
addresses Gap 1 (b). All logging related components (such as an introspection
tool that we have re-used, and a logger application) that have been deployed in
building the proposed logging system in this chapter are inside dom0.
The TCB size of a logging system can be compared to a TCB size of another
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logging system, as discussed in Section 3.5.2.8. For example, the TCB size of
a logging system, which includes all components (hw, a hypervisor, dom0, and
domU) is bigger than the TCB size of another logging system, which includes
only hw, a hypervisor, and dom0. The TCB size of our architecture includes only
a hypervisor and dom0, not domU. In contrast, previous works place some of
their logging-related components in domU; thus, the TCBs of their systems have
to include domU apart from a hypervisor and dom0. Other previous work that
have deployed the same introspection tool as in this chapter yields the same TCB
as ours. However, they are not designed to log the history of critical files.
Secondly, the proposed system collects file-centric logs rather than system-
centric logs. This contribution addresses research Gap 2. The prototype im-
plementation of the proposed logging system can be an alternative to collect
file-centric logs in order to enhance accountability in IaaS by domU's VM mem-
ory introspection approach (by traversing the domU kernel file structures) from
dom0.
Moreover, the file-centric history logs can be associated with a process and
files in a domU, for example, a record of a process P which reads file F. The
proposed log files differ from previous work which focus only on system-centric
logs such as the connection topology, bus speeds, and processor loads.
Lastly, this chapter presents how the results from the proposed logging system
assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 with nine incident scenarios.
This contribution addresses research Gap 3. These scenarios illustrate how the
results from the implementation can be used to form the history of critical files.
These files can be used to assist in mitigating the risks associated with CSA
threat 1 for a customer, when the customer is the only user in the domU or when
she shares the domU with many users. We then discuss how the results can form
process behaviour log files to assist in mitigating risks associated with threat 1
to benefit providers. This discussion includes how the process logs can be used
to investigate the causes when the dom0 is compromised, and when attackers use
domUs for spamming activities.
Thus, with systematic approaches, this shows that our proposed solutions can
assist in mitigating the risks associated with real world IaaS issues and many
scenarios. The proposed solutions also benefit both customers and providers.
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 provides the
design and implementation of a logging system to produce the history of critical
files with an introspection approach. This includes a description of context of a
domU which we want to capture the history information from, a discussion of the
design and implementation of the prototype of the proposed logging system, and
an explanation of running of the experiment in the implementation.
Section 6.2 discusses how the results can be used to form the history of critical
files to assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 to benefit customers.
This includes how the formed history logs assist in analysing nine incidents in
Alice's domU.
Then, Section 6.3 discusses how the result can benefit providers. This includes
a discussion of how the results from the implementation can assist in mitigating
risks associated with threat 1 for the providers such as dealing with the compro-
mising of dom0, and with spamming activities.
In Section 6.4, the proposed system from the implementation is compared to
related work. This includes the comparison between the TCB size of the proposed
system and TCB sizes of the logging and monitoring systems from previous works.
Then Section 6.5 provides the performance measurement of our proposed logging
system in terms of its accuracy in capturing logging information (e.g., a file name
of a file that is read by a domU's application) from domU. Finally, the chapter
is briefly summarised and concluded in Section 6.6.
6.1 Implementation
This section provides the design and implementation of a logging system to pro-
duce the history of critical files with an introspection approach. It begins with a
description of context of a domU we want to capture the history information from
this domU. Then, it discusses the design and implementation of the prototype
of the proposed logging system, and explains running of the experiment in the
implementation.
As discussed in Section 3.5.2.8 that if all logging processes of a logging system
are in only a hypervisor, the TCB size of this system includes only hw0 and
hypervisor. Then, this TCB size is the smallest one. As discussed by the last list
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item in Section 5.9 that to achieve the smallest TCB size (by placing all logging
processes as P5 in hypervisor) is complicated in the interception approach. We
started to investigate the introspection approach.
This section demonstrates how to get the history of critical file using an in-
trospection approach. Although, the introspection approach does not yield the
smallest TCB size, we have succeeded in implementing the proposed logging sys-
tem based on this approach. The proposed system yields less TCB compared to
some previous works, as will be discussed in Section 6.4.
6.1.1 Context of A DomU in the Implementation
This subsection discusses the environment setting in a domU for the implemen-
tation. We already discussed the environment of a domU where the introspection
approach can operate in Figure 5.2 in Section 5.7.1. We use this setting environ-
ment for this implementation. In the figure, we assume that Alice rents a Linux
domU. In Figure 5.2, she has a critical file or s.txt which is in the ellipse in diskU.
The actual location of s.txt is in the '/home/alice/' directory.
Section 5.6.3.1 already discussed how a C program becomes an appU or a
process. In this experiment, read application is an appU, see the rectangle in
domU user level in Figure 5.2. This read appU is read.c which is a C program.
The program is stored in domU/diskU. When Alice compiles read.c which is in
'/home/alice/' directory in diskU, the 'read' executable program of application
is created and stored in this directory. Alice can run this program by command
'./read' from '/home/alice/' directory. The name 'read' is the appU's name and
also the process name of the appU. Alice can run this application to read s.txt,
see the dot-arrow line in Figure 5.2. Read application routines are to:
1. open s.txt file,
2. read the file,
3. close the file, and
4. be terminated.
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Read_mem or the ellipse in memU in Figure 5.2 is the memory space of this
read appU or process when it is reading s.txt. This memory space holds all
information we need to record, as discussed in Section 5.7.1. The first piece of
the information is a file name of s.txt. The rest is the history information of s.txt
shown in rec_no 1 in Table 5.2, listed below:
1. a process Id as 4624 of read appU,
2. a process name of read appU as read, and
3. an owner Id of read process as 1002 which is Alice's user Id in this domU.
The logging system in this implementation records the history of critical files
(rec_no 1 in Table 5.2, as discussed above), and then stores them in a log file.
6.1.2 System Architecture of the Proposed Logging System
This subsection describes the system architecture of the proposed logging system.
The logging system in this implementation records the history of critical files
(rec_no 1 in Table 5.2, as discussed in Subsection 6.1.1), and then stores them
in a log file.
Section 5.7.2.1 has already discussed introspection system architecture or Fig-
ure 5.3. We use this introspection system architecture for this implantation in
this chapter. This is because the architecture is simple and cheap ways for the
design and development (the main benefit of the simple system pattern in Figure
4.7 Section 4.2.2.1) as discussed in Section 4.2.3 Chapter 4. The architecture also
facilitates enforcement of a security policy of a system itself, which is the main
benefit of the security facilitator logging pattern (Figure 4.8 Section 4.2.2.2 from
Chapter 4).
Thus, Figure 5.3 is the system architecture of the proposed logging system.
The main components of the architecture are:
1. an app0 or logger (the white box in dom0 user level in Figure 5.3) which
is an executable program (written in C programming language) located in
'/root/examples' directory in dom0/disk0,
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2. P1 or libVMI [79] (the shaded box in dom0 user level in Figure 5.3) which
is a C library that is installed in this dom0 system, and
3. F3 as a log file which is a text file located in '/root/examples' directory in
disk0.
6.1.3 The routines of the logger
Figure 6.1: The logger running in dom0 to record the history of the critical file s.txt
Figure 6.2: The read command running in domU and reading critical file s.txt
This subsection discusses the routines of the logger in the proposed system
architecture.
The basic idea of the logger's main task is to record the user id or p_ownId of
a user who logs in to a domU, when this user uses any appU to access a critical
file. Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 assist in explaining the routines. Both figures
present how to run the experiment for this implementation and the output or
result of the running. A circle with a number in both figures indicates a step of
running a program. The circle also indicates a line number of output or result of
the running of a program. A rectangle in the first line of each figure represents a
Linux command prompt for a user to type in commands to run application. An
ellipse in the first line of each figure is a Linux command that a user types in to
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run application (e.g., logger or read application). A rectangle in the second line
of each figure represents an important output of a program.
Assumptions of the logger. It is assumed that:
1. the logger knows the name of the process (which is the 'read' process) that
will read s.txt,
2. the logger knows that it will capture a file name called 's.txt'.
Thus, the process name 'read' as trigger 1 and the file name 's.txt' as trigger 2
will be used as the triggers of the logger to capture the history of critical file
s.txt, as discussed below. Note that, when the read command starts reading
s.txt or the 2nd line in Figure 6.2, this is when a memory space of read process
(see Figure 5.2, read_mem or the ellipse in memU) contains Linux kernel data
structures for virtual memory organisation of the read process or Figure 5.6. All
information that the logger needs to capture is in this memory space.
The lists below are the routines of the logger.
1. The logger command as app0 runs in dom0, see the dot-ellipse in the 1st
line of Figure 6.1. After this command starting, it keeps checking memU
until the 'read' command as trigger 1 is performed and exists in memU.
2. When a read command is performed in domU (see the dot-ellipse in the 1st
line of Figure 6.2), the logger pinpoints this command then keeps waiting
until the 'read' command or process reads s.txt which is trigger 2.
3. When the read command starts reading s.txt (the 2nd line in Figure 6.2),
the logger immediately extracts the necessary information, see 2nd line of
Figure 6.1. It extracts the file name or a string "s.txt", see the first dot-
box in the 2nd line of Figure 6.1. Then the logger extracts the history
information as in rec_no 1 in Table 5.2, listed below:
• process id as 4624, the second dot-box in the 2nd line of Figure 6.1,
• read process name as 'read', the third dot-box in the 2nd line of Fig-
ure 6.1, and
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• the id of the owner of read command as 1002, the last dot-box in the
2nd line of Figure 6.1.
Note that, the methods of extraction of the information (file name as s.txt,
process Id as 4624, process name as read, and process owner Id as 1002)
discussed above follow Step 1 to Step 8 as explained in Section 5.7.2.3.
4. After that, the logger writes this extracted information above to a log file
as F3 in Figure 5.3.
We assume that a provider controls and can run the logger in dom0, and a
customer or Alice can control and run the 'read' application in domU. However,
we will run the logger and read application on behalf of both the customer and
provider in this implementation.
6.1.4 The Experimental Environment
This subsection describes the experimental environment of a machine for the im-
plementation. The experimental environment comprises a single physical machine
as hw0. Its hardware configuration includes an Intel Core i7-860 64-bit CPU and
3980556 kB of main memory. The hw0 consisted of hypervisor that is Xen 4.3-
unstable with a Fedora 17 dom0 running a 64-bit Linux kernel, version 3.7.9-104.
Alice's domU is running a 64-bit Linux kernel version 3.8.5-201 for Fedora 18. It
consisted of 738.6 MiB of main memory.
6.1.5 Running the experiment
This subsection explains the running of the experiment in the implementation.
To run one set of the experiment, this entails running both the logger and read
appU. The steps below is to run one set of the experiment in this implementation.
• Step 1 (the circle with number 1 in Figure 6.1), with dom0 root privilege,
we run the logger, see the dot-eclipse in the first line of Figure 6.1. The
command to run the logger is './logger', see the dot-ellipse in the 1st line
of Figure 6.1. We run the command in '/root/examples' directory.
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• Step 2 (the circle with number 1 in Figure 6.2), we run read appU, see
the eclipse in the first line of Figure 6.2. The command to run read appU
is './read', see the dot-ellipse in the 1st line of Figure 6.2. We run the
command in '/home/alice' directory.
6.2 Discussion of the results for the customers
This section discusses how the results can be used to form the history of critical
files to assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 to benefit customers.
This includes how the formed history logs assist in analysing nine incidents in
Alice's domU.
Assumptions for the discussion. As discussed in Section 5.1.2, when a cus-
tomer such as Alice or Carol rents a domU then she will get two accounts at the
same time. They are a root user account and a standard user account. Then, Sec-
tion 5.4 discussed the many reasons that her domU may be compromised accord-
ing to threat 1. The lists below are the assumptions for the discussion in this
section.
• After one's domU is compromised, we assume that an attacker in some
manner is able to compromise her root user account and standard user
account.
• Then, we assume that the attacker can gain access to her domU and can
use appUs in this domU to conduct criminal activities. For example, the
attacker may use appUs to maliciously access her critical files.
For the incident when the attacker maliciously accesses her critical files, the
history of her critical files can be used as evidence to assist in discovering the
incident. History of critical files is a file-centric log which traces files from the
time they are created to the time they are deleted as discussed in [27; 45]. [43], [30],
and [76] argue that file-centric logs are very important aspects to deal with the
cloud problems.
181
We do not demonstrate the assumptions above. However, these assumptions
are used in proposing file-centric logging solutions in the cloud. [30] and [76]
consider these assumptions when proposing their logging solutions in the cloud.
For example, [30] assumes that when a user 'Alice' creates a sensitive file and
modifies this file, later, a user 'Bob' can read the file without Alice's permission.
Bob can read the file, thus one of the consequences of Bob's ability to read the
file can be that Bob can gain access to Alice's domU.
It is critical when Alice's user accounts are obtained by attackers. This is
because the attackers may access Alice's critical file such as s.txt in diskU in
Figure 5.2. Section 5.6.2.1 discusses how the history of critical files can assist
in mitigating the risks associated with this threat to benefit customers. This
section discusses in detail how the history of s.txt can assist in analysing malicious
incidents in Alice's domU to mitigate the risks for the benefit of the customers.
This thesis uses the term 'auditor' to refer to a person who can obtain and use
the history of critical files to analyse incidents of misuse of domUs.
The results from the implementation (e.g., 2nd line of Figure 6.1) can be used
to form the history of critical files (discussed in CASE 1 to CASE 9 below) which
can be used to assist in mitigating risks associated with CSA threat 1 for the
customers in many cases. CASE 1 to CASE 9 are based on how Alice uses her
domU, including when she uses it as the only user in the domU or when she
shares the domU with many users.
Section 6.1.2 discusses system architecture of the proposed logging system, see
Figure 5.3. The logger (the white box in dom0 user level in Figure 5.3) can be
modified to capture the history of critical file to be used for discussion in CASE
1 to CASE 9. The logger records a user id or p_ownId of a user who logs in to
a domU, when this user uses any appU to access a critical file, as discussed in
Section 6.1.3.
6.2.1 Analysing malicious incidents when Alice is a single
user in a domU
This subsection provides analysis of malicious incidents when Alice is a single
user in a domU.
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rec_no p_id p_nm p_ownId time
101 4624 read 1002 t1
102 4002 read 1002 *t2
103 4002 read 1002 t3
Table 6.1: Parts of the fictitious contents of the history of s.txt
In the experiment, the domU is for a single user. However, Alice owns two
accounts: the root which can run all appUs in the domU; and alice or an admin-
istrator. We assume that the contents of Table 6.1 is part of a complete history
of a critical file, as shown in Table 5.1 in Section 5.6.1. However, Table 6.1 is a
fictitious table to represent the history of a critical file.
Thus, Table 6.1 presents only rec_no 101 to 103 of the contents of the history
of s.txt for the purposes of this discussion. The contents in Table 6.1 can be
constructed from the results from 2nd line of Figure 6.1. Note that, in this table,
time or column 5 presents the last accessed times of the file. An asterisk or * in
the following tables indicates possible malicious events in domUs.
We use 'Alice' as the name of a person, and 'alice' as the user name of Alice.
This condition applies for every person name and every user name. When the
history of s.txt is available to Alice, she may audit s.txt. CASE 1 and CASE 2
below discuss how the history of critical files can be useful for analysing malicious
incidents when Alice is a single user in a domU
Rec_no 101 in Table 6.1 is an example of a normal event when Alice logs in
to her domU. Then, she runs her read appU (rec_no 101 in column 3) to access
s.txt (the dot-arrow line in Figure 5.2) with her or root permission. The history
of s.txt or Table 6.1 shows Alice's Id as 1002 in rec_no 101 column 4. However,
when root's or alice's password of Alice's domU is compromised as an example
of threat 1, rec_no 102 in Table 6.1 can represent suspected incidents related to
her file, in the discussions in CASE 1 and CASE 2 below.
CASE 1 In rec_no 102 in Table 6.1, this record can present undesired access
to s.txt. The reason can be that Alice has never accessed s.txt at t2 time, see
rec_no 102 column 5. Thus, she may suspect that attackers may have accessed
s.txt.
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We assume that an interval between times tx and ty (e.g., from column 5 in
Table 6.1, an interval can be between t1 and t2 or t2 and t3) is big enough for
Alice to recognize that t2 (the attacker's event) is suspicious compared to t1 (time
of Alice's event) or t3 which is time of another Alice's event. For example, on the
same date such as 25th October 2013, t1 can be at 08.00, t2 is at 13.00, and t3 is
at 17.00. Thus, Alice can distinguish times of her (t1 and t3) and the attacker's
event (t2). This assumption also applies to discussion of times in CASE 2 to
CASE 9.
rec_no p_id p_nm p_ownId time
101 4624 read 1002 t1
102 4002 read 1002 t2
103 4003 *otherApp 1002 t3
Table 6.2: Parts of the fictitious contents of the history of s.txt, for CASE 2
CASE 2 In rec_no 103 in Table 6.2 , this record can also be undesired access
to s.txt. This is because Alice has never used otherApp (rec_no 103 column 3)
to access s.txt. Thus, she may realise that attackers may be doing this. After
pinpointing otherApp, in order to obtain more evidence for auditing, she may
undertake further investigations.
6.2.2 Analysing malicious incidents when Alice is in a mul-
tiple users domU
This subsection provides the analysis of malicious incidents when Alice is in a
multiple users domU, in CASE 3 to CASE 9 below.
This thesis presents two types of multiple users domU, as discussed in Section
5.1.2. The first is multiple users using a domU with one root. The second type
is multiple users using a domU with more than one root. CASE 3 to CASE 7
are a discussion of multiple users operating in a domU with one root. CASE 8
and CASE 9 are a discussion of multiple users using a domU with more than one
root.
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CASE 3 This case explains how the history of critical file is useful for the envi-
ronment of multiple users using a domU with one root. The domU environment
in this case is multiple users operating in a domU with one root user and when
Alice is a root user, as discussed in Section 5.1.2. The domU in this implemen-
tation can be configured to allow multiple users environment. In this case, it is
supposed that there are three user accounts in Alice's domU, as listed below.
• The first one is a root user account.
• The second account is alice user. Thus, Alice owns two accounts: the root
account and alice account.
• The third account is bob user which is a standard user. This account is
created by Alice for Bob to log in to and share Alice's domU.
As discussed in Section 5.1.2, a standard user can only access his or her files in
specific locations which are managed and provided by the system. For example,
a directory of alice user to store her files can be '/home/alice'. Bob cannot access
'/home/alice/' directory, but a root user may. As discussed in Section 5.1.1, a
root user can access all parts or files of the system [105]. Thus, the root user in
Alice's domU can access any file in '/home/alice/'. The root user can also execute
any executable files in this directory, but bob user cannot. The executable file
can be read appU which belongs to Alice.
As discussed in Section 5.4, this domU can be compromised by threat 1.
Thus, attackers may obtain both Bob's and root's password. Then, they may log
in to Alice's domU using Bob's account. Although the attackers can log in to
Alice's domU with Bob's account, they cannot access '/home/alice/' directory, as
discussed above. However, if they know root's password, then they can run Alice's
read appU to illegally access s.txt with root permission. This illegal incident is
significant.
Alice may discover the incident discussed above by auditing Table 6.3 which
presents parts of the fictitious contents of the history of s.txt in the multi-user
domU. The evidence can be seen in rec_no 104 of the table. This record can
be a suspect incident showing how Bob as id 1003 (column 4 of rec_no 104)
accesses Alice's s.txt. Although the attacker uses the same appU as read (column
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rec_no p_id p_nm p_ownId time
. . . . .
104 4004 read *1003 t4
. . . . .
Table 6.3: Parts of the fictitious contents of the history of s.txt in a multi-user domU
3 of rec_no 104) which is normally used by Alice to access s.txt, the log still
shows Bob's Id as 1003, which is not an owner of s.txt. Consequently, Alice could
eventually discover this suspicion from the history of s.txt. Thus, the history
information in Table 6.3 can be evidence to assist in analysing undesired incidents
inside domUs. As a result, this can assist in mitigating the risks associated with
threat 1 to benefit customers.
CASE 4 This case discusses how the history of critical files can be useful for
multiple users using a domU with one root, and when Alice is a standard user
not a root user. In this case, it is assumed that a domU is owned by Carol, who
owns a root user account and the carol user account, and that Alice and Bob are
standard users who shares Carol's domU. Thus, there are four user accounts in
this environment of Carol's domU as listed below. Note that, this environment
is for discussion of CASE 4 to CASE 7.
• The first is a root user account.
• The second account is the carol user account with id 1000.
• The third account is the alice user account with id 1001, which is a standard
user. This account is created by Carol for Alice to log in to and share Carol's
domU.
• The fourth account is the bob user account with id 1002, which is a standard
user. This account is created by Carol for Bob to log in to and share Carol's
domU.
Rec_no 201 in Table 6.4 is a normal activity of Alice with her s.txt, when she
runs her read appU to access s.txt with her own privilege. The log file records
Alice's id, 1001.
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rec_no p_id p_nm p_ownId time
201 4624 read 1001 t1
202 4725 read *1000 t2
203 4726 *rootRead *1000 t3
204 4727 read *1002 t4
205 46268 read 1001 *t5
Table 6.4: The content of the history of critical file f (s.txt )
Figure 6.3: Running read command to access s.txt in domU
Figure 6.4: Record of read command running to access s.txt with Calor privilege
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Thus, CASE 4 can be rec_no 202 in Table 6.4, which is a malicious incident.
This record can be a suspect incident that why and how Carol with id 1000
(column 4 of rec_no 202 in Table 6.4) accesses Alice's s.txt. This incident may
be because Carol's domU is compromised. This compromise can be one of the
forms of attacks enclosed in threat 1, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Assuming the attackers obtain: a root user account including root's user name
and password1; and the carol user account including Carol's user name and her
password, the following events below are assumed.
• The attackers may use carol account to log in to Carol's domU.
• The attackers open a terminal, request root accesses in the terminal with
the stolen root account.
• In the terminal, they go to '/home/alice' directory. In Figure 6.3, Step
1, 'pwd' in the ellipse is a command to show a current directory (Step 2,
currently is '/home/alice').
• The attackers run Alice's read appU (the ellipse in Step 3 in Figure 6.3) to
read s.txt in '/home/alice/' directory (Step 4) with root privilege.
However, the logger (in the ellipse in Figure 6.4) records Carol's id or 1000 (the
last dot-rectangle in line 2 of Figure 6.4) as evidence of the events when s.txt is
accessed, see in Table 6.4 rec_no 202 column 4.
Other log information of these events are in the first, second, and third dot-
rectangles in line 2 of Figure 6.4. They are: s.txt file name as a string "s.txt"; a
process id as 4725; and a name of read appU as a string "read". The events are
shown in Table 6.4 rec_no 202. Note that, we omit the time attribute or the last
column of Table 6.4.
CASE 5 This case can be rec_no 203 in Table 6.4, which is a malicious incident.
This record can be a suspect incident that why and how Carol as id 1000 (column
4 of rec_no 203 in Table 6.4) accesses Alice's s.txt using rootRead appU which
is shown in column 3 rec_no 203 in Table 6.4. This incident may be because
1In Section 5.1.1, we defined a user account as composed of two pieces of information: i) a
user name and ii) a user password.
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Carol's domU has been compromised. This compromise can be one of the forms
of attacks enclosed in threat 1, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Assuming the attackers obtain: a root user account including root's user name
and password; and Carol's user account including Carol's user name and her
password. The events to access s.txt by rootRead appU are as same as the steps
in the lists discussed in CASE 4 above. However, in CASE 5 it is assumed that
the attackers use rootRead appU to access s.txt rather that using read appU as
in CASE 4.
However, the logger records Carol's id as 1000 (rec_no 203 column 4 Table 6.4)
as evidence of the events when s.txt is accessed by rootRead, see in Table 6.4
rec_no 203 column 3. Other log information of these events is a process id of
rootRead appU, which is 4726, see in Table 6.4 rec_no 203 column 2. We omit
the time attribute or the last column of Table 6.4.
CASE 6 Rec_no 204 in Table 6.4 can represent undesired access to Alice's
s.txt. This case may be because Carol's domU may subsequently be compromised.
This compromise can be one of the forms of attacks enclosed in threat 1, as
discussed in Chapter 5. Then, Bob's account and the root account is compromised
by attackers. After that, the attackers log in to the domU using Bob's account,
and run Alice's read appU with root privilege.
However, id of a user that is recorded by the logger is Bob's id as 1002 which
is rec_no 204 column 4 Table 6.4. The id is used by the attackers to gain access
to this domU, and they can access Alice's s.txt. Thus, Alice can discover this
incident from Table 6.4 and may undertake further investigation.
CASE 7 Rec_no 205 in Table 6.4 can be undesired access to Alice's s.txt. This
case may occur because Carol's domU is compromised (threat 1, as discussed in
Chapter 5), then Alice's account is subsequently compromised. Then, attackers
log in to domU using Alice's account and run Alice's read appU using her priv-
ilege. Note that, it is no need to use root privilege to run read appU to access
s.txt because Alice is the owner of both of them.
Rec_no 205 in Table 6.4 can refer to undesired access to Alice's s.txt. The
reason can be that Alice has never accessed s.txt at t5 time, which is rec_no 205
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column 5 Table 6.4. Thus, she may suspect that attackers may have accessed
s.txt.
CASE 8 This case discusses how the history of critical files is useful for discov-
ering malicious incidents in a domU when Alice is in the environment of multiple
users using a domU with more than one roots. Section 5.1.2 has already dis-
cussed how to set this environment in domU. Note that, this environment is for
discussion of CASE 8 to CASE 9.
In this case, it is assumed that a domU is owned by Alice. Thus, she owns
a root user account (called root) and the alice standard user account. Then, she
adds a new root user account called 'rootusr' using approaches described in [108].
Therefore, this domU has two root user accounts (called root and rootusr), and
rootusr has the same privileges as root including full access to all files in this
domU. Both Alice and the new rootusr can log in to this domU with their own
individual and separate root password. All user accounts are listed below.
• The first is a root user account called 'root' assumingly with id 0.
• The second account is the alice user account with id 1000.
• The third one is a root user account called 'rootusr' assumingly with id
1003.
Alice's domU may be compromised (threat 1). Then, rootusr's account and
Alice's account may be further compromised by an attacker, and the attacker
logs in to this domU using Alice's account. After that, the attacker runs Alice's
read appU or dummyAppU to access s.txt with rootusr's privilege.
rec_no p_id p_nm p_ownId time
302 4725 read 1000 *t302
303 4726 *dummyAppU 1000 t303
Table 6.5: Parts of the fictitious contents of the history of s.txt, for CASE 8 and CASE
9
Rec_no 302 in Table 6.5 can represent undesired access to Alice's s.txt. The
reason can be that Alice has never accessed s.txt at t302 time (rec_no 302 column
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5 Table 6.5) though the id in the table is Alice's id. Thus, she may suspect that
attackers may have accessed s.txt.
CASE 9 Rec_no 303 in Table 6.5 can denote undesired access to Alice's s.txt.
The reason can be that Alice has never used the 'dummyAppU' application
(rec_no 303 column 3 Table 6.5) to access s.txt though the id in the table is
Alice's id. Thus, she may suspect that attackers may have accessed s.txt.
6.3 Discussion of the results for the providers
This section discusses how the results can benefit providers. This includes dis-
cussion of how the results from the implementation can assist in mitigating risks
associated with threat 1 for the providers.
Assumptions for discussion of the provider side. Section 6.1.2 discussed
system architecture of the proposed logging system (Figure 5.3) which deploys
F3. Deploying F3 as the history of critical files in disk0 which is controlled
by a provider, also leads to integrity or privacy concerns of F3, as discussed in
Section 3.3.3. This issue needs to be addressed before deploying F3.
Section 3.4.3 already discussed the possible solution for the issue of F3. Briefly,
it could be that a TTP, not a dom0 or provider, should handle our logging system.
Thus, the TTP can manage and maintain the logging system (P1 or libVMI, the
logging application or app0, and F3) in a special-privileged domU which operates
this system.
To maintain integrity of this TTP domU, for instance to prevent the provider
from altering or learning about F3, the trusted computing related-research could
be the solution. An example is the work in [52] which proposes a solution based on
the TPM and offers protection against a malicious provider who has full privilege
over a domU in an IaaS.
For discussion in this section, we assume that the history of critical files or F3
is managed by a TTP, not a dom0. Thus, the history files can be trusted even
though the dom0 is compromised. When the history of critical file is available
to a provider, Subsection 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 below discuss how the results in this
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implementation assists in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 to benefit
the providers.
6.3.1 Dealing with compromising of the dom0
This subsection discusses how the results can be useful for providers for investi-
gation when the dom0 is compromised by an attacker.
This subsection uses Table 6.2 for discussion of how the history of critical
files can be used when the dom0 is compromised because of threat 1 such as
when domU attacks dom0. In rec_no 103 in Table 6.2, this record can also be
undesired access to Alice's s.txt. The incident in the record may be because of
domU attacks upon dom0 (threat 1) and subsequent use of this dom0 to attack
Alice's domU, as discussed in Section 5.5.2.
After Alice's domU is compromised, attackers may obtain the alice account
which includes the user name and password. Then, the attackers log in to Alice's
domU with the alice account, and use 'otherApp' appU to read s.txt. From the
table, otherApp appU (rec_no 103 column 3 Table 6.2) is recorded in the table
as the history of s.txt. The name of this appU or 'otherApp' that is used by the
attackers can be used as a trigger or pinpoint by the providers to conduct further
investigation into this incident, and consequently into intruders who attack the
providers' cloud infrastructure.
6.3.2 Dealing with spamming
Reducing the number of criminal such as spam domUs should maintain the
providers' reputation. This is significant because customers may buy the cloud
product based on the providers' reputations [131], as also discussed in Section 5.5. Thus,
this subsection discusses how the process behaviour logs help a provider to iden-
tify spam activities in his cloud infrastructure.
rec_no p_nm a_file p_ownId time
1 mail - 1002 t1
Table 6.6: A process behaviour log file to show the malicious mail command involving
spam activities
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rec_no p_nm a_file p_ownId time
1 cat addr.txt 1002 t1
Table 6.7: A process behaviour log file to show the malicious cat command involving
spam activities
Section 3.4.2.1 has already discussed the simulation of spam activities in domU
in the case study. This case study simulates spam activities by assuming that
spammers rent a Linux VM/domU from an IaaS provider. They then use appU or
the mail command to send a spam email to a victim.
However, the mail command can be used as mail -s spamSubj $(cat addr.txt).
In this case, this mail command sends emails to all victim email addresses in a
text file addr.txt. Thus, this mail command involves addr.txt. Hence, this file
could be very important evidence to identify these spam activities. This section
discusses how process behaviour log files can be used to assist in identifying spam
activities.
When mail and cat commands combine to send spam emails as mail -s subject
$(cat addr.txt), Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 can be logs of process behaviour of mail
and cat respectively. Table 6.6 shows that the mail command in column 2 is
activated by a user with id 1002 in column 4 at time t1 in column 5. Column 3
in this table is blank because the mail command does not access any file, unlike
the cat command. Table 6.7 shows that the cat command in column 2 is also
activated by the same user with id 1002 (column 4), which activates the mail
command and at the same time t1 in column 5. This table also shows that the
cat command has accessed addr.txt in column 3.
When both tables above are available to a provider, he can analyse them and
may see that this domU owner with id 1002 (column 4 in both tables) uses the
combination of both commands to send spam emails: cat to read addr.txt (Ta-
ble 6.7 column 3); then mail (Table 6.6 column 2) to send emails to all the victim
addresses in addr.txt. Note that, for this discussion, we assume that the informa-
tion from both tables is sufficient to identify these spam activities. Thus, process
behaviour logs from both tables can be useful to assist in analysing and identify-
ing spam domUs in the providers' IaaS cloud. We do not discuss identifying an
absolute spam domU. This would involve more research on the identification of
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spam application behaviour.
This discussion is different from the discussion identifying spam activities in
Section 5.6.4. In the latter identification is when a provider first pinpoints the
mail command in a suspicion spam domU. The provider then carries out further
investigation by recording the behaviour of another command such as cat that
works with the mail command to send spam emails. Then, the logs from the
recording can be used as evidence to assist the provider in identifying this spam
domU.
On the other hand for this discussion in Section 6.3.2, identification occurs
when both tables are available to the providers. They may then analyse the
combination of the tables with the knowledge of the association among commands
such as mail and cat. Thus, the process behaviour logs are flexible in their use
by the providers as evidence to assist in analysing criminal activities such as
spamming in domU (threat 1) with different approaches such as the approaches
discussed in this section and the others in Section 5.6.4.
6.4 Comparisons with Related Work in term of
TCB sizes
In this section, the proposed system from the implementation is compared to
the systems of related work from Section 2.8 in term of reducing TCB size. The
comparison includes monitoring and logging systems for accountability in IaaS.
Our proposed logging system architecture or Figure 5.3 deploys libVMI. Lib-
VMI is based on six high level requirements of programming guidelines or good
security guidelines [39]. It is designed to work in the Xen-base environment
which is currently virtualisation layer of many cloud providers include EC2 [17],
Rackspace Cloud [146] as argued by [43; 59]. Therefore, our architecture inherits
these requirements while achieving the history of critical files.
The first two requirements involve a trusted computing base or TCB which
is a significant factor when building logging systems in the cloud, as discussed in
Section 2.13. A TCB size of a logging system can be compared to a TCB size of
another logging system, as discussed in Section 3.5.2.8. The biggest TCB size of a
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logging system is shown in Figure 3.6. This is when the system's pattern deploys
P3 such as a pattern of JAR logging in Figure 4.11. This TCB size includes hw0,
hypervisor, dom0, and domU. Figure 3.7 is the smallest TCB size of a logging
system. This is when the system's pattern deploys P5 such as a pattern of AVMs
in Figure 4.12. In this case this TCB size includes only hw0 and hypervisor.
6.4.1 Comparison with logging work
This subsection compares the logging system in this chapter with those in related
work from Section 2.8 based on TCB and achieving a history of critical files.
In this comparison, a logging system is composed of logging processes or Px
and log files or Fy. To be simplified, we omit hw0 to be included in a TCB size
because all TCB sizes in this thesis include hw0. Our proposed logging system
can achieve the history of critical files while yielding a smaller TCB size compared
to JAR logging [76], Flogger [30], PASSXen [43]. AVMs system [44] TCB size is
smaller than ours. However, this system is not designed to obtain the history of
critical files, but may be modified to do so.
Firstly, Flogger and PASSXen can provide a history of critical files. How-
ever, Flogger (Figure 4.4) has logging processes that are distributed across domU
and dom0. PASSXen (Figure 4.5) also has logging processes that are distributed
across the hypervisor, domU, and dom0. Therefore, the proposed architecture
(Figure 5.3) yields less TCB than Flogger and PASSXen. This is because the
TCB of our system includes only hypervisor and dom0, not domU, whereas both
their TCB include domU.
Secondly, a TCB size of AVMs (Figure 4.12) includes only hw0 and hypervisor
(VMware), this is smaller than one of the proposed architecture in this thesis.
However, this system is to record incoming and outgoing network packets of domU
(to detect cheating in on-line gaming) not to record the history of the critical file,
but could be modified to do so.
The last work is JAR logging (Figure 4.11). To apply this approach in an IaaS
environment, when a user's JAR file is stored in diskU and to activate the logging
mechanism in this file, domU needs JVM. To add JVM in domUs increases the
TCB.
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Table 6.8: TCB Comparisons between the proposed logging system and related logging
works
the systems of the related logging work. From the table, our system can achieve
the history of critical files while yielding a smaller TCB size compared to JAR
logging, Flogger, and PASSXen.
This is because the TCB size of our system includes only two components: a
hypervisor and dom0; whereas the others include three components: hypervisor,
dom0, and domU. A TCB size of AVMs includes only a hypervisor; whereas ours
includes a hypervisor and dom0. Thus, AVMs' TCB size is smaller than ours.
However, AVMs is not designed to achieve the history of critical files.
6.4.2 Comparison with monitoring work
In this subsection, the TCB size of the proposed system is compared to the TCB
sizes of the monitoring systems from previous works
As discussed in Section 2.9, monitoring work does not use logging file or Fy.
However, these works below could be modified to perform logging tasks. All the
works also deploy XenAccess or libVMI. The TCB sizes of a network monitoring
application in [1] and a demo monitoring program in [39] is the same as the
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proposed logging system's TCB size. However, only the proposed logging system
achieves the history of critical files while both of them do not, but could be
modified to do so. Lares [77] does not achieve both the history of critical files
and TCB size.
Firstly, Lares [77] can monitor domU behaviours. It may be possible to modify
this system to collect the history of critical files. However, this requires insertion
of hooks at runtime into a domU, which increases TCB. Secondly, [1] propose a
network monitoring application that identifies which process inside a Windows
domU is responsible for malicious network traffic leaving this domU.
Lastly, [39] present a demo monitoring program in dom0 that outputs all
file/directory creation/removals process which are happening in domU's /root
directory. Both works deploy XenAccess in dom0. Thus, these systems have
small TCB (hw0, Xen, and dom0) the same as the proposed architecture in this
thesis. However, they are not designed to achieve a history of critical files, but
could be modified to add this functionality.



































Table 6.9: A Comparison between the proposed logging system and related monitoring
works
related monitoring works. From the table, the TCB sizes of a network monitoring
application in [1] and a demo monitoring program in [39] are the same as the
proposed logging system's TCB size. However, only the proposed logging system
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achieves the history of critical files, while both of them do not, but could be
modified to do so. Lares [77] do not achieve both history of critical files and TCB
size.
6.5 Performance measurement of the proposed log-
ging system
This section provides the performance measurement of our proposed logging sys-
tem (Figure 5.3) in term of its accuracy in capturing logging information (e.g.,
a file name of a file that is read by a domU's application) from a target virtual
machine or domU. The result is that the proposed system has 100% ac-
curacy in capturing log information when an application or appU in a
target domU accesses a file for at least 65 milliseconds.
The lists below discuss the aim of the performance measurement of the pro-
posed logging system in terms of accuracy in this section, and the experiment
sets to calculate the accuracy.
• Aim of the performance measurement of the proposed logging
system in term of accuracy
The aim of the measurement is to guarantee the proposed logging system
will yield 100% accuracy in capturing the information from memU in domU;
how many milliseconds the read application or appU needs to be in memU
after finishing reading a file such as s.txt, and before closing the file. The
answer can be interpreted as that the proposed system in dom0 yields 100%
accuracy in capturing the log information if an application in domU accesses
a file for at least x milliseconds.
• Experiment sets to calculate the accuracy
One set of experiments is as follows. (i) We set a particular sleeping time
such as 80 milliseconds for a read application after it finishes reading a file
and before it closes the file. (ii) The read application will be run 1000 times
to perform Step (i). Then, (iii), the proposed system needs to capture log
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information (a file name string of a file that is read by read application)
from all 1000 runs of the read application.
During a particular run of the read application to read s.txt, if the proposed
system captures (from memU) the correct file name or the string 's.txt' that
has been read by this application in this particular run, this capture is called
a 'hit'. When a read application is run for 1000 times and the proposed
system needs to capture all these 1000 times, then we can count a number
of hits between 0 and 1000.
For each experiment set or steps i to iii, the accuracy (in percentage) is
calculated by the number of hits divided by 100. Thus, the accuracy is
ranged from 0% to 100%. We run each experiment set for 10 times, then
calculate the average accuracy of this experiment set. Thus, the average
accuracy is calculated by the summation accuracy of each experiment set
(in percentage) from the first time to the tenth time divided by 10.
The remainder of this section is as follows. Subsection 6.5.1 discusses the
concerns in terms of performance measurement of logging systems in the cloud.
Subsection 6.5.2 explains our performance measurement environment of the pro-
posed logging system. Then, Subsection 6.5.3 describes the experiment design (in
both domU and dom0) for our performance measurement of the proposed logging
system. Subsection 6.5.4 discusses what it means when the logger can capture
the correct and incorrect information from memU. How to run the experiment
to collect the accuracy of the logger is explained in Subsection 6.5.5. Then, Sub-
section 6.5.6 reveals and discusses the results for the accuracy of the proposed
logging system. Finally, Subsection 6.5.7 provides a summary.
6.5.1 Performance concerns of logging systems in the cloud
This subsection discusses what the concerns in term of performance measurement
of logging systems in the cloud can be from the literature. The concerns can be
considered from both domU and dom0.
To measure the performance of logging systems, we can consider two main
performance concerns of logging systems in the cloud: performance concerns of
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Figure 6.5: Performance Concerns of logging system in the cloud
dom0; and performance concerns of domUs, see Figure 6.5. The performance
concerns of dom0 include accuracy of the logging tasks, log file size, and, re-
duction in performance of dom0 caused by the logging systems, full details are
given in Section 6.5.1.1. The performance concerns of domUs are the reduction in
performance of domUs caused by the logging systems, more details are given in
Section 6.5.1.2. Both concerns can be applied to interception and introspection
logging approaches. Here, we consider the measurements based on the introspec-
tion approach which is deployed in the proposed logging system for this thesis.
6.5.1.1 Performance concerns of dom0
This section discusses the performance concerns of dom0 which deploys logging
systems. We discuss three of the performance concerns: accuracy of the logging
tasks, log file size, and reduction in performance of dom0 caused by the logging
systems. However, we experiment on only the measurement of the accuracy of
the logging tasks.
1. Accuracy of the logging tasks
We discuss the performance measurement only for the introspection ap-
proach for the logging system. This is because this approach needs to
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access the main memory of domU, which is volatile. The accuracy of the
logging tasks in accessing the volatile memory is the first consideration of
the performance measurement. Therefore, this chapter presents only the
measurement of the accuracy. Section 6.5.2, 6.5.3, 6.5.5 and, 6.5.6 provide
details of the accuracy of our proposed logging system, how we measure it,
and the measurement results and discussion.
2. Log file size
[30] state that file-centric logs can grow at a relatively higher rate compared
to system-centric logs. They also argue that tiered storage and archival,
de-duplication and summarisation techniques may be solutions. [44] also
states that present hard disk capacities are measured in terabytes; thus,
this should be a solution to the log file size explosion problem.
3. Reduction in performance of dom0 caused by the logging systems
The performance impact can be measured as a reduction in performance of
dom0 caused by the monitoring software. For example, this measurement
can be achieved by measuring how much CPU of a machine is consumed by
the logger process to achieve logging tasks, compared to the machine that
does not deploy the logger process. This measurement should be done when
the full implementation of a logging system is ready, or after the accuracy
of the logging processes in a particular logging system satisfies the accuracy
requirement of the system.
6.5.1.2 Performance concerns of domUs
For logging systems that deploy the introspection approach, the systems need to
access the main memory of domUs. This may lead to a reduction in performance
of domUs caused by the logging systems. Our proposed logging system reuses
libVMI [79] previously known as the XenAccess [147] tool. This tool imposes a
minimal performance overhead to the target domU memory [39].
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6.5.2 Performance measurement environment
This subsection describes the experimental environment of this performance mea-
surement. This includes application and hardware components.
• Application components of the Experiment
We use the same set of experiments in the implementation of the proposed
logging systems as in Section 6.1. A different machine is used in this mea-
surement testing.
In this experiment, libVMI can obtain the names and IDs of all running
processes in the processes list (Figure 5.5) by accessing the memU of a
target domU. Then, the logger repetitively calls libVMI in a loop to check
whether the list contains a process name called 'read' or not. Section 5.6.3.1
has already discussed how a process, command, or appU such as read appU
works in the Linux system.
In this measurement setting, it assumes that Alice runs read appU 1000
times, and each time the application reads s.txt; thus, ideally, the goal of
the logger is that it has to capture the information of these 1000 times of
read appU activities. Then, it stores the captured information in log files.
• Hardware
The experimental environment comprised a single physical machine as hw0.
Its hardware configuration includes an Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q9400 @
2.66GHz x 4 (64-bit) CPU and 2.7 GiB of main memory. Hw0 consisted
of hypervisor that used Xen version 4.1.4 (preserve-AD) with a Fedora 16
dom0 running a 64-bit Linux kernel, version 3.6.11-4. Alice's domU is
running a 64-bit Linux kernel version 3.6.11-4 for Fedora 16. It consisted
of 989.7 MiB of main memory. Networking of both dom0 and domU is
disconnected.
6.5.3 Experiment design
This section explains the experiment design for both domU and dom0.
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6.5.3.1 Experiment design for domU
These lists below explain the experiment design for domU.
• Setting up
Section 6.1.1 has already discussed the context of a domU in the imple-
mentation and the aim of the proposed logging system. DomU context and
the aim of the logger in this measurement testing is exactly the same as
in Section 6.1.1. Thus, Figure 5.3 shows the context of a domU for this
measurement experiment. Figure 6.6 illustrates the experiment set-up for
the accuracy measurement.
Figure 6.6: The experiment set-up to collect the accuracy measurement
• Read application routines
From Figure 5.3, read application routines are as following. Note that, a
text file or s.txt that the read application accesses contains only a simple
line of text as "9, 9".
Read application routines are to:
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1. open s.txt file,
2. read the file and print the file's contents to a screen,
3. close the file,
4. be terminated.
• Read_invoker
After the read application is started (see Step 1 in Figure 6.6) by the
read_invoker application (discussed below), the read application will then
perform (see Step 2 in Figure 6.6) the routines described above. Read ap-
plication will be run by an application called read_invoker. The invoker
will run read for 1000 times, repetitively performing steps 1 and 2.
• Read application routines with suspension
For the measurement experiment, read application routines are modified to
add suspending execution for microsecond intervals as will be shown below.
The suspension is performed by C programming usleep function [148]. The
time intervals range from 0 to 100 milliseconds. Thus the read application
will sleep after finishing reading s.txt. Then, it wakes up, closes the reading
file, and is terminated. Thus, the routines below are one run of a read
application.
However, read will be run by another application called read_invoker. The
invoker will run read for 1000 times. Note that, the average processing
time of read application in the setting domU (without suspending sleeping
or when setting the sleeping time to 0) is about 400 microseconds. We
obtained this time number by running read application for 100,000 times.
Read application routines with suspension are to:
1. open s.txt file,
2. read the file and print the file's contents to the screen,
3. suspend or sleep for x milliseconds (x = 1000),
4. close the file,
5. be terminated.
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• Running read application for the experiment
To run read application, all 1000 rounds of the read application run will be
performed by read_invoker which will be started only once. The experiment
set-up for read application to be run for 1000 times in a domU is now
ready. Section 6.5.3.2 discusses how to design the logger to capture the log
information from all read application runs.
6.5.3.2 Experiment design for dom0
The lists below discuss how to design the logger in dom0 to capture the log
information from all read application runs.
• Setting up. The logger in this experiment has the same system architec-
ture as the proposed logging system (Figure 5.3) in Section 6.1.2. Thus,
it has exactly the same mechanisms as the one in Figure 5.3. Subsection
6.1.3 explains the routines of the logger in the propose system architecture.
Figure 6.6 provides an overview for both the logger and read application
for this experiment. In this figure, the main components of the proposed
logging system in this experiment are logger, P1 or libVMI [79], and F3 as
a log file.
Again, libVMI is a C library that can read the memory space or read_mem
in memU from domU, see Figure 6.6. The logger finds a read process in the
memU of the target domU by checking (using a loop) from the beginning to
the end of the linked list of all running processes (Figure 5.5) in the domU.
• The logger for this experiment. For this measurement, we modified
the logger in Figure 5.3 to be able to capture the log information of each
run of read application that will be run for 1000 times. Thus, the logger
in Figure 6.6 is capable of doing so. The pseudocode of the modified
logger is presented below.
1. Set totalReadRounds = 0, hit = 0
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2. Check if read application is in the linked list
if (read application is in the list)
2.1 Check if the application has read s.txt
if (the application has read s.txt)







4. if (totalReadRounds = 1000)
goto 5
else
4.1 Check if a brand new read application exists in the list





• Running the logger
The logger in dom0 is run before read_invoker in domU. It is run only once
to capture the log information from each one of all 1000 read application
runs.
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6.5.4 Collecting hits and misses
This subsection discusses how the logger can capture the correct information from
memU. Ideally, the logger must capture information from memU for all 1000 read
application runs. Each run has reading s.txt as in the routine shown above.
6.5.4.1 Hits
We call the correct capture a hit when the logger can capture the correct infor-
mation or the string "s.txt". Figure 6.7 is an example of the output spreadsheet
files in this experiment. From the figure, record number 1, the third column as
comment, is a hit because the captured information (the second column as Cap-
tured file name, in Figure 6.7) is 's.txt'. The record number 6 to 994 is omitted.
Figure 6.7: Hits and Misses
They are assumed to be the same as record number 1; thus, each of them is also
a hit. Thus, the overall hits are in record number 1 (1 hit) and record number 3
to 997 (995 hits). In total, the number of hits is 996 (1 hit plus 995 hits), which
is 99.96% of the accuracy in this case.
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6.5.4.2 Misses
Miss is when the logger captures incorrect information. This can be another string
instead of "s.txt" (record number 2, "foo.bar" instead of "s.txt"), an empty string
(record number 998), or a null value (record number 999).
In this measurement testing, we also consider a miss as when the logger cannot
capture the read appU in memU. For example, when the read application is run
for 1000 times, but the logger can capture the runs only 999 times. For example,
the last row in Figure 6.7 expresses when the logger cannot capture the 1000th
run of the read application. Thus the last row is one miss. It is unacceptable if
the logger cannot capture the 1000 running times. This is because the captured
information of any run of the read application can be very important evidence that
may be used in law courts. Thus, from the figure, the number of overall misses is
four (record numbers 2, 998, 999, and the last row). All accuracy results of the
proposed logging system will be presented and discussed in Section 6.5.6.
6.5.5 Running the experiment to collect accuracy of the
logger
This section explains how to run the experiment to collect the accuracy of the
logger.
Section 6.5.3 has already discussed the design and set-up of the logger, and
read and read_invoker applications to perform the accuracy measurement. Sec-
tion 6.5.4 then explains how to collect hits and misses. To perform the ex-
periment, the logger (Figure 6.8, the black highlight) will be started before
read_invoker (Figure 6.9, the black highlight), and this is one experiment set. To
Figure 6.8: To run the logger in dom0
collect the average accuracy of a particular sleep time such as 100 milliseconds,
we run each experiment set for ten times for each sleeping time setting, then the
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Figure 6.9: To run the read_invoker application in domU
average accuracy from these ten times is calculated and collected. The sleeping
time intervals are set to vary from 100 to 0 to find the least time (in milliseconds)
that the read application needs to sleep for after finishing reading a file and before
closing the file. This will be discussed in Section 6.5.6, along with the results.
6.5.6 Results for accuracy of the proposed logging system
This section reveals the results of the accuracy of our proposed logging system,
and presents a discussion of the results. Then, it demonstrates the decreasing
trend of the accuracy of the logger, and the resulting discussion.
6.5.6.1 The accuracy is 100% when the read application accesses a
file for at least 65 milliseconds
The results show that the optimum sleep time is 65 milliseconds for the read
application. This implies that the accuracy of the proposed logging system is
100% when any application in domU accesses (opening a file until closing the
file) a file for at least 65 milliseconds. Figure 6.10 is the graph of the result.
From the graph, when the sleeping times are from 80 to 65 milliseconds, the
accuracy is 100%.
However, the first time that the accuracy is less than 100% (99.98%) is when
the sleeping time is 64 milliseconds. Thus, the minimum least sleeping time for
the accuracy to be 100% is 65 milliseconds, see the dotted line. The accuracy
decreases as the sleeping time moves from 64 until 59 milliseconds. However, the
accuracy in this interval is only marginally different. It decreases from 99.99%, to
99.95%. The next graph presents the trend of the decreasing accuracy when the
sleeping time is set from 100 to 0 milliseconds with the reduction of 10 milliseconds
each time, in Section 6.5.6.2.
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To improve the accuracy, the logger process can be run in dedicated CPUs.
Ideally, if we double the CPU number, the sleeping time needed to get 100% accu-
racy should be decreased by half such as from 65 milliseconds to 32.5 milliseconds.
However, we did not test this doubling approach.
Figure 6.10: A graph showing the accuracy of the proposed logging system in captur-
ing log information from domU
6.5.6.2 Decreasing trend of the accuracy of the logger
In order to present the decreasing trend of the accuracy, we set up the sleeping
time intervals from 100 to 0 milliseconds with the reduction of 10 milliseconds
for each experiment set. The second graph (Figure 6.11) presents the decreasing
trend of the accuracy for the proposed logging system in capturing log information
from domU. From the graph, the logger yields 100% of the accuracy when the read
application sleeping time is from 100 to 70 milliseconds. The accuracy is 99.98%,
99.99%, and, 93.98% when the sleeping times are 60, 50, and 40 milliseconds
respectively.
The accuracy sharply decreases from 93.98% to 31.75% (see the dotted lines)
when the sleeping time is changed from 40 to 30 milliseconds. From the experi-
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Figure 6.11: A graph showing the accuracy of the proposed logging system in captur-
ing log information from domU
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ment, starting from the 30 milliseconds until 0 millisecond, the logger seems to be
halted. This may be because of the loop in the logger, used to traverse the pro-
cesses list (Figure 5.5), is not fast enough. Thus, it should be possible to increase
the speed of the loop by running the logger on dedicated CPUs in a multi-core
system. However, this issue is out of the scope of this thesis, and needs further
investigation for clarification. Note that, when the sleeping time is 0, the read
application runs without suspension for experiment. It is an actual running of
the read application.
6.5.7 Summary
This section provides the performance measurement of our proposed logging sys-
tem in terms of its accuracy in capturing logging information from a target virtual
machine or domU. The system has 100% accuracy when an application in a target
domU accesses a file for at least 65 milliseconds. To improve the accuracy, the
logger process can be run via dedicated CPUs.
A benchmark of accessing times to access a file can be how many milliseconds
that an application spends to access, open, read, write, or close its database file.
This benchmark can be difficult to measure. This may be because the benchmark
measurement can be heavily related to hardware specific of domUs. A hardware
specific qualities can be different from domU to domU. This specification can be:
storage (e.g., a solid state drive or SSD, or hard disk drive or HDD) of a file
such as s.txt; the amount of main memory; the system load; size of the file; the
file system in use (e.g. Linux third extended file system or ext3, or Microsoft
Windows NTFS), CPU speed; and so on. We did not find such benchmark to
compare with the minimum sleeping time for the measurement result which is 65
milliseconds.
Thus, we cannot compare the results to a benchmark of the average time taken
for an application to access a file. However, the results can be a basis to clarify
the ability of the logger in capturing the log information. This clarification may
be used as a guideline to efficiently and appropriately design, implement, and
deploy logging systems. As a result, this can truly enable the logging systems to
work in real world cloud production systems.
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6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has addressed three research gaps. The first one or research Gap
1 (b) is the lack of concern for reducing the trusted computing base or TCB
size of a logging system. The second one or research Gap 2 is an issue that
research relating to logging in IaaS only focuses on system-centric logs which
is the hardware layer log, such as memory use, disk storage, temperature, and
voltage. The third research gap or research Gap 3 is a lack of analysis of what
the contents of the log file should actually be, and of how the contents can be
used to deal with the real world CSA threats to benefit both sides in detail.
The chapter has three main contributions. Firstly, the design of our proposed
logging system yields TCB size compared to previous work. This contribution
addresses Gap 1 (b). All logging related components (an introspection tool that
we have re-used and a logger application) that have been deployed in building
the proposed logging system in this chapter are inside dom0.
The TCB size of a logging system can be compared to a TCB size of another
logging system, as discussed in Section 3.5.2.8. For example, a TCB size of a
logging system, which includes all components (hw, a hypervisor, dom0, and
domU) is bigger than a TCB size of another logging system, which includes only
hw, a hypervisor, and dom0. The TCB size of our architecture includes only a
hypervisor and dom0, not domU. In contrast, previous works have placed some of
their logging-related components in domU; thus, the TCBs of their systems have
to include domU in addition to a hypervisor and dom0. Other previous work
that have deployed the same introspection tool as in this chapter yields the same
TCB as ours. However, they are not designed to log the history of critical files.
Secondly, our system collect file-centric logs rather than system-centric logs.
This contribution addresses research Gap 2. The prototype implementation of
the proposed logging system can be an alternative to collect file-centric logs to
enhance accountability in IaaS by domU's VM memory introspection approach
(by traversing the domU kernel file structures from dom0).
Moreover, the file-centric history logs can be associated with a process and
files in a domU, for example, a record of a process P which reads file F. The
proposed log files differ from previous work which focus only on system-centric
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logs (e.g., the connection topology, bus speeds, and processor loads).
Lastly, this chapter has presented how the results from the proposed logging
system can assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 with nine in-
cident scenarios. This contribution addresses research Gap 3. These scenarios
illustrate how the results from the implementation can be used to form the his-
tory of critical files which can be used to assist in mitigating risks associated with
CSA threat 1 for a customer when the customer is the only user in the domU or
if she shares the domU with many users. We then discussed how the results can
help to form process behaviour log files to assist in mitigating the risks associated
with threat 1 to benefit providers. This discussion included how the process logs
can be used to investigate the causes when a dom0 is compromised, and when
attackers use domUs for spamming activities.
Thus, with systematic approaches, this shows that our proposed solutions can
assist in mitigating the risks associated with real world IaaS issues and many
scenarios. The proposed solutions also benefit both customers and providers.
The next chapter briefly summarises the contributions of this thesis and de-
scribes some threads of potential future work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) is a base for other types of cloud, and is increas-
ingly being used by individuals and organisations. Accountability that consisting
of logging systems as a core is necessary to build trust.
However, previous work that relate to logging/accountability for IaaS has
the following research gaps. The first research gap or Gap 1 is a lack of
systematic approaches to building logging systems in IaaS. This includes the lack
of simultaneous consideration of both customers and providers or Gap 1(a); the
lack of concerns for reducing the trusted computing base or TCB size of a logging
system or Gap 1(b); and the lack of security analysis of the logging systems
themselves before the deployment of the systems or Gap 1(c).
The second research gap or Gap 2 is that work that relates to logging in
IaaS only focuses on system-centric logs (which are usually disclosed to consumers
e.g., disk storage or temperature) rather than file-centric logs such as tracing
customers' files in VMs from the time they are created to the time they are
deleted. The third research gap Gap 3 is the lack of analysis of what the
contents of the log file should actually be, and how the contents can be used to
deal with the real world CSA threats to benefit both sides in detail. The last
research gap or Gap 4 is that lack of descriptions of logging systems in the
context of a design pattern of the systems' components.
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The aim of this thesis has been to provide support for accountability in
the cloud with systematic approaches to mitigate the risks associated
with real world CSA threats, to benefit both customers and providers.
To achieve this aim, the project has satisfied the objectives listed below.
• Objective 1: understand the real world cloud problems (the CSA threats),
and accountability with logging approaches in the IaaS
• Objective 2: design a generic framework of logging solutions to mitigate the
risks associated with the CSA threats
• Objective 3: define, identify, and draw conclusions on the advantages and
disadvantages of logging system patterns, then analyses existing works in
relation to the patterns
• Objective 4: design and implement logging systems based on the generic
framework from Objective 2 and the identified patterns from Objective 3
to mitigate risks associated with a specific threat (threat 1 which is abuse
and nefarious use of cloud computing, for example when cloud customers
rent VMs then use these VMs to conduct criminal activities), and to the
benefit of both cloud customers and providers
• Objective 5: evaluate the proposed generic framework from Objective 2,
and the proposed logging systems from Objective 4
We evaluate the framework by demonstrating instantiations of logging so-
lutions to deal with CSA threat 1 in Chapter 3 (the spamming case study)
and in Chapter 6 (a proposed logging system to benefit both customers and
providers). We then evaluated the performance of the proposed logging
system in terms of the accuracy of the systems in Chapter 6.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1.1 provides
a summary of the contributions of this thesis. Finally, future work relating to
this thesis is discussed in Section 7.2.
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7.1.1 Summary Of Contributions
This thesis provides a number of key contributions to address the research gaps,
and to satisfy the aim and the objectives stated above:
1. An in-depth background and literature review of CSA threats and
systematic support for accountability
This contribution addresses research Gap 1. This background and liter-
ature review summarises the key concepts of IaaS, CSA threats to IaaS,
accountability/logging approaches to mitigate the risks and the problems
of the approaches, and systematic support for accountability in the cloud.
This summary differs from previous work which focus on dealing with cloud
problems without full consideration of the main involved/systematic as-
pects necessary to provide logging systems. For example, previous works
do not fully discuss the security analysis of logging systems themselves
before deploying them into the real world IaaS productions. Without ad-
equate consideration of the systematic aspects, it is difficult to efficiently
and effectively enable logging systems.
The value of the systematic approach is to provide a clear vision of the
logging system's development in the cloud, such as the security analysis
of the systems. Subsequently, the systematic approach can efficiently and
effectively enable accountability in the cloud. Accountability in the cloud is
an important concept to assist in mitigating the risks associated with CSA
threats.
2. Generic logging components for IaaS cloud
This contribution addresses research Gap 1 (c). To facilitate systematic
support for accountability in the cloud, these generic logging components
provide ways to build logging systems. The value of the generic logging
components are to encompass all possible instantiations of logging solutions
for IaaS cloud, and to provide a clear view of all components that relate to
logging systems in IaaS. This view provides a basis for the analysis of the
logging systems' security before their deployment.
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Thus, the generic logging components enable logging systems to be appro-
priately designed or manipulated by participating cloud parties (a provider,
customer, or auditor). As as result, this enhances systematic support for
accountability in the could.
3. Analysis of how CSA threat 1 affects both customers and providers
simultaneously; and the proposed logging solutions to assist in
mitigating the risks associated with the threat for both
This contribution addresses research Gap 1 (a). The analysis illustrates how
CSA threat 1 such as mis-usage of customer VMs can affect both sides. This
analysis differs from previous work which usually concern the effects of the
threats to only either the customer or provider, providing solutions for either
side, but not for both.
The value of the combined analysis is to provide a basis to understand what
contents logging solutions need to collect to be used as evidence to deal with
threat 1 for both customers and providers.
4. The design of our proposed logging system yields a smaller trusted
computing base or TCB size compared to previous work
This contribution is that the size of the TCB for the design of our proposed
logging system is smaller than TCB sizes of the proposed logging systems
of previous works. This contribution addresses research Gap 1 (b).
All logging related components (such as an introspection tool and a logger
application) which were deployed in building the proposed logging system
are inside dom0. Thus, the proposed system in our prototype implementa-
tion yields a smaller TCB while obtaining the history of critical files. This is
because the TCB of our architecture includes only a hypervisor and dom0,
not a customer VM. In contrast, previous works have placed some of their
logging related components in the customer VM. Other previous work that
deploy the same introspection tool as we have re-used yield the same TCB
as ours. However, they are not designed to obtain the history of critical
files.
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5. Collecting file-centric logs rather than system-centric logs
This contribution is that our proposed logging solutions focus on collecting
file-centric logs rather than system-centric logs. This is because research
Gap 2 states that current logging research in the cloud focuses on system-
centric logs rather than file-centric logs.
There are some logging solutions that emphasise file-centric logs with an
interception approach. However, the prototype implementation of the pro-
posed logging system can be an alternative approach to collect file-centric
logs to enhance accountability in IaaS. This approach is the introspection
of the customer VM's memory from dom0. The introspection traverses the
kernel data structures in the memory.
The prototype implementation of the proposed logging solutions can collect
file-centric log history of customers' critical files. The history information is
composed of file-centric logs rather than system-centric logs. The file-centric
logs can present associations between a process and files in a customer VM,
for example, a record of a process P which reads file F. The proposed log
files differ from previous work which focus only on system-centric logs such
as the connection topology, bus speeds, and processor loads.
6. Presentation of how the results from the proposed logging system
assist in mitigating the risks associated with CSA threat 1
This contribution is that we provide many scenarios to present how the
results from the prototype implementation can be used to form log files to
assist in mitigating the risks associated with CSA threat 1 to benefit both
customers and providers. This contribution addresses research Gap 3.
To assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 to benefit cus-
tomers, we discuss the formation of the history of critical files from the
results of the prototype implementation. This includes analysing nine sce-
narios of malicious incidents in a customer VM when, for example, a cus-
tomer shares her VM with other users.
To assist in mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 (e.g., when crim-
inals use VMs to conduct spamming activities) to benefit providers, we
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discuss formation of the process behaviour log files. This shows that our
proposed solutions can assist in mitigating the risks associated with real
world IaaS issues and many scenarios, and to benefit both customers and
providers.
7. Three proposed design patterns in the context of logging in IaaS
cloud
This contribution addresses research Gap 4. The proposed patterns facil-
itate analysis of logging systems in terms of their quality. These patterns
could increase reusability of the design and development of logging sys-
tems. Designers should access these patterns more easily. The patterns
could assist a designer adopts design approaches which make a logging sys-
tem reusable and not to choose approaches which do not concern reusability
concepts. They can enhance the documentation and maintenance of exist-
ing logging systems.
We provide a spectrum of patterns for describing how to construct log-
ging systems with varying characteristics. For developers when building a
logging system, the knowledge of characteristics of this system could as-
sist them to get the right design of the system with minimal effort and
time commitments. We also clarify why a number of patterns and logging
system architectures based on these patterns are missing. To the best of
our knowledge, these three logging patterns are not yet described in the
literature.
7.2 Future work
The research work presented in this thesis provides a basis for a number of po-
tential related future works as listed below:
1. The accountability within logging system approaches in this dis-
sertation enables systematic support for accountability to assist
in mitigating risks associated with threat 1 for PaaS for both cus-
tomers and providers
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PaaS provides a solution stack and computing platform to assist in prepa-
ration of applications with the low cost and simplicity of purchasing and
managing the fundamental hardware and software, and provisioning host-
ing capabilities [22]. This includes supporting all processes of development
and deployment of web applications and services fully available from the
Internet [22]. An example of PaaS is the Google App Engine which can
also be considered as a web application hosting service [149]. Although
this thesis focuses on dealing with the CSA threats to IaaS, these threats
present issues for the security of PaaS as well [23].
The layers of PaaS infrastructure are more complicated than the layers
of IaaS infrastructure, as agreed by [22; 46; 91] and discussed in Sec-
tion 3.5.2.1. However, the accountability within logging system approaches
in this dissertation should allow the combat of the threats for PaaS. To
apply the accountability approaches to mitigate the risks associated with
CSA threats for PaaS, as we do for IaaS in this thesis, may be achieved via
the following two steps:
• Step 1: Creating generic logging components for PaaS
PaaS can always be built up by adding extra layers on top of IaaS layers
as discussed in the beginning of Section 2.2. Therefore, comprehension
of our proposed generic logging components and of logging systems in
IaaS could also assist in mitigating the risks associated with the CSA
threats applicable to the security of PaaS.
For example, in [22], integration and middleware layer can be added
on top of IaaS to build up PaaS; thus, it is possible that ones can
add extra layers on top of our proposed generic logging components to
create such components for PaaS.
We could then considerer the possible and appropriate locations of
logging processes or Px and log files or Fy in these new PaaS generic
logging components. These locations of Px and Fy in PaaS architec-
ture could affect their security concerns similar as we discussed (in
Section 3.5.2.1) for our generic logging components for IaaS in this
thesis. Thus, these new generic logging components can be a tool to
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enable systematic support for accountability in the PaaS cloud.
• Step 2: Applying the history of customer's critical files to assist in
mitigating the risks associated with threat 1 in PaaS to benefit both
sides
Following development of the new generic logging components (dis-
cussed in Step 1 above) for PaaS as a tool to enable systematic sup-
port for accountability in PaaS cloud, the lists below are a discussion
of applying the history of customers' critical files to assist in mitigating
the risks associated with threat 1 in PaaS to benefit both sides. The
application is similar to the one carried out in this thesis for IaaS.
 Customer's critical files in PaaS provider's servers
To provide accountability for PaaS is difficult. However, there are
many customers' critical files in the provider servers. Theses files
can be customer's business web application codes and database
files. The database files (called datastore [150]) are provided by
Google for the customers. All mentioned customers' valuable crit-
ical files are in the provider's servers. These files may be accessed
without permission, by attackers caused by threat 1. This threat
such as mis-using customer VMs is also relevant for the security
of PaaS [23]. Thus, it is important to deal with this.
 Threat 1 can effects both customers and providers in the PaaS
environment
Threat 1 can effect security concerns from both provider and
customer perspective. For example, from the provider perspec-
tives, [23] state that PaaS providers have traditionally suffered
most from spammer, and malicious code authors, and other crim-
inals have been able to conduct their activities with relative im-
punity.
The threat can also affect the PaaS customers. For example, it is
also possible that criminals may use PaaS to attack other PaaS
users or the providers. For example, in order to use PaaS, cus-
tomers have to upload web application codes to the provider's
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severs which may potentially be shared among many customers;
thus, it is possible that malicious customers may upload the codes
for the purposes of compromising other customer web applications
or the provider's PaaS management systems, similar to the inci-
dents in IaaS discussed in Section 2.5.
 History of the critical files can mitigate the risks associated with
threat 1 in PaaS to the benefit of both sides
It is difficult to deal with threat 1 for PaaS. However, PaaS can be
built up by adding extra layers on top of IaaS layers as discussed in
the beginning of Section 2.2. Thus, comprehension of the generic
logging components and use of the history of customer's critical
files for IaaS, demonstrated in this thesis, can be a guild line in
mitigating the risks for PaaS. For example, after the customers
upload their web application codes to provider's severs, it is possi-
ble to track the history of critical files as we did in this thesis. This
may be achieved by placing loggers in PaaS management systems.
2. Performance Analysis of Logging Systems Which are Based on
the Generic Logging Components
This thesis presents only an example of how to analyse the security of a new
logging architecture itself before deployment, in Section 3.4.2.4. However,
in the complex IaaS environment, performance of the new built logging
system could also be a critical factor that needs to be thoroughly anal-
ysed before deployment. For example, from the generic logging components
(Figure 3.1), the performance of a logging system that deploys P2 in dom0
kernel, and of one that deploys P3 in domU kernel, should be different and
needs to be considered before deployment. With knowledge of the locations
of Px in the newly built logging system architecture, made clear by using
the generic logging components, the system's performance analysis could
be feasible. We believe that the generic logging components may be seen as
a preliminary study to eventually achieve a complete analysis of the newly
built logging systems, based on all possible aspects, such as security and
performance.
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3. To build tools for support of file-centric logging in the cloud using
introspection approaches
From the introspection logging approaches presented in this thesis, one of
the potential related future works is to build tools to support file-centric
logging (e.g., the history of critical files and process behaviour logs) for the
purposes of accountability in the cloud. These tools should facilitate logging
in the cloud with the introspection approaches. The tools can be an app0 or
a library in the dom0 user level. The logger in this thesis can be considered
as one of the primary elements to build the tools. In order to record the
history of critical files and process behaviour logs of a target domU from
dom0 using the introspection approaches, the tools should allow their users
to specify essential configuration parameters, for example, an id or name of
the target domU, and target critical files or processes in the target domU.
4. To apply the logging approaches in this dissertation to CSA threat
2 to 7
One of the potential future works is to apply the logging approaches in this
dissertation to CSA threat 2 to 7.
This thesis provides logging solutions (the history of critical files and process
behaviour logs) to assist in mitigating the risks associated with CSA threat
1 which is abuse and nefarious use of cloud computing. However, this thesis
does not provide the solutions to alleviate CSA threats 2 to 7. Threat 2
to 7 are insecure interfaces and APIs, malicious insiders, shared technology
issues, data loss or leakage, account or service hijacking, and unknown risk
profile respectively, as discussed in Section 2.3.
The logging solutions in this thesis can be applied to threat 2 to 7. We
can consider that there are two common aspects for all seven CSA threats.
Firstly, based on the customers' critical files in domUs (Section 5.2) dis-
cussed in this thesis, all threats can cause the same serious concern for
customers. This concern is undesired accesses to the customers' critical
files.
Secondly, as discussed in Section 2.6.2, for accountability, trust, and security
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in cloud computing, logs are one example of the detective controls which
act as psychological obstructions to go against policies or procedures in the
cloud [27]. Based on the logs we have proposed in this thesis, the history of
critical files and process behaviour logs in Chapter 5 and 6, these logs can
represent solutions to assist in mitigating risks associated with CSA threat
2 to 7.
These logs may not be the absolute solutions. However, they can at least
be a psychological barrier to prevent attackers going against policies or
procedures in the cloud related to all CSA threats, as discussed above. The
purpose of these logs can be seen in the same way as speed cameras serve
for traffic control; the existence of speed cameras will prevent law-abiding
persons from speeding, but the existence cannot halt speeding from taking
place [27].
Thus, one of the potential related future works is to apply the logging
approaches in this dissertation to CSA threat 2 to 7.
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